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On August 20, 2002, the secret court established by the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") did something truly remarkable.
Not only did the full FISA Court' reveal that government agents had
made "misstatements and omissions of material facts" in 75 applications
that were filed to obtain secret electronic surveillance of individuals in
the United States, the court issued a published opinion about the events
That opinion was the first ever published by the full FISA Court in its en-
tire twenty-five-year history.
In the opinion, the FISA Court revealed that it had convened a spe-
cial meeting to seek explanation from the government about "the trou-
bling number of inaccurate FBI affidavits" it submitted "in so many
FISA applications."3 The government, however, offered no explanation
why government agents had made and submitted these inaccurate affida-
vits to the FISA Court, although a government investigation was under-
way.' So troubled was the court that it even barred one FBI agent from
appearing before it again.' A few months later the government admitted
to the FISA Court that agents had made even more misrepresentations
in other affidavits. The misrepresentations were quite stark: government
agents had averred that they had applied the minimization procedures6
approved by the court that required "a 'wall' between separate intelli-
gence and criminal squads in FBI field offices to screen FISA intercepts,
i. The FISA Court is comprised of eleven district court judges appointed to serve on the court
by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. See 50 U.S.C. § 18o3(a) (2000), amended by USA
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 208, II5 Stat. 272, 283 (2001). The FISA Court is also referred to
as the FISC.
2. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d
611, 620 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002). The opinion, which is dated May 17. 2002, was not released for
publication until August 20, 2002. See Letter from Judge Kollar-Kotelly, Presiding Judge, Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Court, to Senators Patrick J. Leahy, Arlen Specter, & Charles E. Grassley, at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisco82002.html (Aug. 20, 2002).
3. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d at
620. These many misrepresentations appear to bear out the conclusions of Richard Scruggs, a federal
prosecutor, who conducted an internal review in 1993 of the office that handles FISA applications.
Scruggs found "the review process to prevent factual and legal errors was virtually nonexistent" in the
office. JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE 329 (1996) (emphasis added). Scruggs concluded that
"mistakes were being made" and the process was "untenable." Id. at 330.
4. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d at
621.
5. Id.
6. Minimization procedures are procedures "that are reasonably designed in light of the purpose
and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit
the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States per-
sons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelli-
gence information." 50 U.S.C. § i8ol(h) (2000).
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when in fact all of the FBI agents were on the same squad and all of the
screening was done by one supervisor overseeing both investigations."7
Even after the government had more than a year to identify the cause of
the problem, it still had not explained to the court "how these misrepre-
sentations occurred."8
The ruling prompted an equally remarkable response from the FISA
appellate court some six months later. The FISA Court of Review9 also
issued its first published opinion ever.'" Reversing a longstanding inter-
pretation of FISA that the lower court had followed," the court held that
FISA does not require the government to show that the "primary pur-
pose" of its requested surveillance is to gain foreign intelligence: the pri-
mary purpose of the surveillance could be to conduct a criminal
investigation, and FISA would still authorize the surveillance as long as a
significant purpose was also to gather foreign intelligence.'2 Thus, the
government is no longer obligated to follow the previous minimization
procedures that required it to keep any criminal investigation of targets
of surveillance separate from its use of FISA surveillance for foreign in-
telligence purposes." Although this latter holding has received the lion's
share of public attention, the court revealed in a footnote another star-
tling fact: apparently, the government still had not explained why it made
so many misrepresentations to the FISA Court.'4
In the end, what is most extraordinary about the FISA Court's opin-
ion is not its revelation of repeated misrepresentations made by govern-
ment agents to obtain secret surveillance of individuals in the United
States. Although it is rare for a court to find that government agents have
7. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct., 218 F. Supp. 2d at
628 (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. The FISA Court of Review is comprised of three federal judges appointed to the court by the
Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. See 50 U.S.C. § 18o3(b) (2000).
io. In re Sealed Case, 31o F.3 d 717 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). In fact, it was
the first appeal ever to reach the court because never before had the government been denied a re-
quest for FISA surveillance. The Supreme Court denied the ACLU's petitions to intervene and for a
writ of certiorari to challenge the FISA Court of Review's decision. Id., cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1615
(2003).
ii. See United States v. Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 118o, 1192 (E.D.N.Y. I982) (holding FISA search
proper "only if foreign intelligence surveillance is the Government's primary purpose"), aff'd sub
nom., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984). Accord United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d
565, 572 (1st Cir. i991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d IO67, 1075-76 (4 th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (sith Cir. 1987).
12. In re Sealed Case, 31o F.3d at 727. 735. The Court of Review held that FISA, both as
amended by the Patriot Act and as originally enacted, did not require that the primary purpose of the
FISA search be limited to foreign intelligence gathering. Id.
13. Id. at 746.
14. ld. at 729 n.i8.
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been making repeated material falsities in affidavits submitted to it,
probably no system of justice or law enforcement is immune from such
conduct. Instead, what is most extraordinary about these events is the
simple fact that we even know about them.
Although many may not be aware of it, the FISA Court is a special
court that operates virtually in total secrecy. 5 There are no open pro-
ceedings, no opportunity for the subject of an investigation to appear be-
fore the court,' and, until now, no published opinions to reveal even a
glimpse of the inner workings of the full FISA Court." People who are
the target of a FISA search may not even know it, and even if they even-
tually find out a FISA search has been used against them (usually follow-
ing an indictment), they have no right to see the affidavit the government
used to obtain the authority for conducting the FISA search.8 This con-
trasts with the procedures under the Federal Wiretap Act, which requires
notice to the target of the surveillance once it is completed 9 and which
affords defendants the right to see and contest the affidavits the govern-
ment used to obtain surveillance." Nor is there public scrutiny of what
happens behind the closed doors of the FISA Court, at least not until the
published opinion of August 20, 2002 appeared to invite such public at-
tention.
Given the shroud of secrecy that envelops nearly everything the
FISA Court does, that the FISA Court published its opinion is striking.
The court sought refuge in publishing information about potential gov-
ernment misdeeds that had occurred, up to that time, in secret. Perhaps
to underline the seriousness that the court ascribed to the issue, the court
declared its intention to publish "any [other] unclassified opinions or or-
ders in the future" in a letter to ranking senators on the Committee on
15. See 50 U.S.C. § 18o3 (2000). The court reportedly meets in a "cipher-locked, windowless, se-
cure room on the top floor of the Department of Justice." Gerald H. Robinson, We're Listening! Elec-
tronic Eavesdropping, FISA, and the Secret Court, 36 WILLAMErE L. REV. 51, 6i (2000).
i6. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1824 (ex parte orders); id. §§ 18o6(f), 1825(g) (ex parte and in camera
review of challenges to FISA searches used against criminal defendants).
I7. In the i98os, one FISA judge issued a published opinion ruling that (at the time) FISA did
not authorize physical searches of places. See Letter from Judge Kollar-Kotelly, supra note 2.
i8. See 5o U.S.C. §§ 18o6(f), 1825(g). Courts have the authority to disclose to the defendant the
government's FISA application "only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determi-
nation of the legality of the surveillance." Id. § 18o6(f). There has been no reported case in which a
court ever authorized such a disclosure of FISA material to a defendant.
i9. See i8 U.S.C. § 25 18(8)(d) (2000).
2o. See id. § 2518(9). The Federal Wiretap Act is also referred to as Title III because it was en-
acted as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-35I, 82
Stat. 197 (1968). In 1986, Congress amended federal wiretap law by passing the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act (ECPA), which restructured Title III as Title I of ECPA. See DANIEL J. SoLOVE &
MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 324 (2003).
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Intelligence.' But why? The FISA statute does not expressly authorize
the publication of opinions by the FISA Court, much less require it.22 The
court could have easily kept its opinion secret and no one in the public
would have known.
The answer lies, I believe, in the concept of the public domain, a
term that is more commonly used in the intellectual property context, but
that is no less important to areas involving government secrecy. In both
contexts, the concept of the public domain helps to establish a legal re-
straint against government overreaching by ensuring the public's access
to materials that are essential for self-governance and a learned citizenry.
By publishing its opinion and releasing it into the public domain, the
FISA Court must have been aware of the public scrutiny of the govern-
ment's conduct that would necessarily follow, particularly in our post
9/11 world. But that undoubtedly must have been one of the court's rea-
sons for publishing the opinion in the first place. It is not often that a
court discovers that government agents may have been lying to it, and
repeatedly. The government's more than one-year delay in proffering
any explanation to the FISA Court to account for the government's mis-
representations must have only added to the court's consternation. Per-
haps then it should be no surprise at all that the secret court published its
opinion. Injecting information into the public domain is the perfect anti-
dote to government abuses that are carried out by means of secrecy. The
public domain counters secrecy with public scrutiny.
This Article develops a theory to explain the concept of the public
domain, its various uses in intellectual property law and areas involving
government secrecy. While there is a firestorm of debate about the pub-
lic domain in intellectual property law, this concept has been scarcely
discussed, much less understood, in areas outside of intellectual property
law. Part of the problem with the current debate over the public domain
is that it focuses almost exclusively on intellectual property law as the
sole area in which the public domain matters. This is shortsighted. The
concept of the public domain figures prominently in other areas of law,
including First Amendment rights of access, government secrecy agree-
ments, espionage law, laws regulating classified information and muni-
tions lists, and the Freedom of Information Act-areas that I collectively
call the "government secrecy cases.
' ' 3
21. See Letter from Judge Kollar-Kotelly, supra note 2.
22. See 50 U.S.C. § 18o3(a)-(b).
23. It goes beyond the scope of this article to analyze the concept of the public domain as it ap-
plies to public lands or the environment. Other scholars have suggested comparisons. See James Boyle,
The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 33, 33-34 (2003) [hereinafter Enclosure]. The connection between the public domain in IP and
November 20031
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These various uses of the public domain raise an important question
that has been neither asked nor answered in legal scholarship: Why does
the concept of the public domain recur in so many areas of law? Put dif-
ferently, is there some common thread that ties together these various
recurring uses of public domain that will help us better understand why
the concept is recognized in the first place? To my knowledge, no court
has ever considered these issues, at least not squarely in a published
opinion. Even more surprisingly, nor has anyone in legal scholarship.
Most legal scholarship about the public domain comes from the intellec-
tual property circle, of which I must confess I am a part. The scholarship
here has largely thrown blinders on to uses of the concept of the public
domain in areas outside of intellectual property. This Article aims to cor-
rect this myopia.
My theory is elaborated in four parts. Part I examines the various
uses of the public domain in intellectual property (IP) law. The focus of
this Part is historical. I trace the origin of the term "public domain" and
its development from the related concepts of publici juris ("of public
right") and public property. As originally understood, the public domain
is the "domain of things public," meaning the domain of all things be-
longing to the people as a matter of public right, a notion that traces back
to the very concept of a republic (res publicae).
Part II examines the various uses of the public domain outside of IP,
in the areas of law involving government secrecy. I show how these cases
also recognize the public domain as a restraint on the government's
power to control public access.
Part III then provides a unified theory of the public domain. Using
evolution theory as a framework, Part III explains how all of the uses of
the public domain in IP and the government secrecy cases have a parallel
origin, structure, and function. This doctrinal parallelism does not neces-
sarily mean that the public domain in IP is exactly the same as the public
domain in government secrecy cases. Instead, the doctrinal parallelism
indicates the relatedness of the doctrines. In both areas the concept im-
poses a legal restraint on the government's ability to restrict the free flow
of information, ideas, or materials. It does so by a simple mechanism: ac-
cording each person a right of unrestricted access to or common owner-
ship of material in the public domain. In at least some instances, this
restraint is constitutionally based. Properly understood, the public do-
the public domain in government secrecy cases, however, has largely gone unexamined-a fact that is
surprising given the closer connection between the uses of the public domain in IP and government
secrecy cases, which both deal with information and knowledge. The public goods nature of such in-
formational goods is absent in the case of land. Unlike land, information is a resource that is difficult
to exhaust through use among people and difficult to exclude people from using after its disclosure.
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main is the public's domain, meaning that it is off-limits to government
control.
Part IV applies my theory to practice. Drawing from both Bruce Ac-
kerman's theory of "constitutional moments" and punctuated equilib-
rium theory from evolution, Part IV makes the case for why the public
domain is now in threat of extinction. Just as in nature, where superior
organisms that are best suited for the environment may become extinct
in a catastrophic moment, so too in law catastrophes may cause the ex-
tinction of superior doctrines that are best suited for democratic govern-
ance. In either case, the cause of extinction is the same: the catastrophe
imposes "different rules" that make it impossible for the organism's or
doctrine's continued survival. Examining the government's recent expan-
sions of copyright law, its greater use of government secrecy post-9/I i,
and its assertion of the extraordinary power to remove thousands of
works from the public domain, this Article concludes by suggesting how
"different rules" may be jeopardizing the continued viability of the doc-
trine of the public domain.
I. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The public domain is now the focus of an intense public debate, pre-
cipitated in large part by the Eldred case24 and growing concerns over the
scope of IP. No longer is the concept just for legal scholars to discuss; the
public too has an interest. But much of the recent debate over the public
domain has been waged without a firm understanding of the origin of the
concept. There is a danger that the public domain may well become noth-
ing more than an empty abstraction, debated but little understood.25 This
Part attempts to address this problem by tracing the development of the
concept of the public domain in intellectual property law. Revealed is a
conception of the public domain as a restraint against the government's
power to grant monopolies that operated by a simple mechanism: what
was considered off-limits to the government's power to grant intellectual
24. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003) (holding that Copyright Term Extension Act's
twenty-year term extension of subsisting copyrights is constitutional). See, e.g., Shannon McCaffrey,
Battle Over Public Domain, THE MIAMI HERALD, Oct. to. 2002, at I; Warren Richey, High Court
Weighs Best Copyright Length: Constitutional Issue Is How Long Work Can Remain Outside Public
Domain, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, Oct. 9, 2002, at 2; Joan Biskupic, Copyright Case to Determine Use
of Classic Culture; Songs, Poems, and a Famous Cartoon Mouse Could Enter Public Domain, USA
TODAY, Oct. 9, 2002, at A5. I should note that I worked on behalf of Eldred in his unsuccessful chal-
lenge.
25. David Lange, one of the first legal scholars to analyze the public domain, recognized this dan-
ger. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 177 (198I) ("[T]he
public domain tends to appear amorphous and vague, with little more of substance in it than is in-
vested in patriotic or religious slogans on paper currency.").
November 2003]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
property rights was deemed public property, to be owned and enjoyed by
all as a matter of public right.
A. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
The public domain is at the center of some of the most important in-
tellectual property controversies of our digital age." The discussion in-
volves Newsweek, 7 The New York Times , National Public Radio," and
other mainstream media. No longer is the concept a forgotten remnant in
legal scholarship;" it is now the focus of symposia,3' articles,32 and even
public interest centers.33 Spurred on by the writings and work of Law-
rence Lessig,34 Yochai Benkler,35 James Boyle, 36 and others, a grass-roots
26. Part of this (or a related) debate is sometimes waged in terms of the "commons." Although
the "commons" and the "public domain" are often used interchangeably, they are not necessarily iden-
tical. James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2003) [here-
inafter Foreword]. The word "commons" has particular prominence in the economic debate over
whether a certain resource-such as land-will be overconsumed if the rights to it are held in common
(i.e., the tragedy of the commons). There is a very rich social science literature exploring this debate,
sparked in large part by Garret Hardin's analysis in The Tragedy of the Commons, Sci., Dec. 13, 1968.
See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION (1990); MARGARET MCKEAN, MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORY, PRACTICE AND POLICY
(David Bromley et al. eds., 1992); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). It goes beyond the scope of this Article to
provide a full exegesis of the term "commons." See generally Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas,
Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. I I I.
115-I8 (2003) (discussing various notions of "commons"). I focus on the public domain because I wish
to analyze the legal term that courts have adopted. The public domain is an example of a commons,
but other types of commons exist outside of the public domain. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE Fu-
TURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 20 (2OO) (listing examples of dif-
ferent commons); Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23, at 65 (discussing open source software as a
commons for software).
27. E.g., Steven Levy, Glitterati vs. Geeks, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2002, at 40.
28. E.g., Amy Harmon, Case Could Shift Balance in Debate on Public Domain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 2002, at C7.
29. The Connection, The Public Domain on Stand, available at http://www.theconnection.org
(National Public Radio, Aug. 28, 2003).
30. As Lange noted in i98I, "[r]emarkably little direct attention has been paid to the public do-
main in recent years; there seems to have been no extended treatment of the subject on its own
terms." Lange, supra note 25, at I5o n.20.
31. Duke Law School, Conference on the Public Domain, at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd. Most of
the articles presented at the conference were later published in The Public Domain, 66 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003), http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (collecting articles).
32. See, e.g., Symposium, The Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003); Edward
Samuels, The Public Domain Revisited, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 389 (2002); R. Polk Wagner, Information
Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2o3).
33. See Center for the Public Domain, at http://www.centerforthepublicdomain.org.
34- See LESSIG, supra note 26.
35. See Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003) [hereinafter Looking Glass]; Yochai
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movement appears to be forming to help bring greater scrutiny to laws
that effectuate an "enclosure" of the public domain. The movement has
even led to the introduction of a bill in Congress entitled the Public Do-
main Enhancement Act that aims to allow many older copyrighted works
that are no longer commercially valuable to fall into the public domain
sooner than their lengthy term of copyright, so the public can benefit
from these underutilized works.37
But there is an equally, if not more, powerful counter-movement led
by the movie and recording industries that contends that Congress can
diminish the public domain without restraint through the grant or expan-
sion of IP rights. To Jack Valenti, the president of the Motion Picture
Association of America, the public domain contains old, neglected mate-
rials that people have no incentive to cultivate.38
The government has taken a clear side in this debate, asserting in
litigation that Congress has the power to remove material from the pub-
lic domain through the grant of IP rights.39 In the government's view, the
fact that works have been in the public domain for many years has no
constitutional significance at all; Congress is free to grant exclusive rights
over these works thereby removing them from the public domain. This
view is, I believe, untenable, based on the original understanding of the
public domain.
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (I999) [hereinafter Free as the Air].
36. See Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23.
37. A copyrighted work would fall into the public domain if the copyright owner fails to pay a $i
fee in the 5oth year of the copyright term. Public Domain Enhancement Act. H.R. 26oi, io8th Cong.
(2003).
38. All Things Considered (National Public Radio, Jan. I5, 2003) (statement of Jack Valenti)
("Now if nobody owns it and anybody can use it, where is the incentive to keep that particular piece of
film ... in the best condition? The answer is, there's no incentive."); Sabra Chartrand, To Some, Glob-
alization, Not Corporate Lobbying, Is the Real Reason Copyrights Are Growing in Power, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2002, at C6 (quoting Jack Valenti) ("I'm not saying the public domain is bad, [blut how does it
benefit the consumer?").
39. See Def. Mem. in Supp. of Def. Renewed Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon
Which Relief Can Be Granted, Golan v. Ashcroft, No. oi-B-i854, at 8-14, 25 (D. Colo. filed Apr. 30,
2003).
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B. THE ORIGIN OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS A LEGAL CONCEPT
What is missing from today's debate about the public domain is a
clear understanding of its origin. Much of the legal scholarship about the
public domain gives the misimpression that the concept is largely, if not
entirely, a late twentieth-century creation. Starting with David Lange's
influential work in I98i40 and extending to recent scholarship,4' the focus
has largely been on sources from the last half of the twentieth century.
While several legal scholars have brought increased attention to the early
development of the concept of the public domain,4" none thus far has
traced its lineage in court cases in the United States.
This section attempts to fill the gap in legal scholarship by analyzing
some of the leading cases in the early development of the concept of the
public domain. 3 These cases show that the concept of the public domain
establishes a limit on government power. As the concept was first recog-
nized in the United States, the public domain embodied affirmative
rights of the public to the unrestricted access and use of public domain
material. These rights were encapsulated in the twin concepts of publici
juris ("of public right") and public ownership (or public property), both
of which eventually coalesced into the general rubric of the public do-
main, meaning the domain of things belonging to the public. Under this
conception, the public domain embodies more than simply what is left
unprotected by intellectual property law: it demarcates constitutional
limits on the government's power to grant IP rights in terms of both (i)
their duration and (2) their subject matter.
40. Lange expressly confined his research to "public domain-oriented writings back to 1964."
Lange, supra note 25, at 151 n.20.
41. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 32; Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23.
42. Both Wendy Gordon and Malla Pollack have analyzed Lockean notions of property, particu-
larly common property or the common, to explain the public domain. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Prop-
erty Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1599-72 (1993); Malla Pollack, The Owned Public Domain: The Constitutional
Right Not to Be Excluded-Or the Supreme Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v. Na-
tional Biscuit Co., 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265 (2000). Mark Rose has analyzed the eighteenth-
century development of the concept of the public domain stemming from the creation of copyright law
in England. See Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric
of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2003) [hereinafter Nine-Tenths]. Carol Rose has
discussed Roman concepts of public property in analyzing the public domain. See Carol M. Rose, Ro-
mans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003) [hereinafter Romans].
43. There are far more cases recognizing the concepts of public property, publici juris, or the pub-
lic domain in the context of intellectual property than I can possibly discuss here. In my selection, I
have made judgment calls about the importance of the case based primarily on (i) whether it is the
first-reported federal court decision recognizing the term, (2) the court deciding the case, and (3) the
depth of the discussion.
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i. The Public Domain as a Limit to Intellectual
Property's Duration
The first limit established by the public domain occurs at the mo-
ment the intellectual property protection expires. For copyrights and
patents, this occurs at the end of a specified term of protection set by
Congress. For trademark, it comes when the trademark becomes generic,
while for trade secrets when the secret becomes public. At each of these
moments of expiration, the material that was once protected by intellec-
tual property is said to "fall into" the public domain.' The public domain
thus represents the final resting place for material whose IP protection
has expired. Once material reaches the public domain through the expiry
of IP protection, the public domain acts as a bar to prevent the govern-
ment from continued application of IP protection to that material.
a. The Webster's Dictionary Case: Recognizing
Publici Juris and Public Property as a Limit
The public domain's operation as a limit on government power was
recognized in the Webster's Dictionary case, which raised the question
whether the copyrighted work Webster's Dictionary could receive
trademark protection even after the term of the copyright for the dic-
tionary expired."a In practical terms, if trademark protection in "Web-
ster's" survived the expired copyright, G. & C. Merriam Co., the owner
of the expired copyright, could prevent others from copying its dictionary
by the name by which the public had known it. Merriam had a huge fi-
nancial interest in seeking to extend intellectual property protection for
its dictionary as long as and in any way it could.
Justice Miller, who was one of the most influential early justices on
copyright law, 46 rejected such an extension. Relying on the concept of
44. Determining when material has fallen into the public domain becomes more complicated if
several forms of IP protection exist concurrently for the same material. For example, a person could
conceivably get both patent and copyright protection for computer software, in which case the expiry
of the shorter term of patent would not inject the material into the public domain while the copyright
was still in effect. Because the Copyright Clause limits the duration of both patent and copyright, how-
ever, the eventual entry of the material into the public domain is assured. The more difficult scenario
involves a patented invention or copyrighted work that also is trademarked in some respect. Because
federal trademark law derives from Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, trademark law
does not contain a "limited times" requirement. Thus, the question is whether the material whose pat-
ent or copyright expired could nevertheless claim trademark protection indefinitely to keep the mate-
rial out of the public domain. As discussed below, such an extension of IP rights over material whose
patent or copyright has already expired is impermissible, at least when it has the effect of denying the
public the full enjoyment of the underlying material.
45. See Merriam v. Holloway Publ'g Co., 43 F. 450,450 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 189o).
46. Justice Miller was responsible for writing some of the Court's most important early copyright
cases, which are still influential today. See In re Trade-Mark Cases, too U.S. 82 (1879); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, i i i U.S. 53 (1884).
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public property, Justice Miller recognized a limit to the government's
power to grant IP rights:
[T]his proceeding is an attempt to establish the doctrine that a party
who has had the copyright of a book until it has expired, may continue
that monopoly indefinitely, under the pretense that it is protected by a
trade-mark or something of that sort. I do not believe in any such doc-
trine, nor do my associates. When a man takes out a copyright, for any
of his writings or works, he impliedly agrees that, at the expiration of
that copyright, such writings or works shall go to the public and become
public property. I may be the first to announce that doctrine, but I an-
nounce it without any hesitation.... The copyright law gives an author
or proprietor a monopoly of the sale of his writings for a definite pe-
riod, but the grant of a monopoly implies that, after the monopoly has
expired, the public shall be entitled ever afterwards to the unrestricted
use of the book.47
What is striking about Justice Miller's opinion is its self-assurance
and absoluteness. Justice Miller recognized "without any hesitation"
(and without citing a single authority, albeit in a case of first impression)
an absolutist conception of public property to limit the scope of intellec-
tual property. Miller's holding was absolute in duration: once a work be-
comes public property, it must remain public property "ever afterwards."
And it was absolute in scope: the expiration of the copyright to a work
entitles the public to the "unrestricted use" of it.48 Merriam, therefore,
had no right to attempt to limit the public's enjoyment of the work to the
contents without the title by which it was known to the public. The title,
along with the work, had become the public's property and therefore
could not be made for exclusive appropriation by another grant of IP.49
Although Justice Miller's opinion does not speak in terms of the
public domain, it provides the foundation for the doctrine. Before the
public domain was expressly recognized as a concept in American intel-
47. Merriam, 43 F. at 451 (emphases added).
48. The result is the converse of an author's exclusive rights. The author has exclusive rights un-
der copyright for a limited time. Once that ends, the public gains non-exclusive rights to enjoy the ma-
terial forever.
49. One qualification recognized by Justice Miller was that other subsequent publishers of Web-
ster's Dictionary could not attempt to deceive the public by claiming that Merriam had published their
publication. Merriam, 43 F. at 455. Other courts reached similar results with respect to Webster's Dic-
tionary. See, e.g., Merriam v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co., 47 F. 411, 413 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 189s) ("[Als
the copyright on that edition has expired, it has now become public property."); Merriam v. Tex. Sift-
ings Publ'g Co., 49 F. 944, 948 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Straus, 136 F. 477, 478
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (rejecting "attempt to protect literary property in the dictionaries which became
publicijuris upon the expiration of the copyrights"); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Publ'g Co., 237
U.S. 618, 622 (915).
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lectual property law," courts used the concepts of public ownership and
publici juris5" to refer to the same basic idea now embodied in the con-
cept of the public domain: the public gained affirmative rights of unre-
stricted access to and use of material once its IP protection had expired.
Early courts recognized these affirmative rights of the public by either
public property or the term publici juris, which means:
Of public right. The word "public" in this sense means pertaining to
the people, or affecting the community at large; that which concerns a
multitude of people; and the word "right," as so used, means a well-
founded claim; an interest; concern; advantage; benefit. This term, as
applied to a thing or right, means that it is open to or exercisable by all
persons. It designates things which are owned by "the public"; that is,
the entire state or community, and not by any private person. When a
thing is common property, so that any one can make use of it who
likes, it is said to be publici juris; as in the case of light, air, and public
water."
The close connection between public rights and the public domain
becomes even more apparent in the next case, which marks the first time
the Supreme Court recognized the public domain in IP law.
b. The Singer case: Recognizing the Domain of Things
Public as a Limit
In Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.," the Court faced the same ques-
tion as presented by the Webster's Dictionary case, but this time in the
patent context. Singer Manufacturing asserted a trademark claim for its
mark "Singer" even after the patents for its sewing machines had ex-
pired.'M Singer was attempting to do what Merriam had tried in the copy-
right context: extend its expired grant of monopoly over its product
through trademark law.5
5o. The use of notions of public property and public rights to limit intellectual property has roots
dating back to the Enlightenment period in England. See Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths, supra note 42, at
76-86.
51. In a related case, a circuit court rejected a similar attempt by Merriam, although this time with
express reference to the concept of publici juris: it was impermissible "to protect the literary property
in the dictionaries which became publici juris upon the expiration of the copyrights." Straus, 136 F. at
478.
52. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 199o) (emphasis added). Ownership is inherent in the
historical notion of "public." See THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE (2d ed. 1789) (defining "publickness" as the "[s]tate of belonging to the community; openness,
state of being generally known or publick").
53. 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
54- Id. at 183.
55. The Court recognized this danger. Id. at 185-86 ("[Tlhat the patentee or manufacturer could
take the benefit and advantage of the patent upon condition that at its termination the monopoly
should cease, and yet, when the end was reached, disregard the public dedication and practically per-
petuate indefinitely an exclusive right.").
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In a unanimous opinion, however, the Supreme Court rejected
Singer's argument.6 Additionally, for the very first time, the Court for-
mally recognized the concept of the public domain in IP law by explicitly
tying the notions of publici juris and public property to the concept of the
public domain. As the Court explained:
It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly cre-
ated by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly cov-
ered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition
that the patent is granted. It follows, as a matter of course, that on this
termination of the patent there passes to the public the right to make
the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the pat-
ent.... It equally follows from the cessation of the monopoly and the
falling of the patented device into the domain of things public that
along with the public ownership of the device there must also necessar-
ily pass to the public the generic designation of the thing which has
arisen during the monopoly in consequence of the designation having
been acquiesced in by the owner, either tacitly, by accepting the bene-
fits of the monopoly, or expressly by his having so connected the name
with the machine as to lend countenance to the resulting dedication. 7
In this remarkable passage, the Supreme Court introduces the concept of
the public domain, "the domain of things public," into American intellec-
tual property law.
The Court's particular phraseology, "the domain of things public,"
deserves special attention. The word order, which inverts the more typi-
cal "public domain," in fact parallels the French term, domaine public,
which both Jessica Litman and James Boyle attribute as the source for
greater usage of the term after its inclusion in the Berne Convention, a
leading international agreement governing copyright law.5 The Court's
later quotation of four French authorities on patent law that specifically
refer to the public domain is further evidence of the French influence in
the Court's derivation of the term.5 9
56. Although Singer was not entitled to prevent other manufacturers from using "Singer" to iden-
tify the sewing machines no longer under patent, the Court did recognize that other manufacturers
making "Singer" sewing machines could be required to include a label indicating themselves, not
Singer, as the manufacturer. Id. at 187.
57. Id. (emphases added).
58. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 975 n.6o (t99o); Boyle, Enclosure,
supra note 23, at 58 n.99. As Boyle notes, this lineage to the French domaine public is "somewhat
ironic," given that French law "is in many ways among the least solicitous and protective of the public
domain." Id.
59. See Singer, 163 U.S. at 186 ("Abandonment in industrial property is an act by which the public
domain originally enters or reenters into the possession of the thing (commercial name, mark or sign)
by the will of the legitimate owner.") (quoting DE MARAGY, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY) (emphasis added); id. at 196 ("But at the expiration of the patent, does the designation fall
into the public domain with the patented invention?") (quoting BRAUN, MARQUES DE FRABRIQUE, p.
232 , § 68) (emphasis added); id. at 197 ("That the denomination under which a patented article is des-
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Although the Court's phraseology parallels the French term, the
content is not exactly the same. The key difference is that the Court
specifies what this domain contains-things public. The connection to
publici juris and public property should be apparent. "Public things" are
things owned by the people, to which they have unrestricted rights. Once
something falls into the public domain (i.e., the "domain of things pub-
lic"), it is a "public thing" no longer subject to exclusive appropriation.
The Court makes this connection explicit by repeatedly recognizing the
public's rights over public property throughout the opinion. The Court
quotes at length Justice Miller's opinion in the Webster's Dictionary case
for its discussion of public property,6' as well as an English decision hold-
ing that "an invention [whose patent has expired] becomes ... entirely
publici juris" and "open to all the world to manufacture. ' '62 The Singer
decision unites these three concepts into a single doctrine, the public
domain, that limits the duration of IP rights.6 3
Like Justice Miller's opinion in Merriam, Singer is striking in its self-
assurance. Although the Court had ample supportive authorities that it
later cited and discussed, the key part of the Court's opinion rests on a
principle that the Court considered to be "self-evident," along with sev-
eral corollaries that follow "necessarily" or "as a matter of course."6' It
was self-evident to the Court that once a patent expires, "the right to
make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public prop-
erty." And one necessary consequence of the invention becoming public
property was that the public also must be able to use the name that was
used to identify the invention. The Court embraced the absolutist under-
ignated by the inventor falls into the public domain at the same time as the invention, at least when
this denomination has been drawn from common language, and does not reproduce the name of the
inventor himself.") (quoting POUILLET, BREVETS D'INVENnON, Nos. 327, 328, at 278-79) (emphasis
added); id. at I99 ("Whereas, without doubt, that methods of manufacture of a patented product fall
into the public domain after the expiration of the patent, but it is otherwise as to the name of the in-
ventor.") (quoting I DICIONARY OF DE MARAFY I I) (emphasis added).
6o. See, e.g., id. at 185 ("IThe right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes
public property."); id. ("there passes to the public the right to make the machine in the form in which
it was constructed during the patent"): id. ("[Flrom the cessation of the monopoly and the falling of
the patented device into the domain of things public that along with the public ownership of the device
there must also necessarily pass to the public the generic designation of the thing."); id. at I86 ("[tihe
public having the right, on the expiration of the patent, to make the patented article"); id. ("this right
may become public property").
61. Id. at 191.
62. Id. at 194.
63. Another interesting feature of "things public" is its similarity to the Roman concept of res
publicae (public things). Under Roman law, res publicae belonged to the public and were open to all-
things such as "roads, harbors, ports, bridges, rivers that flowed year-round, and lands immediately
adjacent thereto." Carol M. Rose, Romans, supra note 42, at 96.
64. Singer, 163 U.S. at 194.
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standing of public property and publici juris articulated by Merriam: once
something enters the public domain, it must remain there for the public's
unrestricted use.6" This was "essentially necessary to vest the public with
the full enjoyment of that which had become theirs by the disappearance
of the monopoly."66
Some may dispute whether these restraints are constitutionally
based. Singer and the Webster's Dictionary case did not specifically refer
to the Constitution in reaching their decisions.6 , It is possible to charac-
terize the decisions as pure statutory interpretation of the federal copy-
right and patent acts.
However, such a reading is less convincing. None of the statutes in-
volved contains any text that even intimates the kind of robust limitation
that Singer and the Webster's Dictionary case recognize. The Copyright
Clause does contain such text in the requirement that exclusive rights last
only for "limited Times" and in order to "promote Progress."6 What
clearly animates these decisions is the courts' fear of an extension of ex-
clusive rights for material whose "limited" term of copyright or patent
had already expired.6 The courts fashioned a doctrine in the public do-
main that would preclude this evasion of the Copyright Clause's limita-
tion, which carries an understanding that the public must have
unrestricted rights to a work following the expiry of the "limited" term of
copyright or patent.7" As shown below, the Court has used the term "pub-
lic domain" in other cases to indicate a constitutional restraint on the
government's power to grant exclusive rights. If the restraint recognized
in Singer and the Webster's Dictionary case were only statutory, it would
be hard to square with the absolutist description of the public's rights
contained in the opinions and the notion that the public has unrestricted
65. Id. at 203 (Because "the word 'Singer' .. . had become public property... it could not be
taken by the Singer Company out of the public domain by the mere fact of using that name as one of
the constituent elements of a trademark.").
66. Id. at 185.
67. Twice recently the Supreme Court has chosen to decide on statutory grounds limits to trade-
mark law for material subject to copyright and patent, while avoiding discussion of possible constitu-
tional limitations. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2048 (2003)
(Lanham Act does not require attribution of the author of work in the public domain after copyright
expired); Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (expired utility patents for
signs provided strong evidence signs were functional and not eligible for trade dress protection and
declining to discuss constitutional question).
68. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
69. See Merriam v. Holloway Publ'g Co., 43 F. 450, 45I (C.C.E.D. Mo. I89O); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185-86 (1896).
70. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 558, at 402
(Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (Copyright Clause is intended to "admit the people




rights to public domain material "ever afterwards." Were the public's
rights to the public domain only statutory, there would be no basis for
such an unqualified description of the public's rights to the public do-
main."
c. The Public Domain as a Limit to Trademarks and
Trade Secrets
In contrast with copyrights and patents, which the Copyright and
Patent Clause requires to be for "limited Times,"7 trademarks and trade
secrets do not have defined terms and can conceivably be perpetual in
duration. Yet, just as with copyrights and patents, the public domain op-
erates as a limit on the life of a trademark and trade secret. Indeed, with
these latter two forms of intellectual property, it may be even more ap-
parent that the public domain acts as a trump against IP rights, since here
the public's conduct itself can terminate the life of the IP right.
In trademark law, a mark expires when it becomes generic, such as
the words "shredded wheat," "yo-yo," "thermos," and "nylon." This
means that the public has given the mark, which once had a distinctive
secondary meaning to identify the trademark holder's goods or services,
a common usage to refer to the entire type of product, regardless of its
maker.73 The public's common usage of the mark as a generic term
trumps the trademark holder's exclusive right to use the mark only on its
products. Just as in the case of both copyright and patent law, early
courts used the concept of publici juris to indicate this ultimate limit in
trademark law.74
The public's claim on a trade secret is even more direct and immedi-
ate. While a trademark may take years to become generic, a trade secret
expires as soon as it is made public. In order to constitute a trade secret,
"[t]he subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public
knowledge ... in the trade or business."" Trade secrets lose their protec-
71. To the extent that the cases are characterized as statutory interpretation, they would at least
involve the doctrine of constitutional avoidance-with the courts avoiding the adoption of an interpre-
tation that might run afoul of the Copyright Clause and instead interpreting the patent or copyright
statute to give effect to the Clause's directives.
72. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
73. See Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 3 97, 4 04 (6th Cir. 2002).
74. See, e.g., Star Brewery Co. v. Val. Blatz Brewing Co., 36 App. D.C. 534, 537 (D.C. Ct. App.
19I 1) ("[A] word which was originally a trademark, to the exclusive use of which a particular trader, or
his successors in trade, may have been entitled, may subsequently become publici juris .... If the mark
has come to be so public and in such universal use that nobody can be deceived by the use of it, and
can be induced from the use of it to believe that he is buying the goods of the original trader.., the
right to the trademark must be gone."); Barber v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 F. 312, 318
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883) ("Where the name, trade-mark, or symbols are words publici juris, that is, words
which the public have a right to use, their use will not be enjoined.").
75. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416 U.S. 470,475 (1974).
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tion if they are disclosed or made accessible to the public through lawful
means. 6 The public domain acts as a limit on the life of any trade secret.77
The public domain's limits on trademark and trade secret law are
constitutionally based. If trademark law were interpreted to protect ge-
neric words, or trade secret law to protect public information, such an in-
terpretation would most likely result in a restriction of speech that
violates the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects the pub-
lic's right to use generic words and publicly available information that is
not protected by copyright. 75
2. The Public Domain as a Limit to the Subject Matter of
Intellectual Property
The second important limit established by the public domain is on
the subject matter of IP. This limit bars the government from granting
exclusive rights to certain subject matter deemed to be ineligible for ex-
clusive rights, and thus within the public domain. Unlike the limit estab-
lished on the duration of IP rights, the public domain here establishes a
limit that precludes the grant of IP to the material in the first instance-
public domain material is off-limits to exclusive appropriation."
a. Graham
Courts have used the term "public domain" to demarcate a constitu-
tional limit that indicates what subject matter or material cannot be made
the subject of Congress's grant of exclusive rights. In Graham, the Court
recognized:
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach
the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it
enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, ad-
76. Id. at 476.
77. Id. at 484 ("By definition a trade secret has not been placed in the public domain.").
78. See Girl Scouts of the United States v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, 8o8 F. Supp.
1112, 1118-i9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing First Amendment limits to trademark protection for
marks where there is no likelihood of confusion), affd, 996 F.2d 1477 (2d Cir. 1993); Robert N.
Kravitz, Trademarks, Speech, and the Gay Olympics Case, 69 B.U. L. REV. 131, 136 (1989) (a rule
against "plucking generic words out of the public domain and granting an individual the exclusive right
to use them prevents trademark law from severely intruding on others' freedom of expression"); Pam-
ela Samuelson, Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment 5 (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (describing First Amendment limit to applying trade secret to infor-
mation in the public domain); see also Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 219-24, 230-31 & n.370 (discussing
First Amendment limits to trademark and trade secret law).
79. The public domain's limit on the duration of IP could be characterized as a limit on subject
matter as well, in that material whose IP protection has expired can be described as a class of works
that has become ineligible for continued IP protection. I treat the duration cases as a separate category
because they involve material that did obtain IP protection at one time. The cases that I treat as sub-
ject matter cases do not involve works that received IP protection before entering the public domain.
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vancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may
not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to
the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
which by constitutional command must "promote the Progress
of... useful Arts." This is the standard expressed in the Constitution
and it may not be ignored. so
In this pivotal passage, Graham gives the public domain constitu-
tional significance: Congress may not remove knowledge from the public
domain, or restrict the public's free access to materials already available
in the public domain.8' Congress's ability to alter the public domain is
thus limited by the very grant of power under the Copyright and Patent
Clause. Implicit in the Copyright Clause is a bar against the government
attempting to restrict, by the grant of intellectual property rights, the
public's ability to freely access materials already in the public's posses-
sion.
As the Court recognized, the Copyright Clause is "both a grant of
power and a limitation ',8, that was drafted in response to the rampant
abuses of the British Crown in granting monopolies to goods that the
public had long enjoyed. 8' Elizabeth I granted monopolies for such com-
mon goods as "vinegar, bottles, brushes, starch, cards, dice, paper, [and]
salt-petre.' These monopolies were granted not out of a concern for
spurring innovation, but simply to court favorites for the Crown.'
Fear of these kinds of abuses informed the Framers' drafting of the
Copyright Clause.86 The Framers did not establish a grant of unlimited
power to Congress to grant patents or copyrights; instead, they limited
the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times the exclusive Right to Authors and Inventors to
their respective Writings and Discoveries .,5  Ultimately, the Clause is
8o. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) (emphasis added).
8i. Id. See Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23, at 59 (Graham "makes it unconstitutional under the
patent clause for Congress to privatize any portion of... [the public] domain."); see also Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (To forbid copyright would "'interfere[]
with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution and in the implementing federal
statutes, of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the
public domain."') (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234. 237 (1964)).
82. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5.
83. Id.
84. Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property
Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public's Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 45
(2ooo).
85. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6.
86. Id.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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meant to serve the public18 and to ensure that the public enjoys unre-
stricted access to sources of learning-the foundation for "progress."9 To
that end, the Clause forbids the removal of material from the public do-
main through the grant of copyrights or patents.
The principles enunciated in Graham have roots tracing back to one
of the earliest federal court opinions to interpret the Clause. In 1826, in
Thompson v. Haight,' the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New
York held that the patent for an "improved" process of manufacturing
carpeting was invalid because the invention was not novel. Under the
Patent Code in force at the time, patents were issued without any exami-
nation,9' which not surprisingly led to a proliferation of patents, many ob-
tained for the same or similar inventions,92 as was the case with the old
invention in Thompson.3
As the Graham Court would 140 years later, the circuit court in
Thompson did not rest its opinion solely on a statutory basis. The court
felt obliged to explain why the Copyright Clause would not permit the
grant of a patent to inventions lacking in novelty or already enjoyed by
the public.' Like Graham, the Thompson decision turns to the patent
abuses in England for its understanding of the Framers' intent. The Stat-
ute of Monopolies provided a model for the Framers in the United
States, 95 as it was enacted to curb the excesses of the British monarchy in
granting monopolies over common goods. 6 The Thompson court also
foreshadowed the Graham Court's admonition that Congress may not
"remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or ... restrict free
access to materials already available."97 But the slight variant in Thomp-
son is the court's reliance on publici juris and public property, instead of
the public domain. 98 The following passage is, I believe, the first time that
88. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
89. STORY, supra note 70, at 402-03 (Copyright Clause is intended to "admit the people at large,
after a short interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings.., without restraint.").
90. 23 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) (No. 13,957).
91. Id. at 1042. See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. ii, IStat. 318.
92. Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1040.
93- Id.
94. Id. at 1045.
95. Id. at 1042.
96. Id. at 1043 ("[T]he king had immemorially exercised a supreme and unlimited control over
both the foreign and domestic trade of the nation; and on that foundation rested the whole multitude
of exclusive privileges which had been granted to powerful associations or mercenary individuals.")
(emphasis added).
97. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
98. Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1045 (This action would be "subversive of great public rights, which
congress has no authority under the constitution, to abridge.").
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publici juris is recognized as a part of a constitutional limit on Congress's
power under the Copyright Clause:
And, I maintain, with confidence, the broad principle that the congress
had no authority to grant a monopoly of a thing which is known, and in
common use. It is, then, publici juris, and the enjoyment of it can never
again be made exclusive, in the hands of an individual.... For, whether
the inventor gratuitously throws open his invention to the public, or
whether it becomes known by other means; whether the patent expires
by its own limitation, or is declared void by judgment of law, is per-
fectly immaterial. In either case, no second patent can issue. The inven-
tion is then the property of the public, and of that the legislature cannot
grant a monopoly.... [T]he legislature has no right to give to him what
has become the property of others. It cannot deprive the public of what it
possesses, to give it to an individual. It cannot prohibit the people from
the use and application of their own knowledge to any beneficial pur-
pose, or from the practice of any art, useful to themselves, and not inju-
rious to the state. Knowledge, diffused, is as common to the use and
enjoyment of mankind as the atmosphere in which we live and move.99
The above passage is striking in several respects. "[W]ith confi-
dence," the court ties the notion of publici juris not only to the notion of
public property, but also to a constitutional limitation on Congress's
power under the Copyright and Patent Clause, a limitation that is again
recognized by the Supreme Court in Graham. Also striking is the
Thompson court's recognition that once "knowledge" becomes "dif-
fused," it is as "common to the use and enjoyment of mankind as the at-
mosphere in which we live and move."'" The analogy to air is
particularly apt, given that air itself was thought to be publici juris.'I Fi-
nally, Thompson is consistent with the absolutist conception of the public
domain: once something falls into the public domain (or becomes publici
juris) "it can never again be made exclusive in the hands of an individ-
ual ..... The reason is that the material is now the public's property, and
"of that the legislature cannot grant a monopoly" or "deprive the public
of what it possesses, to give it to an individual.""
99. Id. at 1047-48 (emphasis added).
I0. Cf. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
IoI. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1229 (6th ed. 199o).
102. 23 F. Cas. at 1047.
lO3. Id. Although the issue was not before it, the Thompson court suggested in its reasoning that it
would find unconstitutional under the Copyright Clause Congress's grant of an extended patent to
Oliver Evans for his invention four years after the original patent had expired. Id. Although the ex-
tended patent was challenged based on the Contracts and Ex Post Facto Clauses, apparently no chal-
lenge was made that Evans's patent violated the Copyright Clause's bar against removing material
from the public domain. See Evans v. Eaton, 8 F. Cas. 846 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,559), rev'd, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 454 (1818) (rejecting Contracts Clause challenge); Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 874
(C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564), affd, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199 (815) (rejecting Ex Post Facto Clause




The analogue to Graham in the copyright context is Feist, in which
the Supreme Court held that originality is a constitutional requirement
under the Copyright Clause, implied in part by the words "Authors" and
"their Writings.' ' .4 Originality requires that a work (I) be independently
created by the author, and (2) possess a minimal degree of creativity in
order to qualify for a copyright.' 5
Just as with the durational requirement of "limited Times," the con-
stitutional requirement of originality protects the public domain.' 6 The
public domain helps to define in copyright law what is not original and
therefore not copyrightable.' 7 Like facts and ideas, materials in the pub-
lic domain are, by definition, not original and beyond the scope of copy-
right. 8
Like Graham, Feist recognizes the policy against removing material
from the public domain. The central dispute in Feist was whether a copy-
right could be granted to a telephone directory on the sheer basis that the
compiler of the directory had labored to collect the data. This "sweat of
the brow" theory"° had drawn a fair amount of support in the case law
and commentary. ' The Supreme Court, however, rejected this ap-
challenge the removal of material from the public domain, the cases would be at odds with Court's
modern view of the public domain in Graham. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 796-97 (2003)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that Evans's patent violates Graham's restriction against the re-
moval of material from the public domain).
104. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
105. Id.
io6. Originality, however, does not require a "novel" creation as patent law does for inventions.
As Learned Hand explained: "Borrowed the work must indeed not be, for a plagiarist is not himself
pro tanto an 'author'; but if by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew
Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and if he copyrighted it, others might not copy
that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 8i
F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936). Although this teaching has assumed the status of black-letter law, if it actu-
ally ever occurred this situation might present perplexing difficulties in distinguishing copying of the
public domain version and copyrighted version. Cf. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (discussing hypothetical problem).
107. Litman, supra note 58, at 998.
io8. Feist, 499 U.S. at 350 ("Copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a
prior author's work those constituent elements that are not original-for example ... facts, or materials
in the public domain.") (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547-
48 0985)) (emphasis added).
to9. Id. at 359.
iio. The Second Circuit, for example, adopted the "sweat of the brow" theory: "'The right to
copyright a book.., does not depend upon whether the materials which he has collected consist or not
of matters which are publici juris, or whether such materials show literary skill or originality, either in
thought or in language, or anything more than industrious collection."' Id. at 352-53 (emphasis added)
(quoting Jeweler's Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83,88 (2d Cir. 1922)).
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proach. Facts are "publici juris ..... and a "part of the public domain avail-
able to every person, .... the Court explained, and therefore cannot be
copyrighted. Some originality in the selection, arrangement, or coordina-
tion of facts in a compilation is necessary in order for the work to qualify
for copyright. Even then, the scope of copyright for the compilation
would be exceedingly thin and apply only to that particular arrangement,
but the copyright could not remove the underlying facts from the public
domain. '
While Feist speaks most directly against the removal of facts from
the public domain, its logic could apply to material in the public domain
in general. Like facts, materials in the public domain provide the "con-
stituent elements" for authors to draw upon."4 Accordingly, such con-
stituent elements are essential for all to copy as a matter of public right."5
The bar against removing material from the public domain carries
out the Framers' intent to preclude the kind of abuses of the Crown in
granting monopolies. Just as in the case of old inventions, the British
Crown granted monopolies to old books."6 One source of monopolies for
books was the Stationers' Company,"7 which had control over virtually
all printing in England."8 To publish a work, a printer or publisher had to
register the work on the Stationers' registry, thereby entitling the pub-
lisher to the copyright for the work."9 The only other means to publish a
book was to obtain letters patent, or a printing patent, from the Crown.
A consequence of this system of control was that all works, no matter
how old, were essentially fair game for monopoly grants. The Crown
granted printing patents to classical works from long ago.'20 And, because
the stationer's copyright was perpetual in duration, the Stationers had
"the power to control in perpetuity the publication of such works as
those of Shakespeare, Milton, and Dryden," works first published in the
Ii1. Id. at 354 (quoting Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1988)).
112. Id. at 348.
113. Id. at 350-5 I .
I14- Id. at 350.
115. As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, the principle set forth in Graham "would indeed preclude
Congress from authorizing under [the Copyright] Clause a copyright to a work already in the public
domain." Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affd sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.
Ct. 769 (2003). See Eldred. 823 S. Ct. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one seriously contends
that the Copyright/Patent Clause would authorize the grant of monopoly privileges for works already
in the public domain.").
116. L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 91-92 (I968).
117. Id.
I I8. Id. at 32.
I19. Id. at 38.
120. Id. at 91.
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I6oos (in Shakespeare's case, posthumously).' 2 ' Under this regime, the
Crown always had the power to restrict the public's access to works, no
matter how ancient, by concentrating the power of publication of the
works in a select few.'2
Written against this backdrop, the Copyright Clause is intended to
provide a safeguard for the public's right of unrestricted access to works
that have fallen into the public domain.2 3 The public domain gives the
public the assurance that it can freely enjoy all works contained therein
without the fear that one day its enjoyment of those works can be taken
away (as it could under the British Crown). Delineating a clear line be-
yond which the government's intellectual property power cannot tres-
pass, the public domain serves a fundamental goal of the Copyright
Clause in clearly defining what is owned by rights holders, and, just as
importantly, what is owned by the public.'24 Material in the public do-
main is not eligible subject matter for intellectual property rights; it is
material owned by the public.' 5
C. SYNTHESIS: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS A RESTRAINT ON
GOVERNMENT POWER
In tracing the development of the concept of the public domain, I
have returned to first principles in IP cases in order to give a deeper un-
derstanding of the concept of the public domain than the more common,
impressionistic descriptions of the concept today. Although publici juris
and public property have receded from legal discourse in favor of the
public domain, they do resurface now and then, as in Feist. The Supreme
121. Id. at 92.
122. This regime ended in 1710 when Parliament enacted the Statute of Anne, the first copyright
act, which limited the duration of copyrights to a set term. By subjecting all works, both existing and
future, to its limited statutory term, the Statute of Anne ensured that copyrights for all works would
expire, thereby guaranteeing that the works would eventually fall into the public domain. Statute of
Anne, 17io, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The book publishers, however, did not go quietly. They lobbied Par-
liament to amend the Statute of Anne to extend the term of their copyrights. When that failed, they
pursued litigation to have courts recognize a natural, common law right of perpetual copyright. They
were successful in persuading one court to adopt that view in Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.
1769). But the House of Lords overruled that decision in the famous case of Donaldson v. Becket, 98
Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774), which established that the Statute of Anne divested the author of any
common law copyright upon publication of the work. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom
of Expression in Historical Perspective, tot INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 325 (2003) ("Thereafter ancient
books were in the public domain and could be printed by anyone.").
123. See PATTERSON, supra note II6, at 90--91.
124. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002)
("[T]he monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear. This
clarity is essential to promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation.").
125. The public domain's limit on the duration of trade secrets and trademarks functions in the
same way as its limit on the subject matter of trade secrets and trademarks. Publicly available informa-
tion cannot be the subject of a trade secret, while a generic mark cannot be the subject of a trademark.
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Court has consistently made clear that the Copyright Clause protects the
rights of the public in accessing and using public domain materials with-
out restraint,"' rights that are also discussed in legal commentary.'27
Likewise, public ownership remains a recurring theme in legal commen-
tary2' and judicial opinions involving the public domain.'29 This concep-
tion of the public domain has a robust theory setting forth (I) the
function of the public domain as a restraint on government power and
abuses, and (2) the mechanism by which this restraint operates.
i. Function: Restraint on Government Power and Abuses
The primary function of the public domain is to delineate restraints
on the government's power to grant monopolies in the form of intellec-
tual property. These restraints are considered necessary to guard against
the huge potential for abuse created when government has unlimited
power to grant exclusive rights, a pervasive problem under the British
Crown before the Framing. As the cases describe, the history of abuses
of the British Crown in granting monopolies without restriction, such as
for things already enjoyed by the public, in order to give special rewards
to favorites of the Crown, to censor speech and control the flow of in-
formation, or to concentrate power in a privileged few,'30 was anathema
to the Framers.
Yet; except for the restriction that any grant of exclusive rights be
for "limited Times," the words the Framers chose in drafting the Copy-
right and Patent Clause left much unspecified in terms of restraints. The
concept of the public domain, first encapsulated by publici juris and pub-
lic property, was instrumental in delineating what precisely some of those
limits are.
Courts invoked the public domain to demarcate constitutional re-
straints on the government's power to grant intellectual property rights
126. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (recognizing
"'the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution ... of allowing free access to copy
whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain') (quoting Compco Corp.
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234. 237 (1964)); Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 (Anything "in the pub-
lic domain ... can be copied in every detail by whoever pleases[.]"); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964) ("[W]hen the patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and
the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented-passes to the public[.]") (emphases
added); Kellogg Co. v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 1I1, 122 (1938) ("Sharing in the goodwill of an arti-
cle unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all.") (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 25, at i.
128. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 42, at 265.
129. See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) ("[P]ublic ownership of the law means precisely that 'the law' is in the 'public domain' for what-
ever use the citizens choose to make of it[.]"); Comedy Ill Prod., Inc. v. New Line Cinema. 200 F.3d
593. 595 (9th Cir. 2ooo) (When a work falls into the public domain, then "[w]e all own it[.").
130. See generally PATrERSON, supra note i 16, at 5-7.
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at two key points: (i) at the moment when the grant was to be made, by
making certain subject matter ineligible for any exclusive appropriation
because it was already in the public domain; and (2) at the expiration of
the grant of intellectual property rights, by guaranteeing the public's
right of unrestricted access to the underlying material, which had now
fallen into the public domain. The effect of (i) and (2) is the same: the
government cannot grant exclusive rights over something that is public
property and free for all to enjoy as a matter of public right.'3 ' Once
something enters the public domain (or becomes publici juris or public
property), it does so completely, meaning that "the public shall be enti-
tled ever afterwards to the unrestricted use"'32 of the material, and "the
enjoyment of it can never again be made exclusive, in the hands of an in-
dividual."' 33 It has, in short, become the public's property.
2. Mechanism: Dispersing Power through Public Rights and
Public Ownership
The original understanding of the public domain specifies a particu-
lar mechanism by which it operates. The public domain protects against
government abuses in granting monopolies by dispersing the power to
control public domain material among the public at large. In particular,
the public domain accords everyone equal ownership rights over material
in the public domain, meaning "public rights" of unrestricted access to
and use of the material. Although the government can grant exclusive
rights over a wide variety of materials, its power is circumscribed by the
public's superior rights in the public domain.
By using the concept of public property to limit the government's
ability to create intellectual property rights, courts recognized an ingen-
ious mechanism to guard against the potential abuses of the government
in granting exclusive rights. No longer can the government grant mo-
nopolies for common things already enjoyed by the public, or grant ex-
clusive rights over information and inventions without restraint, as the
public domain establishes an ultimate restraint on the government's
power. Whatever is in the public domain, whether due to the expiry of IP
protection, or because of ineligibility of subject matter for such protec-
tion, is completely off limits to government or private control. These ma-
terials are now public property, to be enjoyed freely by all.
This use of the concept of "public property" as a restraint in IP law is
consistent with nineteenth century application of the term in other areas
131. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 ("An unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has
expired, is in the public domain and may be... sold by whoever chooses to do so.").
132. Merriam v. Holloway Publ'g Co., 43 F. 450,450 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 189o) (emphasis added).




of law. Carol Rose has shown the important function that "public prop-
erty" served in the development of different doctrines to ensure that the
public has access to roads and waterways. '34 Even further, this under-
standing of public property can be traced back to notions of property in
Roman law.' 35 The Romans treated certain property, "roads, harbors,
ports, bridges, rivers that flowed year-round, and lands immediately ad-
jacent thereto," as res publicae, or things belonging to the public.
3 6 Citi-
zens were ensured that the outlets of transportation, communication, and
commerce were open for public access by the same mechanism: those
outlets were treated as inherently public property, to which all were
guaranteed access."'
The public domain thus delineates an important sphere in which the
people have equal rights, and ultimate power, over information, ideas,
and knowledge. When the Singer Court first articulated the doctrine of
the "domain of things public," it set forth a vision of the public domain
quite consistent with our republican form of government. Indeed, our
concept of a "republic" derives from this notion of res publicae, or "pub-
lic things." In a republic, ultimately the power of governance lies in the
hands of the people. By treating the fruits of intellectual production as
eventually redounding to the benefit and ownership of the people, the
public domain helps to foster a learned citizenry and to fulfill the goal of
self-governance.
Part III will expand on this theory of the public domain. For now, it
is sufficient to understand that the public domain originated as a concept
to set a restraint against potential government abuse in the exercise of its
intellectual property power. As we will see in the next Part, the public
domain functions in a like manner in the government secrecy cases.
II. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN GOVERNMENT SECRECY CASES
Perhaps it should come as no surprise that the current debate over
the public domain in intellectual property law has ignored the many uses
of the concept in areas outside of intellectual property. After all, intellec-
tual property is a highly specialized field, in which both scholars and
practitioners often specialize in one form of intellectual property. More
surprising, however, is the fact that legal scholarship dealing specifically
with issues of government secrecy has ignored the concept as well.' 38
134. Rose, supra note 26, at 711.
135. Id. at 713.
136. Carol M. Rose, Romans, supra note 42, at 96-97.
137. Id. at 98-99.
138. Often, the concept of the public domain is not even mentioned. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein,
Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1986). When it is mentioned, it usually is
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This Part examines the use of the concept of the public domain in
several different areas of law that involve issues of government secrecy.
These government secrecy cases utilize the concept of the public domain
in a manner remarkably similar to its use in IP law: courts invoke the
public domain in order to establish a legal restraint against potential gov-
ernment abuse by according the public rights of unrestricted access to
certain information, material, or proceedings. By showing this parallel, I
have dual aims: to deepen our understanding of the public domain as it
bears on intellectual property and issues involving government secrecy.
A. THE CURRENT DEBATE OVER GOVERNMENT SECRECY
The tragedy of September ii has had an enduring effect on our
country and government. Americans will forever remember the over
3,000 people who lost their lives due to the events on that day. The tre-
mendous loss of life underscored the very stark reality that mainland
United States is not invulnerable to foreign or terrorist attack.
The government's responses to the terrorist attacks have been mani-
fold. One set of responses is primarily military and involves the war
against the Al Qaeda network and search for Osama bin Laden. The
other set of responses, however, is primarily domestic and involves en-
hancing the ability of law enforcement and government to prevent ter-
rorism. Chief among these measures are the enactment of the Patriot
Act, which provides a battery of measures to law enforcement to fight
terrorism,' 39 and the establishment of a new cabinet-level agency,4 ' the
Department of Homeland Security.
Another significant development is the government's increased use
of secrecy over its own conduct. In the name of fighting terrorism, the
government has denied public access to certain proceedings in which the
liberty of individuals is withheld: the government (i) has deported peo-
invoked without elaboration. See, e.g., Patrick E. Cole, The Freedom of Information Act and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency's Paper Chase: A Need for Congressional Action to Maintain Essential Secrecy
for Intelligence Files While Preserving the Public's Right to Know, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 350, 374-76
(1982); Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and
National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 349, 368 (1986); James R. Ferguson, Govern-
ment Secrecy After the Cold War: The Role of Congress, 34 B.C. L. REV. 451, 488 n.21I (i993); Jona-
than C. Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 775, 785, 802 (1982); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2002); Laurence H. Tribe, Public Rights, Private Rites, 6
GREEN BAG 2d 289, 290 (2003).
139. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, ii 5 Stat. 272 (2001).
140. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
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ple at hearings that are held in secret;'4' (2) has detained, as "enemy
combatants," American citizens (and non-citizens 12) indefinitely without
public access or right to counsel;4 3 and (3) has resurrected the possibility
of using closed military tribunals against non-citizens.'" Under the Pa-
triot Act, the government also has (4) more expansive powers to conduct
FISA searches and surveillance of individuals in the United States, which
are authorized and executed in secret.'45 Other areas of enhanced secrecy
involve denying the public access to information: the government has (5)
ordered agencies and libraries to remove from government Web sites in-
formation that was once publicly available,' 46 (6) instructed government
employees to scrutinize Freedom of Information Act requests with
greater stringency, abandoning the prior Administration's presumption
of openness,'47 and (7) asked researchers and scientists not to publish
141. A circuit split has arisen over the constitutionality of closed deportation hearings. Compare
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (unconstitutional), with North Jersey Me-
dia Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (constitutional). See Sadiq Reza, Privacy and
the Post-September ii Immigration Detainees: The Wrong Way to a Right (and Other Wrongs), 34
CONN. L. REV. I169 (2002).
142. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom. Al Odah v. United States,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Sept. 2, 2003) (No. 03-
334).
143. Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla are the two known U.S. citizens who are currently being de-
tained as enemy combatants. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3 d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla v. Bush, 233
F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Neal R. Sonnett et al., A.B.A. ASS'N TASK FORCE ON
TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 3 (Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www
.abanet.org/leadership/enemycombatants.pdf; Philip Heymann, The Power to Imprison, WASH. POST,
July 7, 2002, at B7 .
144. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in
the War Against Terrorism § i(e), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 6, 2OO); Department of Defense, Mili-
tary Commission Order No. i, Procedures for Trials by Military Commissioners of Certain Non-
United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d2oo2O32iord.pdf. For critiques of the use of military tribu-
nals, see Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribu-
nals, iii YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Harold Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L
L. 337 (2002); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military Tribu-
nals, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635 (2002).
145. See infra notes 559-8o and accompanying text.
146. Thousands of public documents have apparently been removed from public access. See
Ariana Eunjung Cha, Risks Prompt U.S. to Limit Access to Data, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2002, at Ai;
Rachel Kipp, Researchers Barred from U.S. Papers, AP ONLINE, Oct. 14, 2002, http://www
.cqservices.com; OMB Watch, Access to Government Information Post September iith, at http://www
.ombwatch.org (listing some of the removed material).
147. See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to Heads of All Federal Depart-
ments and Agencies: The Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/
o4foia/oIIOs2.htm; Press Release, New Attorney General FOIA Memorandum Issued (Oct. 15, 2001),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapOst/200ifoiaposti9.htm.
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findings that might possibly be used by terrorists in an attack against the
United States,1, a request acceded to by the top scientific journals.'
Although each of these enhanced secrecy measures involves distinct
issues, they all raise a common question: is there any legal restraint on
the government's ability to keep information, proceedings, or materials
secret? The question of government secrecy may well be as old as our
Republic,"5 yet only sporadically-typically, during times of war or gov-
ernment scandal-has it been a matter of pressing public concern. The
last great controversy over government secrecy occurred at the end of
the Vietnam War with the publication of the Pentagon Papers."' In a
terse per curiam opinion, a highly fractured Court upheld the denial of
the government's request to enjoin The New York Times and The Wash-
ington Post from publishing a classified study on the U.S. decision-
making process in the Vietnam War, which the newspapers had obtained
without authorization.'52 Although the decision confirms that the First
Amendment limits the government's ability to keep material secret by
enjoining the press, it offered no doctrinal analysis to support its result or
provide guidance for future cases. A few years later, the Watergate scan-
dal would further highlight the need for limits on the Executive's ability
to keep materials secret, but this was in the exceptional case where
prosecutors sought confidential materials from the Executive in a crimi-
nal investigation of wrongdoing by Executive officials.'53
Today, the Vietnam War and Watergate may seem like a distant
memory. Fighting a "new kind of war," the Bush Administration has
made extensive use of secrecy in everyday government operation. The
speed by which the Executive has implemented these measures (within
less than a year and a half) has greatly outpaced the ability of the public
to evaluate their validity. Indeed, many of these measures have resulted
from Executive order or policy,'54 without the opportunity for public de-
148. See Top Scientists Call for Balancing Security with Openness, AP ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2002,
http://www.louisville.edu/-rmatlaoi/press/io-i8-o2Associated2.html. See generally J. WIGGINS, FREE-
DOM OR SECRECY 109-12 (1964) (discussing tradeoff between secrecy and innovation).
149. See Joseph B. Verrengia, Science Journal Cutting Bioterror Data, WASH. POST, Feb. 16. 2003,
at A9.
150. It is curious to note that the Framers kept their debate secret. See Sunstein, supra note 138, at
889.
151. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
152. Id.
153. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
154. Of the seven examples of enhanced secrecy I have listed, only the Patriot Act's expansion of
the government's FISA powers occurred by an act of Congress.
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bate before their adoption. Legal scholars have only begun to evaluate
these secrecy measures."'
B. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN GOVERNMENT SECRECY CASES
Courts have long recognized the concept of the public domain as a
restraint on the government's power to use secrecy. ' 6 As I explain below,
these cases show that: (i) information falls into the public domain when
it becomes available to the public (without IP protection'57 ); and (2) the
First Amendment protects the public's ability to access and further dis-
seminate information already in the public domain.
I. First Amendment Rights of Access
Just as in IP law, the public domain has been used in the First
Amendment context to define the public's rights of access to material. If
information is in the public domain, people have a First Amendment
right to access it.
Criminal proceedings have provided the clearest enunciation of this
First Amendment principle. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,'Ss the
Court held that the First Amendment forbids the imposition of civil li-
ability based on a reporter's publication of the name of a deceased rape
victim that was revealed in open court and in public records (i.e., the in-
dictment). 9 Expressly invoking the public domain, the Court empha-
sized the importance of the ability of citizens to scrutinize government by
obtaining information in the public domain:
By placing the information in the public domain on official court re-
cords, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public
interest was thereby being served. Public records by their very nature
are of interest to those concerned with the administration of govern-
ment, and a public benefit is performed by the media. The freedom of
press to publish information appears to us to be of critical importance
to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of
the proper conduct of public business. In preserving that form of gov-
ernment the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less
155. See, e.g., Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy after September it, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115
(2002); Paul M. Schoenhard, Note, Disclosure of Government Information Online: A New Approach
from an Existing Framework, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 497 (2002).
156. This Article does not attempt to address each of the government's expanded uses of secrecy,
much less argue that the concept of the public domain provides a definitive answer to whether each
use is valid. Such an undertaking goes well beyond the scope of this Article. I will, however, discuss
and evaluate some of the examples in Part IV.
157. I will explain the relationship between secrecy and intellectual property in Part III. I do not
argue that the public domain in government secrecy cases is necessarily identical to the public domain
in IP law. My claim, developed in Part III, is that the concepts are related in origin, structure, and
function.
158. 420 U.S. 469 (975).
i59. Id. at 491.
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than that the States may not impose sanctions on the publication of
truthful information contained in official court records open to public
inspection.'6°




Subsequent cases have built on the principle of Cox, recognizing that
once information is publicly revealed in open court, it is in the public
domain and beyond government restriction. The Court has held that a
court order forbidding the press from reporting confessions or admis-
sions made by a defendant to law enforcement before trial is an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint. 6, Significantly, the information in question was
submitted as evidence in a preliminary hearing that was open to the pub-
lic and press. 6' Likewise, the Court has held that a district court could
not prohibit the publication of information that was disseminated at a ju-
venile hearing at which "members of the press were in fact present with
the full knowledge of the presiding judge."' '6 Even though a state statute
made the juvenile hearings closed, the Court emphasized that the trial
court knowingly permitted the press to attend the hearing.' For the pur-
poses of the First Amendment, the key was that the information was
"publicly revealed" in open court and thus "placed in the public do-
main ..... [O]nce the truthful information was 'publicly revealed' or 'in
the public domain' the court could not constitutionally restrain its dis-
semination."6 '
The Cox line of cases establishes a fairly bright-line rule of First
Amendment protection for information that is revealed in open court.
The categorical approach is consistent with the cases recognizing the
public domain in intellectual property. Once material enters the public
domain, the government is not free to restrain its dissemination, whether
through intellectual property law or government secrecy.
What is distinctive about the public domain here is that it coincides
with a physical or geographical location where the information origi-
nates-open court proceedings. This makes it much easier to identify
public domain information in this area of law than in IP law, where the
public domain does not correlate to a physical location. The locator here
is the courtroom. Criminal trials and most court proceedings in this coun-
i6o. Id. at 495-96.
i6i. Id. at 492 (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947)).
162. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 568-69 (976).
163. Id. at 568.
164. Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311 977).
i65. Id.
166. Id.
167. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g, Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (I979).
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try are open to the public. The public nature of proceedings helps to en-
sure fairness in and to allow for public scrutiny of the proceedings.' 68 A
requisite of the "public" aspect of court proceedings is that any member
of the public who attends such proceedings can further disseminate what
information was revealed in open court.
Although Cox involved information revealed in court proceedings,
the public domain principle has a more general application. Lawful pub-
lic disclosures of information not subject to IP protection, by the gov-
ernment or third parties, causes the entry of the material into the public
domain. This can be seen in the Daily Mail case in which the Court dealt
with a state statute that made it a crime for a newspaper to publish the
name of a youth charged as a juvenile offender absent the written ap-
proval of the juvenile court. In the case, two newspapers had obtained
the information about the youth by monitoring police band radio fre-
quency, dispatching reporters and photographers to the scene of the
shooting, and interviewing the police, witnesses, and an assistant prose-
cutor.'6 All of these techniques were lawful; all occurred outside the
courtroom. The Court held that the statute violated the First Amend-
ment insofar as it prohibited the dissemination of information that was
lawfully obtained.'70
For unauthorized or illegal disclosures of information to the public,
the public domain analysis is more difficult. Do disclosures of informa-
tion that is unlawfully obtained, too, inject the information into the pub-
lic domain? Here, the Court has been more equivocal. In the Pentagon
Papers case, the result seemed to allow the entry of stolen material into
the public domain, but it is not easy to divine much from the per curiam
decision. 7' Recently, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,'72 the Court considered an
illegal intercept of a cellular call and whether it was constitutional to hold
liable someone who did not participate in the illegal intercept but who
later published that call in violation of federal wiretap laws.'73 The Court
held that the First Amendment bars the imposition of such liability, be-
168. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,492 (1975).
169. Daily Mail Publ'g, Co., 443 U.S. at 99.
170. Id. In certain cases, the First Amendment may even allow the public to reveal information
divulged at confidential proceedings, such as a judicial commission's review of alleged judicial miscon-
duct of a particular judge. Landmark Comms., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
71. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 754 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (not-
ing the newspaper had obtained the Pentagon Papers from a source who had stolen it); see Florida Star
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 (1989) (Prior cases left open "whether, in cases where information has
been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may even punish not only the
lawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well[.]").
172. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
173. Id. at 518-19.
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cause it threatened to "impose sanctions on the publication of truthful
information of public concern." ''
To analogize the Cox line of cases to the intellectual property cases
we have discussed, one might view the First Amendment cases as exam-
ples of the public domain setting a limit on the duration of government
secrecy. The government has the power to keep much information se-
cret,'7 5 but the secrecy ends when the information enters the public do-
main (by becoming publicly available). Once the information is in the
public domain, the people have unrestricted rights of access to it. The
government's interest in secrecy is outweighed by the free dissemination
of the information once it is made public.
The public domain in the First Amendment context also provides a
limit to the subject matter of the government's secrecy in the first in-
stance. Criminal trials, for example, are presumptively open to the pub-
lic, with the First Amendment guaranteeing the public a right of access. ,
6
As Cox itself suggests, a criminal trial is public property, a proceeding
that belongs to the public. Just as in the intellectual property context, the
domain of "things public" in the First Amendment context contains cer-
tain subject matter that is beyond the government's power of restric-
tion. '
2. Secrecy Agreements for Government Employees
The First Amendment also establishes a limit on the government's
ability to prevent government employees from discussing information
that is already in the public domain. Government employees who handle
classified information typically are asked to sign secrecy agreements as a
174. Id. at 534.
175. Thus, the government might seek the sealing of certain information before it becomes public.
Cox, 420 U.S. at 496.
176. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (i98o) ("The right of access to places
traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by the amal-
gam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press.") (opinion of Burger, C.J.). The Court
has also recognized that "the presumption [of open criminal trials] may be overcome only by an over-
riding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tai-
lored to serve that interest." Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 5'0 (1984); Press-Enter, Co.
v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1,8 (1986).
i77. The baseline test for duration cases is that the government's claim to secrecy ends once the
material becomes public. It is much more difficult to provide a general test to determine what subject
matter involves a "public thing" that must be in the public domain. Are there some classes of subject
matter that must be public like criminal trials? Cf Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular
Government: The Convergence of Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and
Control of Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 65I, 709 (2003) (arguing for public ownership
over presidential papers). It goes beyond the scope of this Article to formulate such a test. The Rich-
mond Newspapers "experience and logic" test provides a good starting point for determining what
proceedings must be open to the public. See infra note 5oi.
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part of their employment. In these secrecy agreements, employees agree
to maintain, essentially forever, the secrecy of any classified information
they examine during the course of their employment and to seek prepub-
lication review of any material they intend to publish that may contain
such classified information."' However, the public domain operates as a
limit on the government's power to enforce secrecy agreements in the
name of national security. Although the government can prevent the
publication of classified information, the First Amendment prohibits the
government from preventing the publication of material already in the
public domain.'
The leading case that recognizes this First Amendment doctrine is
United States v. Marchetti.'° The case involved a former CIA employee
who intended to publish a book about his intelligence experiences. The
government sued to enforce the secrecy agreement that the defendant
had signed, requesting an injunction ordering Marchetti to submit his
work to the government for prepublication review. ' The government
was successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction, which the Fourth
Circuit upheld on appeal. Recognizing the government's "right and duty
to strive for internal secrecy about the conduct of governmental affairs in
areas in which disclosure may reasonably be thought to be inconsistent
with national interest," the Fourth Circuit had little difficulty in finding
justification in the secrecy agreement's use of a prior restraint on
speech, '8 a rare circumstance in which a prior restraint is upheld. 8,
But the court went on to recognize that the defendant had a First
Amendment right to publish information "already in the public do-
178. See, e.g., Robert C. Lind & Alan D. Ullberg, Institutional Regulation of Employee Expression:
Writing as a Conflict of Interest Within Museums and Related Nonprofit Institutions, 32 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 427, 493 (1992); Lewis Chimes, National Security and the First Amendment: The Proposed Use of
Government Secrecy Agreements Under National Security Directive 84, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
209 (1985); Michael L. Charlson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Expanding Prepublication Review
of Government Employees' Speech, 72 CAL. L. REV. 962 (1984); Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of
Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Government Expression for Government Employees and the Public
Right of Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690 (1984); James Peter Rau, Note,
Government Secrecy Agreements and the First Amendment, 28 Am. U. L. REV. 395 (1979).
179. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4 th Cir. 1972).
18o. Id.
181. Id. at 1313. Even before the case, Marchetti had in fact published a novel and a nonfiction
article that may have been inspired by his CIA experience, although neither was the subject of the
government's request for injunction. Id.
I82. Id. at 1311-12.
183. Id. at 1316-17 ("[T]he Government's need for secrecy in this area lends justification to a sys-
tem of prior restraint against disclosure by employees and former employees of classified information
obtained during the course of employment.").




main"'1s5 and "the right to speak and write about the CIA and its opera-
tions, and to criticize it as any other citizen may."'8 6 The court recognized
that even if the government classified the information, it "may have been
publicly disclosed."'' 7 And, if there was such a public disclosure, then
Marchetti had a First Amendment right to republish the information.'
18
Since the secrecy agreement did not purport to affect this First Amend-
ment right, the court deemed it to be enforceable. I""
Importantly, the court also held that Marchetti was entitled to judi-
cial review of the government's decision denying publication of passages
of Marchetti's book." On review, a court is to examine "whether or not
the information was classified and, if so, whether or not, by prior disclo-
sure, it had come into the public domain."''9 ' If the information had al-
ready entered the public domain, the government cannot bar its
publication. '9 2
Thus, in Cox and Marchetti courts recognized that the First Amend-
ment protects the ability of people to freely access and disseminate in-
formation in the public domain. The government may not prevent
publication (whether by statute or contract), or impose liability for publi-
cation, of information that is already available to the public. Where in-
185. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4 th Cir. 1972).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1318.
I88. Id.
189. Id. (secrecy agreement enforceable but only insofar as government "withholds approval of
publication only of information which is classified and which has not been placed in the public domain
by prior disclosure"). See Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 5o9 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir. 1972) ("These
plaintiffs [subject to secrecy agreements] should not be denied the right to publish information which
any citizen could compel the CIA to produce and, after publication, could publish. We thus move to
the conclusion that the deletion items should be suppressed only if they are found both to be classified
and classifiable under the Executive Order."); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(same).
19o. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1317.
191. Id.
192. In Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (I98O), the Supreme Court upheld, in a per curiam de-
cision, the constitutionality of a similar secrecy agreement imposed on an ex-CIA agent who published
a book criticizing the Vietnam War in violation of his fiduciary obligation to submit the book to the
government for prepublication review. Id. at 51o. The government conceded, however, that "as a gen-
eral principle" the defendant had a "right to publish unclassified information." Id. at 511; see also id. at
521 n.II (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court does not disagree with the Fourth Circuit's view in
Marchetti, reiterated in Snepp, that a CIA employee has a First Amendment right to publish unclassi-
fied information."). For a critique of the Court's upholding of a prior restraint, see Medow, supra note
138. But see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983) (supporting
Snepp decision). Subsequent courts have continued to recognize the public domain limitation to se-
crecy agreements following Snepp. See McGehee, 718 F.2d at 1141 (government may not censor un-
classified materials or information in the public domain); see also id. ("[Ilf in fact information is
unclassified or in the public domain, neither the CIA nor foreign agencies would be concerned[.]").
[VOL. 55:91
THE PUBLIC'S DOMAIN
formation is in the public domain, the First Amendment protects the
public's right to access and discuss it.
3. Espionage Law
Other government secrecy cases recognize the public domain with-
out expressly invoking the First Amendment. One such area is espionage
law, which is designed to protect sensitive information that our govern-
ment possesses. It is a crime to obtain, copy, or transmit "information re-
lating to the national defense"'93 without proper authorization and with
the requisite criminal intent. Obviously, our espionage laws serve a vital
government interest: national security. The government must be able to
keep certain information, such as military strategy, battle plans, and
launch codes, out of the hands of foreign adversaries. Espionage laws en-
able the government to keep such information secret and confined to the
few individuals who "need to know" such information.
There is a tension, however, with maintaining a strong regime of
government secrecy in a free and open society. If the government were
given carte blanche to decide what constitutes "information relating to
the national defense," it might have a natural proclivity to make more
and more things secret, perhaps simply out of an abundance of caution."
From the government's view, it would be far better to err on the side of
over-inclusion (or overclassification) when it comes to protecting na-
tional security. Yet, from the public's view, there must be some limit to
what constitutes acceptable over-inclusion. It would be unimaginable, for
example, to treat the Constitution as secret and off-limits to the public,
even though it does bear on our national defense, in some passages, ex-
pressly.'95 This tension becomes greatest when some or all of the informa-
tion that the government contends relates to the national defense is
already available to the public. It is a defense to a charge of espionage
and other related offenses for the defendant to establish that all or nearly
all of the information at issue was in the public domain. For example, in
the recent case involving Wen Ho Lee, the defense offered the testimony
of several scientists from Lee's lab who estimated that ninety percent of
the restricted information at the lab was in the public domain and could
have easily been obtained by China or others from public domain
sources, instead of Lee.'9'
193. i8 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
194. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 138, at 354 ("[T]he Executive is inherently self-interested in
expanding the scope of matters deemed 'secret'; the more that is secret, the more that falls under ex-
ecutive control.").
195. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II-i6; id. art. II, § 2; id. art. III. § 3.
196. Bob Dowling, The Making of a Scapegoat. Bus. WK., Feb. 4, 2002, at I7. No factual resolution
was made of the defense theory. Although Lee eventually agreed to a plea bargain admitting to only i
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The development of this "public domain" defense owes its lineage to
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Heine, a case involving a Ger-
man American defendant convicted of espionage during World War 11.97
The central issue on appeal was whether an individual can be convicted
of espionage for giving a foreign entity information that was lawfully ac-
cessible to the public. Hand answered no.
Starting in May 1940 through approximately August 1941 ("though
not after December 7, 1941"), the defendant, Edmund Carl Heine, had
passed back reports he made about the U.S. aviation industry to a Ger-
man car manufacturer."95 The reports were based on information Heine
collected from numerous publicly available sources, including:
ordinary magazines, books and newspapers; technical catalogues,
handbooks and journals; correspondence with airplane manufacturers;
consultation with one, Aldrich, who was already familiar with the in-
dustry; talks with one or two employees in airplane factories; exhibits,
and talks with attendants, at the World's Fair in New York in the
summer of 194o."'
Heine used the information to prepare a report analyzing the spe-
cific capabilities and production numbers of the U.S. airplane industry,
both military and commercial."° Heine sent the reports to an intermedi-
ary in New York and Peru, so that they could be forwarded to Ger-
many.2°IAlthough Heine's activity occurred before the United States
joined World War II, it is not difficult to see why his conduct might seem
suspicious, if not illegal. Heine was sending detailed reports to a German
corporation analyzing the capabilities of U.S. manufacturing of airplanes,
including military planes. At the direction of the German company, he
sent the reports in a roundabout manner, possibly to escape detection.
There was even evidence that Heine had obtained some of the informa-
tion from the people he interviewed using false pretenses or deception.2
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld Heine's conviction for the of-
fense of failing to register as a foreign agent, holding that the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to support a finding that Heine was
of the 59 counts (none espionage), the government's case unraveled completely, earning a strong re-
buke from the judge, who also apologized to Lee for the treatment he received. See Thomas W. Joo,
Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and Af-
ter September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002).
197. 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 815.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 816.
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working as an agent for the Third Reich. "3 But the Second Circuit re-
versed Heine's conviction for the more serious offense of espionage.
Writing for the court, Judge Hand held that Heine could not be con-
victed for compiling and processing information that was lawfully avail-
able to the public in the United States, even if he collected such
information "so that the Reich should be advised of our defense in the
event of war.""2 4 It did not matter if Heine misled the sources from whom
he obtained information, or if he took the information and processed it in
a more convenient form for the Germans." In the end, "[alll of this in-
formation came from sources that were lawfully accessible to anyone
who was willing to take pains to find, sift and collate it."2 "Certainly it
cannot be unlawful to spread such information within the United States,"
the court concluded.0 7 Although the Second Circuit's decision did not
explicitly use the term "public domain," subsequent courts and commen-
tators have done so in explaining this limitation on espionage law.2,
Although Heine rests on statutory interpretation, it is not absent of
constitutional concerns."° Clearly, Judge Hand was concerned about the
First Amendment and any interpretation of the espionage law that would
result in "so drastic a repression of free exchange of information .... .
Hand recognized the danger to a free society if "information relating to
the national defense" were given a broad interpretation: "every part in
short of the national economy and everything tending to disclose the na-
tional mind are important in a time of war, and will then 'relate to the na-
tional defense ..... .Under such a broad interpretation, the government
could criminalize the mere sending "to a citizen of France a railway map,
a list of merchant ships, a description of automobile assembly technique,
an account of the latest discoveries in antisepsis, or in plant or animal
203. Id. at 817 ("Nobody but a simpleton could fail to detect the hall-marks of the principal in
whose interest the whole web of chicane and evasion had been woven.").
204- id. at 815-16.
205. Id. at 816.
2o6. Id. at 8 15.
207. Id.
208. See, e.g., United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 9o8, 918 n.9 (4th Cir. i98o) ("[T]he defendants
would not be guilty of transmitting national defense information if the information were available in
the public domain."); Slack v. United States, 203 F.2d 152, 156 (6th Cir. 1953) (distinguishing Heine
because information was "secret information not obtained from public domain of knowledge"); Me-
dow, supra note 138, at 775 ("Together, Gorin and Heine thus removed from the purview of section
794(a) all disclosures of information that had previously entered the public domain.").
2o9. Heine is similar to Daily Mail. In both cases, the court's opinion turned on the fact that the
information had been lawfully accessible to the public. Because the information in question was pub-
licly available, the government could not later criminally punish an individual or entity for disseminat-
ing it. See supra notes 169-7o and accompanying text.




breeding, or even a work upon modern physics ..... That result, according
to Hand, was "intolerable. 2 .3
Solicitous of "the spread of information" that was lawfully available
to the public, Judge Hand settled upon a simple rule to protect it: "what-
ever it was lawful to broadcast throughout the country it was lawful to
prepare and publish domestically all that Heine put in his reports. 2. 4
Thus, "when the information has once been made public, and has thus
become available in one way or another," an individual cannot be con-
victed of espionage for disseminating that publicly available information
to others."5
The outcome reached in Heine was by no means a foregone conclu-
sion, particularly in time of war. ,6 The only decision cited by the Second
Circuit was Gorin v. United States."7 In Gorin, the Court made no men-
tion of a public domain limitation, at least not in the context of defining
"information relating to the national defense." In fact, the Supreme
Court gave a very broad definition to "information relating to the na-
tional defense," describing it as "a generic concept of broad connota-
tions, referring to the military and naval establishments and the related
activities of national preparedness..2.. In dicta, the Court did suggest a
limitation to the intent requirement of proving that the defendant in-
tended to give advantage to a foreign government: "Where there is no
occasion for secrecy, as with reports relating to the national defense, pub-
lished by authority of Congress or the military departments, there can, of
course, in all likelihood be no reasonable intent to give an advantage to a
foreign government. ' '.. 9
The Second Circuit essentially shifted the Supreme Court's concern
about publicly available information from the intent requirement to the
definition of information relating to the national defense. Part of the rea-
son undoubtedly must have been that the evidence in Heine suggested,
perhaps strongly, that the defendant hoped to help the German govern-
ment with his reports. The dictum from Gorin, if applied to Heine's in-
212. Id. at 816.
213. Id. at 815.
214. Id. at 816.
215. Id. at 817.
216. Apparently, other countries have attempted to prosecute under espionage law individuals
who merely collected data from publicly available sources. See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS
OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 284-85 (1982) (bringing criminal charges against "peace researchers
[in Norway and Sweden] ... for assembling information from openly available sources that the au-
thorities judged dangerous for military security").
217. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).




tent, might not save him from conviction. In this respect, the Heine deci-
sion is a broader ruling than Gorin. Intent is a subjective inquiry that
must be made on a case-by-case basis. It is conceivable, as the facts in
Heine show, that one could intend to advantage a foreign government
with reports based on publicly available information. By contrast, infor-
mation relating to the national defense is a more objective inquiry. Un-
der Heine, publicly available information is not information relating to
the national defense, regardless of the defendant's motives. Put more
starkly, it is not espionage to pass information that already is in the pub-
lic domain to a foreign government, even if your intentions are to harm
the United States.2 °
4. Classified Information and Regulations of Munitions
List Information
A corollary to the public domain's limitation on espionage law is its
limitation on the government's ability to classify information. Although
the government has considerable power in regulating what information
enters the public domain by classifying information and keeping it secret,
the Marchetti line of cases shows that there are limits to what the gov-
ernment can properly classify.2"' Just as the public availability of informa-
tion precludes an espionage conviction, the government may not restrict
the public from disseminating information that is entirely in the public
domain (at least if there by lawful means).
220. While purporting to apply Heine, the Fourth Circuit appears to have qualified the public do-
main defense in that circuit. United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 577 (4th Cir. 2000). The Fourth
Circuit upheld the use of jury instructions that defined "information that relates to the national de-
fense" in a way that may allow the conviction of a person for transmitting publicly available informa-
tion that was also contained in a classified government document that the government did not itself
disclose. Id. at 576. Adopting the government's reasoning. the court explained that a government dis-
closure of information is more "official" than finding the same information in the public domain
through other sources, and that "official" quality made the government's disclosure of the information
more crucial than disclosures of the same information in public sources for the purposes of espionage
law. id. at 578. The court's reasoning is open to question. Although facts about the U.S. government or
information related to and produced by the U.S. government might bear greater "officialness" from
government sources, the argument for "officialness" has much less, if any, force when applied to gen-
eral facts about and disclosed by other entities. Cf Bareford v. General Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d
1138, I 44 (5th Cir. 1992) (government's claim to "officialness" of publicly available information has a
"troubling sweep"). To draw upon Hand's example, the U.S. government could hardly argue that a
city's publicly available railway map was information relating to the national defense just because the
U.S. government had classified it as its own "official" version of the rail system. The Heine case rejects
the argument that an "official" government report of factual information is somehow different from
the same factual information reported by the participant in the fact itself. 151 F.2d at 816 ("There can,
for example, be no rational difference between information about a factory which is turning out
bombers, and to which the army allows access to all comers, and information about the same bombers,
contained in an official report, or procured by a magazine through interviews with officers.").
221. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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The government's regulations for classifying information embrace a
public domain limitation, but without establishing a per se rule. For in-
formation to be properly classified, a determination must be made that
"the unauthorized disclosure of the information, either by itself or in the
context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security .... .But once information is generally
available to the public, further disclosure of the information would not
likely "advantage" a foreign government.23 The regulations governing
classified information "require[] consideration of the information avail-
able from intelligence sources concerning the extent to which the same or
similar information is known or is available to others." '24 The classifying
agent should "consider whether it is known, publicly or internationally,
that the United States has the information or even is interested in the
subject matter." '225
Even after a government document has been properly classified,
eventual public disclosures of the information through lawful sources
may necessitate its declassification."' Although unauthorized disclosures
do not necessarily require declassification under the regulations,2 . "such
disclosures require.., reevaluation of the information to determine
whether the publication has so compromised the information that down-
grading or declassification is warranted.
'2, 8
Because the current regulations do not contain a per se rule exempt-
ing public domain information from classification, it might be conceiv-
able for the government to classify information that was entirely in the
public domain. But even if that were the government's position, the en-
forcement of that classification would be highly vulnerable to legal chal-
lenge. Moreover, apart from the question of propriety of the
government's classification of the information, Heine and Marchetti sug-
gest that any attempt to restrain the public's further dissemination of the
information, whether through espionage law, government secrecy
222. Dep't of Def. Administrative Instruction 26, § 2-202 (Apr. 1I, 1987), at http://www
.dtic.mil/whs/directives/current.htm. These provisions are comparable to those previously contained in
32 C.F.R. pt. 159a (2oo1). After 9/1I, however, the Department of Defense removed part 159a from
the Code of Federal Regulations. Dep't of Defense Removal of Regulatory Parts, 66 Fed. Reg. 53957
(Oct. 25, 200I).
223. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 28 (194).
224. Dep't of Defense Administrative Instruction 26, § 2-208.
225. Id.
226. Id. § 2-209.
227. Id. In such cases, the regulations state that "[a]ppearance in the public domain of information





agreements, or other means, would almost certainly run afoul of the First
Amendment.
The public domain also plays a significant role in laws prohibiting
the export of defense related information on the United States Munitions
List under the Arms Export Control Act29 and implementing regula-
tions . 3' These laws regulate the transmission of defense articles (includ-
ing weapons and technical data) to foreign countries, 3 ' in order to
prevent them from developing greater arms and weapons capabilities.
But one important limitation on this prohibition is provided by the public
domain. Information that is already available in the public domain is ex-
pressly exempted from the statutory prohibition, meaning that it is not a
crime to transmit such information abroad.2 3 The parallel to Heine is
unmistakable. 33
What is particularly noteworthy about the public domain limitation
here is that the regulations provide a definition of the public domain. To
my knowledge, this is the only instance a federal statute or regulation at-
tempts to define the public domain. It states in part: "Public domain
means information which is published and which is generally accessible
or available to the public" by one of several listed means.34 Section
120.1i's definition of the public domain builds on the general principles
that we have already discussed. Entry into the public domain hinges on
dissemination and accessibility of material to the public. The regulations
specify the particular means by which the material can be made publicly
available, although the list is fairly expansive. Again, the public domain
serves to limit the power of the government to control the dissemination
of public domain information.
229. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-96 (2000). By contrast, the former Compre-
hensive Anti-Apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5o67, which was repealed in 1992 (Pub. L. No. 103-149,
§ 4(a)(i)), did not contain a public domain limitation on export of material to South Africa. See
United States v. Posey, 864 F.2d 1487, 1492 (9th Cir. 1989).
230. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (2003).
231. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2000).
232. See 22 C.F.R. § 125.1 (2003) ("Information which is in the 'public domain' is not subject to the
controls in this subchapter."); see also id. § 120.10 ("Technical data ... does not include information
concerning general scientific, mathematical or engineering principles commonly taught in schools, col-
leges and universities or information in the public domain as defined by § 120.H .") (emphasis added).
233. The public domain limitation here is qualified in two respects. First, the determination of
what information is subject to restriction under the munitions list is not subject to judicial review. See
Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (D.D.C. 1996). A First Amendment challenge, how-
ever, may be reviewable. Id. at 10-13. Second, the public domain limitation applies to technical data,
not to items such as firearms or weapons on the Munitions List. Even though these items might be
publicly available in the U.S., the public availability of the item would not preclude the government
from regulating the export of the weapons or technology.
234. 22 C.F.R. § 120.11.
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5. Freedom of Information Act
The public domain also plays a role in the Freedom of Information
Act ("FOIA"), a statute that gives the public statutory rights of access to
broad categories of government information unless it falls within an ex-
emption.235 Exemptions i and 3 are often invoked to exempt information
that is properly classified and relates to national defense.36 In interpret-
ing FOIA, the D.C. Circuit has recognized a "public domain doctrine"
that limits the government's ability to assert an exemption from disclo-
sure.237
Under the public domain doctrine, "materials normally immunized
from disclosure under FOIA lose their protective cloak once disclosed
and preserved in a permanent public record. ''238 As the D.C. Circuit ex-
plained, "'the logic of FOIA' mandates that where information requested
'is truly public, then enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill its pur-
poses.'" 39 The party invoking the public domain doctrine has the burden
of presenting "specific information in the public domain that appears to
duplicate that being withheld" by the government.24" The paradigmatic
example of public domain material that falls within this doctrine is in-
formation revealed in open court or as a part of judicial proceedings.
This includes the evidence admitted at trial, the trial transcripts, the par-
ties' briefs, and the court's orders and opinions.2 "' The public nature of
the information establishes a right of the public to access and disseminate
such information -a clear parallel to Cox.2
C. SYNTHESIS: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN AS A RESTRAINT ON
GOVERNMENT POWER
Although the government secrecy cases typically invoke the public
domain without much explanation (and therefore lack the richness of
discussion present in the IP cases we examined), I believe it should be
readily apparent how the public domain operates in these cases. In each
235. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (b) (2000).
236. Id. § 552(b)(i), (b)(3).
237. See Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Afshar v. Dep't of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
241. Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554.
242. The public domain doctrine in the FOIA context is qualified to official public disclosures. See
Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 9ii F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 199o). This qualification does not necessarily diminish
the robustness of the public domain principle under the First Amendment. The qualification allows the
government to withhold certain information from production by the government, even though the in-
formation was available in public (though unofficial) sources. But the government's power would not
extend to removal or restriction of the information that was already publicly available. Such a restric-
tion would most likely violate the First Amendment.
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of the five areas of law discussed above, the government seeks to restrict
the ability of some member of the public from either accessing or further
disseminating information that is already in the public domain (because
publicly available). And, in each area, the public domain prohibits the
government from doing so by recognizing public rights of unrestricted
access to the public domain under the First Amendment or by statute.
i. Function: Restraint Against Government Power and Abuses
Just as in the IP context, the function of the public domain in these
cases is to act as a restraint on government power, here, the power to use
secrecy.243 Courts recognized the concept of the public domain to limit
the government's ability to keep information or proceedings secret.
Without such a limitation, the government would have the ability to use
secrecy in an ever-expanding way, even on information that is already
available to the public. Under espionage law, to borrow Hand's admoni-
tion, "every part in short of the national economy and everything tending
to disclose the national mind are important in time of war, and will then"
be the basis for criminal prosecution.2" Likewise, in classifying informa-
tion or prohibiting the export of technical information, the government
would have every incentive to err on the side of overclassification- in the
interest of "national security." '245 Indeed, without a public domain, the
government could make secret everything it wanted, no matter if the in-
formation was already publicly available.
None of this is to suggest, however, that the government necessarily
acts nefariously when utilizing secrecy; rather, secrecy is an essential part
of any government. However, public disclosure "is of critical importance
to our type of government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the
proper conduct of public business."24' The public domain in the govern-
ment secrecy cases is rooted in the First Amendment and protects what
Learned Hand called the "spread of information." In these cases, there is
a danger that the government may prevent members of the public from
using information already in the public domain, whether it be informa-
tion related to national security, information revealed in open court or
related to criminal or governmental proceedings, information subject to
classification, or information sought under FOIA. But, in each of these
243. It is conceivable that, in a certain set of facts, the government might attempt to justify the re-
striction of public domain information as satisfying strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. The
burden on the government, though, would be very high. In most cases the government could not re-
strict the further dissemination of the public domain material.
244. United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815 (2d Cir. 1945).
245. See United States v. Hoffman, to F.3d 808, 1993 WL 468713, at *7 (9th Cir. Nov. I2, 1993)
(unpublished table decision) ("[T]he public domain exclusion ensures that the government cannot
place anything it wants on the Munitions List.").
246. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975).
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areas, the public domain acts as a restraint against the government's at-
tempts to restrict the flow or use of information already available to the
public. The cases recognize that, while the government has an interest in
maintaining secrecy, the interest is generally outweighed by the public's
interest in the spread of the information once it is already available to the
public. Paralleling the Copyright Clause's bar against removing material
from the public domain through the grant of IP, the First Amendment
prohibits the government from removing material from the public do-
main through secrecy.
2. Mechanism: Dispersing Power Through Public Rights of Access
The mechanism by which the public domain operates as a restraint
on government secrecy is analogous to how the public domain operates
in intellectual property. As Cox recognized, the public domain accords
each member of the public a right of access to public information. Once
information becomes publicly available, the government's claim to se-
crecy over the information is forever lost. It could not be invoked against
Cox Broadcasting, Heine, or others who wanted to disseminate informa-
tion already in the public domain, as the First Amendment protects the
free flow of information in the public domain.
III. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
THE RESTRAINT AGAINST GOVERNMENT CONTROL
Part I made the case that the public domain is used within the vari-
ous forms of IP (I) to define what is not appropriate subject matter of IP;
and (2) to mark the termination of IP rights, in both cases by according
the public full rights of unrestricted access to the underlying material.247
Part II made a similar case for the various uses of the public domain
within the government secrecy cases: the public domain (I) defines what
is not appropriate subject matter of government secrecy and (2) marks
the termination of government secrecy by according the public full rights
of unrestricted access to the underlying material .2" This Part ties the two
strands together and shows how the uses of the public domain in IP par-
allel its uses in the government secrecy cases based on origin, structure,
and function. Under my unified theory, the public domain acts as a re-
straint on the government's power to control the public's access to cul-
ture, information, and know-how in a free and open society.
247. See supra notes 40-137 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 156-246 and accompanying text.
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A. THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ONE OR MANY?
In a recent article Boyle asks whether there is one public domain or
many?249 Good question. To borrow Pamela Samuelson's evocative im-
agery,25° if we were to "map" the public domain, would it consist of one
large territory involving different areas of law, or would it instead consist
of several discrete territories that may or may not be connected in any
way? Based on his analysis of intellectual property law, Boyle concludes
the latter: "Just as there are many 'properties,' so too there are many
'public domains[,]"' 25 and many theories of them. 52 Litman's theory
about the role of the public domain in underwriting copyright's concept
of originality is one theory'53; Lessig's focus on the public domain's role
in spurring innovation and creation is another theory.25 g To this, we might
add Boyle's own theory, which espouses a pluralist understanding of the
public domain-having many theories of the public domain "is all to the
good." '255 Boyle's pluralist account still leaves room for developing
greater coherence among the various uses of the public domain.16 My
theory of the public domain attempts to "unify" the uses of the public
domain in IP with its uses in government secrecy cases without necessar-
ily foreclosing other views of the public domain. I make no claim that the
different invocations of the public domain that I discuss necessarily refer
to a single, unitary concept of the public domain.5 7 My unified theory of
the public domain should not be mistaken for a unitary theory of the
public domain that posits that IP law and government secrecy cases rec-
ognize the same concept that is identical in all respects. Rather, my thesis
is that the various uses of the public domain in IP law and in the govern-
ment secrecy cases are related in several important respects.
249. Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23, at 38.
250. See Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLS. L47,
148 (2003).
251. Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23, at 36.
252. Id. at 38.
253. See Litman, supra note 58, at 1013-14.
254. See LESSIG, supra note 26, at 19-25.
255. Boyle, Foreword, supra note 26. at 29.
256. In political theory, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is a paragon example of an attempt to
develop general principles of political ordering within a pluralist framework. See JOHN RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
257. The several uses of the public domain may be viewed as deriving from one common body that
has been subdivided by artificial distinctions, as may be argued in the case of the several oceans consti-
tuting one body of water. I, however, stop short of arguing that the various uses of the public domain
refer to the exact same thing in every respect. It is interesting to note, though, that Samuelson's map of
the public domain appears to place government secrecy (classified information) and intellectual prop-
erty in the same general region (or perhaps continent). Samuelson, supra note 250, at i5I (fig. ).
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First, they are related by origin, in that: (i) at least some of the uses
of the public domain originate directly from the Constitution-
specifically, the First Amendment and the Copyright Clause, which to-
gether aim to foster and protect sources of learning for the public; (2) all
of the uses of the public domain originate from the common norm of pro-
tecting the free flow of ideas, knowledge, and materials in our democratic
society; and (3) all of the uses of the public domain respond to pressures
created when the government exercises power to control the public's ac-
cess to materials, whether through secrecy or the grant of IP rights. Sec-
ond, all of the uses of the public domain are related in structure and
function, in that each (4) functions as a restraint on government power
and potential abuses by (5) the structural mechanism of according the
public rights of unrestricted access to materials in the public domain.
B. THE THEORY OF DOCTRINAL PARALLELISM
My theory rests on the view that the law sometimes develops in two
or more different areas in parallel fashion.2: By doctrinal parallelism I
mean to describe situations in the law when a doctrine or rule originates,
develops, or functions in a manner that is parallel, meaning at least simi-
lar or analogous, if not completely identical, to another doctrine or rule.
Doctrinal parallelism encompasses a range of different phenomena
showing that two or more different laws have some similarity, whether it
be in (i) origin, (2) structure, or (3) function. A simple example of doc-
trinal parallelism can be found in the doctrines of patent misuse 59 and
copyright misuse. 6° Both operate to prevent efforts of the IP rights
holder to extend its grant of exclusive rights to restrain competition be-
yond the scope of the grant. The doctrine of misuse was first adopted in
the context of patents. In Morton Salt, the Supreme Court held that a
patentee cannot recover for infringement during any period in which the
patentee misused its patent. 61 Although the Patent Code does not con-
tain a defense of misuse, the Court fashioned the doctrine based on prin-
262ciples of equity and the policy inherent in the Copyright Clause. Patent
258. By origin, I mean the thing (principle, norm, source of law, etc.) that first animated the par-
ticular law. By structure, I mean the requirements, tests, or elements of the law, the components that
make it operate. By function, I mean the purpose or operation of the law, what the law seeks to do.
The terms should become more apparent as I apply them below.
259. See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 0942).
260. Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 199o). See generally Scott A. Mi-
skimon, Note, Divorcing Public Policy from Economic Reality: The Fourth Circuit's Copyright Misuse
Doctrine in Lasercomb America. Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1672 (I99I) (tracing "the develop-
ment of equitable defenses ... from the origin of the 'unclean hands' doctrine through the parallel
evolutions of patent and copyright misuse").
261. Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 490-92.
262. Id. at 492.
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misuse functions in a way that is parallel or analogous to the doctrine of
unclean hands to invalidate the legal claims of parties who acted improp-
erly in the events underlying the basis of their claims.
A second instance of doctrinal parallelism can be found in the
courts' eventual adoption of the misuse doctrine in copyright law. The
Fourth Circuit was the first federal circuit to recognize misuse in copy-
right law, albeit over forty years after its adoption in patent law. 64 The
application of the misuse doctrine to copyright was all but compelled by
virtue of the common goals that animate copyright and patent law. 6 ' Af-
ter all, copyrights and patents are both grants of "exclusive rights" au-
thorized by Congress pursuant to its power under the Copyright and
Patent Clause. 66 The parallel concerns of the two IP systems compel
similar legal treatment of the same type of bad behavior of the IP rights
holder. As the Fourth Circuit explained:
[S]ince copyright and patent law serve parallel public interests, a "mis-
use" defense should apply to infringement actions brought to vindicate
either right.... [T]he similarity of the policies underlying patent and
copyright is great and historically has been consistently recognized.
Both patent law and copyright law seek to increase the store of human
knowledge and arts by rewarding inventors and authors with the exclu-
sive rights to their works for a limited time. At the same time, the
granted monopo! does not extend to property not covered by the pat-
ent or copyright.'
Here we see parallelism not just in function, but also in origin and
structure. First, as to origin, the Fourth Circuit explicitly notes the "par-
allel" policies of patent and copyright law in drawing upon patent misuse
doctrine to adopt a similar doctrine for copyright." The two doctrines
are also nearly identical in structure: they are defenses that require the
defendant to prove that the plaintiff has used its copyright or patent "in a
manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant. ' 6' If misuse
is proven, the IP rights holder cannot recover for infringement during
any period of misuse.
But what is the significance of doctrinal parallelism? Is it anything
more than a fancy name for drawing an analogy between different rules,
263. See United States Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457,465 (1956).
264. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
265. See Miskimon, supra note 26o, at 1689.
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
267. Lasercomb, 91 F.2d at 976 (emphasis added).
268. Another example of this kind of doctrinal parallelism can be found in Sony, in which the
Court drew upon the staple article of commerce provision of the Patent Code and applied it in limiting
contributory infringement under copyright law. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 44-41 (1983).
269. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 976.
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or using analogical reasoning in the law? This is like that, and therefore
we should treat that like this. While it's true that analogy is commonplace
in the law,"' doctrinal parallelism is meant to encompass more than anal-
ogy. Analogy in the law tends to involve direct or express comparisons
made by courts. By contrast, doctrinal parallelism need not involve any
conscious or intentional comparison at all; the points of parallelism be-
tween doctrines may be latent or even unintended. And, although doc-
trinal parallelism does rely upon analogical reasoning to draw
comparisons, it attempts to do more: to examine systematically the evo-
lution of the law in order to discern common patterns in the origin, struc-
ture, and function of different doctrines and rules. While analogical
reasoning need not include anything more than a factual comparison of
two cases applying one doctrine (say, the minimum contacts test for per-
sonal jurisdiction"'), the study of doctrinal parallelism focuses on two or
more doctrines as they developed over time, in the hopes of finding inter-
relationships among the doctrines that may not have been apparent be-
fore.
By identifying these common patterns in the law, we may better un-
derstand legal doctrines or rules through enhanced comprehension of
their origin, structure, and function. Sometimes, of course, these interre-
lationships will be obvious, as it is for the misuse doctrines in copyright
and patent law, which courts recognized by express analogy. Other times,
however, the interrelationships will be less apparent, as I believe is the
case with the various uses of the public domain, which often developed
without any express analogy to each other. In these sorts of cases, where
the relevant doctrines or rules are underdeveloped, unsettled, or not of-
ten associated with each other, the study of doctrinal parallelism may
have its greatest reward.
Evolution theory provides a helpful comparison to understand the
possible benefits the study of doctrinal parallelism may have for the
law. 72 Part of the genius of Darwin's theory of evolution is that it re-
270. See Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical Reasoning, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. I179 (1999); Cass
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, io6 HARV. L. REV. 741 993).
271. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
272. There is a fair body of legal scholarship that has drawn upon or discussed the theory of evolu-
tion in the context of the law. See, e.g., PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 69-98
(1980); Robert Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 91 YALE L.J. 1238 ('99I); E.
Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985); Michael S.
Fried, The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 291 (i999); Her-
bert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985); Oliver A. Houck,
Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of Environmental Law, 63 Miss. L.J. 403 (i994);
J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society
and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy. 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996); M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in
Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 31 (1993).
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vealed possible interrelationships among different organisms that may
have appeared, on the surface, to have no connection whatsoever to each
other.273 Under divergent evolution theory, different organisms may have
structures-a human arm, a bat's wings, a whale's flippers, a cat's fore-
limbs-that appear quite different on the surface.274 But, in fact, these
homologous structures are quite similar when they first develop in the
embryo.275 Although the structures may look different and may eventu-
ally perform somewhat different functions for each organism, the struc-
tures develop in a quite similar manner among the group.276 Under
evolution theory, this common ancestry shows the relatedness of differ-
ent organisms.
By contrast, under convergent evolution theory, 77 different organ-
isms may have similar structures-the wings in birds, insects, bats, and
reptiles-that have virtually the same function. But these analogous
structures are not thought to have developed from a common ancestor,
but instead, from different ancestors that evolved through adaptations
better suited to the pressures placed on them by a similar environment.78
According to convergent evolution theory, different organisms may de-
velop similar features through adaptations when faced with similar envi-
ronments or architectural demands. 79
273. See CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES AND THE DESCENT OF MAN 99 (I96O) (elaborat-
ing theory of natural selection to support view "that all animals and all plants throughout all time and
space should be related to each other in groups, subordinate to groups, in the manner which we eve-
rywhere behold -namely, varieties of the same species most closely related, species of the same genus
less closely and unequally related, forming sections and sub-genera, species of distinct genera much
less closely related, and genera related in different degrees, forming sub-families, families, orders, sub-
classes, and classes"); ERNEST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION,
AND INHERITANCE 507 (1982) ("Darwin ... was the first author to postulate that all organisms have de-
scended from common ancestors by a continuous process of branching.").
274. For a general discussion of divergent evolution, see 3 MAGILL'S SURVEY OF SCIENCE: LIFE SCI-
ENCES SERIES 911-12 (Frank N. Magill ed., I99i).
275. DOUGLAS J. FUTUYAMA, EVOLUJTIONARY BIOLOGY 109 (3d ed. 1998) ("[O]rgans of two organisms
are homologous if they have been inherited (and perhaps modified) from an equivalent organ in a
common ancestor.").
276. See id. at iog-io; see also ScoTT FREEMAN & JON C. HERRON, EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS 22-23
(2d ed. 2001) (discussing homology and common ancestry).
277. For a general discussion of convergent evolution, see FUTUYAMA, supra note 275, at ITO;
MAGILL, supra note 274, at 913-14; JOHN A. ENDLER, NATURAL SELECTION IN THE WILD 62-64 (1986).
278. See STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTION 1077 (2002) (The "similarity [is] due to
common pressures of natural selection upon backgrounds of no common descent[.]").
279. See MAGILL, supra note 274, at 913 ("[T]he forms of their bodies [under convergent evolution]




A third form of evolution is parallel evolution."' This type of evolu-
tion is a slight variation of divergent evolution, in that both forms of evo-
lution are predicated on the development of organisms from a common
ancestor. Here, however, the organisms develop with even greater simi-
larities than they do under divergent evolution, so that the physical re-
semblance between the organisms may be even more apparent.
I am not schooled enough in evolutionary biology to defend the va-
lidity of evolution as a scientific theory. I do have the assurances of a
close biologist friend, however, that "just about every biologist (except
maybe a Raelian) believes in Darwin's theory in principle." ''S The reason
I draw this analogy is not to show that evolution is necessarily right, but
rather to sketch out a particular model or framework by which doctrinal
developments may be more systematically analyzed in the law.
At the risk of causing some confusion with parallel evolution, I will
use the term "doctrinal parallelism" as an umbrella term to encompass
any instance of similarity among doctrines in terms of origin, structure, or
function. Thus, when I speak of doctrinal parallelism, I intend to include
what might be likened to not only parallel evolution, but also divergent
and convergent evolution. All three forms of evolution indicate some
similarity-or what I will characterize as a point of "parallelism"-
among different things. My theory is that we should think of the law as
sometimes evolving in ways analogous to the evolution of organisms. But
let me be clear: my view is not that all law can be explained by what I call
doctrinal parallelism, or that all law is subject to evolution or a kind of
natural legal selection. My argument is more modest; sometimes the law
may evolve in a way that mimics evolution theory.
For example, a common norm or principle may give rise to different
doctrines or rules that develop structurally or functionally in a parallel
manner, much akin to parallel or divergent evolution (common origin).
The doctrines of patent and copyright misuse provide one example: their
common source is the public policy inherent in the Copyright and Patent
Clause, and their structure and function is virtually the same, i.e., to pre-
vent IP rights holders from misusing their IP rights to restrain competi-
tion beyond the proper scope of the rights. Another example can be
280. For a general discussion of parallel evolution and homology, see ENDLER, supra note 277, at
59-60; FUTUYAMA, supra note 275, at I io ("Parallel evolution is thought to involve similar developmen-
tal modifications that evolve independently (often in closely related organisms, because they are likely
to have similar developmental mechanisms to begin with).").
281. Interview with Robert Jeng, Ph.D., Dept. of Molecular and Cell Biology, University of Cal. at
Berkeley in Berkeley, Cal. (Jan. j6, 2003). See also MAGILL, supra note 274, at 626 ("It is perhaps fair
to state at the outset that no well-informed biologist doubts evolution any longer.").
282. How much and to what extent I leave for future inquiry.
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found in the renewal right under the i909 Copyright Act2s3 and the ter-
mination right under the 1976 Copyright Act.2"' On the surface, they are
two distinct animals. And, in fact, some works are eligible for both re-
newal and a termination right. But both emanate from the same common
norm. Congress specifically crafted the termination right to provide a
"second chance" opportunity comparable to the renewal right that would
give authors the chance to recoup value from their copyrights by allowing
them to invalidate existing licenses. Although the features of renewal and
termination are somewhat different 8 they function in a parallel manner
to allow authors a "second chance."
Other times, different areas of law may embrace doctrines that serve
the same or similar function, without necessarily originating from the
same source or a single animating principle. The doctrines develop in
similar fashion in response to a similar environmental or architectural
demand, much akin to convergent evolution (common adaptation). For
example, the doctrines of misuse in patent and copyright law share a
similar function to the doctrine of "unclean hands," even though they all
do not originate from the exact same source: although misuse derives
from equity, unlike the doctrine of unclean hands it derives more specifi-
cally from the policy inherent in the Copyright Clause.
Another example of convergent evolution in the law can be found in
the non-discrimination principle embodied in the Equal Protection
Clause and in the principle of national treatment in intellectual property
law. The Equal Protection Clause protects people from discrimination
283. Under the I9O9 Copyright Act, the renewal term gave authors the ability to exploit their
copyrights free and clear of any prior licenses from the initial term. Renewal gave authors a "second
chance" to recoup value from their copyrights, based somewhat on the paternalistic notion that au-
thors might foolishly bargain away their exclusive rights without full appreciation of the value of their
works. Renewal occurred upon the expiration of the 28th year of the initial term of copyright, but au-
thors had to file an application in the 28th year of copyright in order to obtain a renewal term. Copy-
right Act of i909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, io8o-81. Because the copyrights to some works
published before the 1976 Act are still subsisting, current copyright law still uses the concept of re-
newal for those works. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2o00).
284. Congress abandoned the system of renewal for future works when it enacted the 1976 Copy-
right Act. In place of renewal, Congress gave authors a termination right, which functions in a manner
similar to renewal. An author may now terminate past licenses during a five-year period beginning at
the end of thirty-five years after the assignment. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c). As with the renewal
term, the termination right affords authors a "second chance" to gain value from their copyrights by
releasing them from their licenses of their works.
285. The main structural difference is that renewal operated at once (end of the 28th year) to clear
possibly all past licenses granted by the author, whereas the termination right operates at separate
times for each license granted by the author.
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based on certain suspect classes, including national origin and alienage.2
6
Governmental discrimination based on national origin and alienage must
survive strict scrutiny.7 It may perhaps be somewhat surprising to learn
that intellectual property law recognizes a comparable principle of non-
discrimination for foreign nationals as well. All of the major international
agreements dealing with intellectual property-TRIPs, the Berne Con-
vention,289 the Paris Convention," ° and the Rome Convention29'-are
founded on the principle of national treatment. Under this principle, a
country must extend to foreign nationals legal rights (here, with respect
to IP) that are at least as favorable as those enjoyed by its own nation-
als.29 This principle is not an exact equivalent of equal protection, be-
cause it allows a country to treat foreign nationals better than its own
nationals. And the principle may have developed more out of an eco-
nomic concern (to enable international sale of intellectual property
goods) than out of recognition that discrimination against foreign nation-
als is invidious from a moral point of view. But, at the same time, the
principle of national treatment does function as a restraint against dis-
crimination in a manner that is analogous to the Equal Protection
Clause: the government may not discriminate against foreign nationals in
according intellectual property rights.
The study of doctrinal parallelism can help to correct the inclination
of taking an insular view of the law, which may be more prevalent in to-
day's environment of specialization. Much of this specialization in the
law is for the good, but there is a danger that each of us can see only a
glimpse of the proverbial elephant in our respective fields. Recognition
of doctrinal parallelism, however, can reveal patterns or developments
across different areas of law that were completely ignored in the past.
Pattern recognition is a common subject of study in other fields, such as
artificial intelligence, bioinformatics, engineering, statistics, and neural
286. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (noting that discrimination based on national ori-
gin is given the "most exacting scrutiny"); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (971)
("[C]lassifications based on alienage [are] inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.").
287. See supra note 286.
288. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 3.
289. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 3 (1971 Paris text).
290. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 2 (t967 Stockholm text).
291. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
Broadcasting Organisations, arts. 4-6 ("Rome Convention") (t96I).
292. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 20 (2001) ("The na-
tional treatment principle, embodied in all the major intellectual property conventions as well as the
TRIPs Agreement, is a rule of nondiscrimination, promising foreign intellectual property owners that




networks.293 Although these fields may differ in their focus, they all rec-
ognize that the ability to recognize patterns in data is an important form
of learning. I'd like to draw upon this basic insight by more formally
studying the existence of patterns in the law.
To some extent, the law has always operated by pattern recognition
through the process of categorization and analogical reasoning. Legal
scholarship is not barren of attempts to draw connections among differ-
ent doctrines or rules; '94 indeed, this is a stock-and-trade of legal synthe-
sis (although typically within the same area of law). What I propose to
do, however, is to make the study of the existence of patterns in the law
more formal, not only by giving it a name (doctrinal parallelism), but
also, and more importantly, by providing a framework drawn from evolu-
tion theory by which we may analyze parallelism in the law, particularly
across different areas of law whose connection may seem remote or even
nonexistent. The underlying premise on which my theory rests is that
parallel doctrines are usually parallel for some reason. Discerning that
reason is the desideratum of the theory of doctrinal parallelism.
293. See, e.g., K.S. Fu, APPLICATIONS OF PATTERN RECOGNITION (1982) (remote sensing, seismic
wave interpretation, system reliability, medical data analysis. speech recognition); HOWARD MARGOLIS,
PATTERNS, THINKING AND COGNITION (1987) (human cognition); WILLIAM S. MEISEL, COMPUTER-
ORIENTED APPROACHES TO PATTERN RECOGNITION (1972) (mathematics and statistics); YOH-HAN PAO,
ADAPTIVE PATTERN RECOGNITION AND NEURAL NETWORKS (1989) (neural networks); B.D. RIPLEY, PAT-
TERN RECOGNITION AND NEURAL NETWORKS (1996) (same); J.M. Spectar, The Fruit of the Human Ge-
nome Tree: Cautionary Tales about Technology, Investment, and the Heritage of Humankind, 23 Loy.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (201) (mapping the human genome).
294. For elegant examples of pattern recognition in constitutional law. see Charles Fried, Types, 14
CONST. COMMENT. 55 (1997); Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (994).
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C. DOCTRINAL PARALLELISM IN THE USES OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GOVERNMENT SECRECY CASES
This section explains how the various uses of the public domain are
parallel in origin, structure, and function.
i. Parallel Origins of the Public Domain
The first point of parallelism between the use of the public domain
in intellectual property law and its use in government secrecy cases is
origin. At least some of these uses originate directly from the same
source, the Constitution, while all can be described as originating from
the same common norm of protecting the free flow of culture, informa-
tion, and know-how in a free and open society. Alternatively, all of the
uses can be viewed as parallel developments or adaptations in response
to the same potential for abuse in the government's power to control the
public's access to sources of learning.
a. Common Origin I: The First Amendment and the
Copyright Clause
Although the Supreme Court has long recognized the concept of the
public domain in interpreting both the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment,295 it has stopped short of explaining the precise relationship
between the public domain from these two constitutional provisions. The
connection is not difficult to draw, however. One of the goals of both the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment is to ensure that the public
has a wide availability of works and information from which to draw.2
96
The public domain under the Copyright Clause"97 and the public domain
under the First Amendment' 98 are both designed to protect the public's
right of free access to important sources of learning-works of art, litera-
295. See supra notes 53-71, 79-125, 156-77 and accompanying text.
296. See Twentieth Century Music Corp v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (I975) (under the Copyright
Clause "private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music and the other arts"); First National Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 782-83
(1978) (First Amendment has a "role in affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dis-
semination of information and ideas."); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (First
Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.").
297. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (The Copyright Clause bars "restrict[ing]
free access" to materials in public domain.); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S.
141, 153 (1989) (recognizing policy in Copyright Clause "of allowing free access to copy whatever the
federal patent and copyright laws leave in the public domain.").
298. See Belloti, 435 U.S. at 783 (First Amendment "goes beyond protection of the press and the
self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which the public may draw.").
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ture, know-how, information about government, etc.' 99 Such public access
is critical to furthering the promotion of learning among the citizenry, a
common goal of both the Copyright Clause" and the First Amend-
ment, 0' which in turn facilitates self-expression and self-governance.3 2
However, the precise operation of the public domain in both contexts is
slightly different. In the First Amendment context, once material is
available to the public, it enters the public domain, establishing a First
Amendment right of access among the public to the material. This un-
derstanding might be called the First Amendment baseline to the free
flow of information in a democratic society:3"3 once information is avail-
able to the public it must be allowed to flow freely among the people.
Diagram A depicts this model of the public domain.
299. This is not to suggest that all aspects of IP law work free of tension with the First Amend-
ment. The Copyright Clause does permit restrictions on public access to works by allowing the grant of
exclusive rights for limited times. There is an extensive debate in cases and legal scholarship concern-
ing the extent to which copyright law (or other IP law) may cause the restriction of speech in tension
with or actual violation of the First Amendment. See Samuelson, supra note 122, at 320-22 (summariz-
ing the debate and scholarship). The Supreme Court has taken the view that copyright law serves as an
"engine of free expression" by providing incentives for the creation of works. Undue restrictions of
speech in copyright law are thought to be ameliorated by First Amendment "safety valves" in the fair
use and idea/expression doctrines. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558-60 (1985). But, even with these safety valves, First Amendment concerns may still arise in copy-
right law if Congress alters the traditional contours of copyright protection. See Eldred v. Ashcroft,
123 S. Ct. 769, 789-9o (2003).
300. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3 d 1257, 1261 (sith Cir. 2001).
301. See Belloti, 435 U.S. at 783 (First Amendment protects access for "society's edification."); see
also Samuelson, supra note 122, at 326 (arguing that "copyright clause ... embodies First Amendment
and anti-monopoly principles").
302. The public domain helps to ensure the kind of democratic governance envisioned by Madison,
who warned: "A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it is but
a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.... A people who mean to be their own Gover-
nors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives." 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
103 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (Letter to W.T. Barry dated August 4, 1822).





























On the left-hand side of the diagram is the baseline understanding of
the public domain governed by the First Amendment. Starting at the top
of the diagram is the polar opposite of the public domain: the domain of
secrecy, where the public has no right of access. This realm includes ma-
terials held in secret not only by the government, but also by private in-
dividuals (such as an author with an unpublished manuscript or an
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inventor with an invention still in development). However, once the ma-
terial becomes publicly available without IP protection, the baseline First
Amendment approach accords full rights of access to the public to re-
ceive, copy, and further disseminate the material, which is deemed to
have entered the public domain. Of course, the baseline approach may
be departed from when the state can satisfy the relevant standard of First
Amendment scrutiny for the regulation of speech.3 4 But, assuming the
baseline approach applies, the First Amendment protects the ability of
the public to freely access materials in the public domain. Importantly,
the flow of information from top to bottom, from secret to the public
domain, is unidirectional. 5 This one-way flow helps to ensure that in-
formation and know-how that are already available to the public remain
"free as the air to common use.'' 6
On the right-hand side of the diagram, the entry of material subject
to IP protection into the public domain is slightly different. The First
Amendment baseline has an important Copyright Clause overlay. The
public availability of a writing or invention protected by IP does not acti-
vate the immediate entry of the material into the public domain." In-
stead, the Copyright Clause adds another layer to the flow of material
from secret to the public domain. In order to give authors and inventors
304. For example, the government can proscribe publicly available child pornography, which is
unprotected speech, consistent with the First Amendment. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982). Under the First Amendment, the public domain has no legitimate claim to unprotected catego-
ries of speech.
305. As Justice Brandeis wrote, it is "[t]he general rule of law that the noblest of human produc-
tions -knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become, after voluntary communica-
tion to others, free as the air to common use." Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250
(1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting): see Benkler. Free as the Air, supra note 35, at 355. Or, as Jefferson
wrote, "ideas should freely spread from one another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruc-
tion of man,... like the air in which we breathe,.., incapable of confinement or exclusive appropria-
tion." Letter to Isaac McPherson, quoted in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
306. Benkler, Free as the Air, supra note 35, at 355. The analogy to the air conveys the importance
of the public domain to sustain democratic living: just as air is essential for existence, so too is the pub-
lic domain. The former sustains our physical needs; the latter, our mental and intellectual needs. Peo-
ple could not breathe without air, nor think freely without information that is available to all. The
analogy also illuminates the relationship between the public domain and the free flow of information.
Information in the public domain is meant to spread like the atmosphere, to flow freely for all to en-
joy. Finally, the analogy suggests the strength that courts attributed to the constitutional restraint
against government incursions of the public domain. For government to deplete the public domain or
prevent the public's access to it would be akin to the government attempting to take away a person's
ability to breathe.
307. As explained above, the public availability of a trade secret would inject it into the public do-
main, so here the flow into the public domain coincides with the First Amendment baseline approach.
Trademarks are somewhat different from the other forms of IP; entry of a trademark into the public
domain hinges on whether the mark has become a generic term. Thus, one might describe this flow as




an incentive to create and disseminate their works and inventions to the
public, the Copyright Clause authorizes the grant of exclusive rights to
their creators for a limited time. This limited time is like limbo, but with
an eventual and definite end. The limited grant of exclusive rights serves
as an inducement or incentive for people "to create and disseminate
ideas."' 8 While the copyrights and patents are in effect, the public has
partial access to the works or inventions. The partial access allows the
public to have (i) unrestricted access to the unprotected elements in any
work or invention it lawfully purchases, such as the facts or ideas in a
copyrighted work, but only (2) restricted access to the protected ele-
ments in the work or invention, such as the expression in a copyrighted
work."° Once the copyright or patent expires, the underlying work or in-
vention falls into the public domain, and the public gains full, unre-
stricted access rights to the entire work or invention." °
One might question whether there is any real difference between (I)
the public's full access to material in the public domain and (2) the pub-
lic's partial access to material subject to IP. After all, the public has ac-
cess to many copyrighted works through the library or bookstore.
Although the public cannot make copies of copyrighted works or make
other derivative works based on them without permission of the copy-
right holder, it can freely use the ideas and any facts contained therein.
Polk Wagner suggests that materials subject to copyright or patents may
provide the public with much "open information.... For example, some
of the underlying material contained in a work or invention may be out-
side the scope of IP: the ideas in a book or general scientific principles
utilized in a patented invention. In other cases, copyrighted or patented
materials may stimulate greater discussion or research in an area:
"Eminem's music stimulates public discussion of spousal abuse," Wagner
suggests.1 2 Under a theory of incomplete capture, an IP "owner cannot
possibly appropriate all of the information (and thus social value) gener-
3o8. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
309. The public has partial access because ultimately the IP rights holder may restrict copying of
the material completely and limit other public uses of the material in a number of ways. See, e.g., Paul
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 986 (1970) (describing how
copyrights enable the restriction of public access to expression).
31o. This is not to suggest that the First Amendment does not operate whenever Congress exer-
cises its Copyright Clause power. Although the Court has recognized that fair use and the
idea/expression dichotomy normally obviate First Amendment scrutiny of copyright law, such a "defi-
nitional balance" does not apply when Congress alters the traditional contours of copyright protection.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 789-90 (2003); see also Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional
Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 50 J. CoPYRIGrr & Soc'Y (forthcoming 2003).
311. See Wagner, supra note 32, at iooo.
312. Id. at 1007.
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ated by her creation."3 '3 Thus, in Wagner's view, increased IP protection
may grow the public domain by stimulating the creation of more works
that are protected by IP, which in turn yields more "open" information.1 4
Wagner's theory seems to assume, however, that "open" information
that stems from IP protected material provides the same or equivalent
benefit to society as if the material itself were in the public domain." '
Accordingly, in Wagner's calculus, any positive increase of "open" in-
formation is accorded the same value as an increase to the public do-
main. I don't believe that's the case, however.
Even Wagner concedes that "open" information itself may be sub-
ject to IP rights.316 Discussion generated by Eminem's music can itself be
copyrighted. Such copyrighted material is clearly not in the public do-
main-not unless we simply redefine the term to drain it of its original
meaning. We then could include every single patented invention and
every single copyrighted work as being in the public domain. But that re-
sult would make the term meaningless.
However, some "open" information may itself be free of any IP pro-
tection-this is where Wagner's theory has its greatest promise. Such
"open" information arguably adds to the public domain, even though the
underlying material is still copyrighted or patented. But the key issue
that Wagner does not address is whether this kind of "open" information
is fungible with the underlying work that still remains protected by IP. If
it were fungible, then Wagner's theory might support the grant of perpet-
ual copyrights and patents (putting aside constitutional questions) be-
cause whatever might be lost by keeping forever the underlying work
from the public domain could be compensated by the growth of "open"
information that the copyrighted or patented work generated.
Thus, in order to assess properly whether the public domain has
"grown" as Wagner argues, we need to compare the net effect on the
public domain of (i) increasing "open" information in the sense that
Wagner imagines by increasing IP rights, versus (2) not increasing IP
rights but allowing the actual work or invention itself (as opposed to
merely the "open" discussion it generates) to fall into the public domain
after a limited time. If the net growth of the public domain in (i) is less
than the growth in (2), either qualitatively or quantitatively, then serious
problems arise with an IP system that depends on "open" information as
313. Id. at 1O02.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 998 ("[T]he control-critics emphasize the existence of the 'public domain' or 'open' in-
formation-(information that is not subject to proprietary rights, offering anyone access, anytime, for
low or no cost).").
316. Id. at 1oo5 n.34.
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a primary means of growth of the public domain. Although more empiri-
cal study is needed, let me suggest why I believe there is really no com-
parison. A key problem with the "open" information that Wagner
imagines is that it always comes with conditions that must occur before
the IP protected work can even generate "open" information. This
makes the "growth" of the public domain under Wagner's theory always
contingent.
The first condition of Wagner's "open" information is that the IP
rights holder agrees to sell its work. Of course, there is an economic in-
centive to do so in the typical case, but sometimes people have other
purposes (such as, in the patent context, to preemptively block others
from making a technology). And sometimes incentives may spur the IP
rights holder to limit greatly the distribution of the work. For example,
the copyright holders to sheet music for orchestral works typically rent
copies of their works for a single performance, usually at high prices, and
then demand the copies back.
The second condition is payment to the rights holder for the public
to access the underlying work that contains or stimulates the "open" in-
formation. To take one of Wagner's examples, people are paying to buy
Eminem's music: it's not coming for free (even if over the radio3"). Some
of the discussion that Eminem's music generates may well be in the form
of copyrighted articles, which, too, are subject to all these same condi-
tions. The cost of copyrighted works limits the total number of works
that most individuals can afford to purchase. A hundred books in the
public domain could be obtained for the mere cost of printing them from
the Internet, whereas a hundred books still under copyright might cost
several thousand dollars.
The third condition concerns the public's ability to actually find
"open" information contained in an IP protected work. People have to
be able to identify the permissible scope of "open" information if they
are to use it. But the problem is that there is no easy way to do so, except
for maybe in identifying facts described in copyrighted material. Wagner,
for example, discusses how "the fundamental breakthroughs inherent in
the invention of nylon opened up the possibility of further developments
in synthetic polymers."' But how could the subsequent inventors of syn-
thetic polymers be ioo% certain ex ante that their inventions would not
infringe the patent for nylon? A typical patent has at least one claim that
is worded quite broadly. Given this practice, it often is not clear what
317. Radio stations pay for broadcasts of musical works, typically, through a blanket license.
318. Wagner, supra note 32, at ioo6.
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part of a patent is "open" information that can be used without the pat-
entee's consent.
The same problem exists for copyright. Two of Wagner's three ex-
amples involve cases in which the copyright holder actually sued some-
one for infringement based on using what Wagner would describe as
"open" information.319 It is cold comfort to the public if, in order to use
"open" information, it has to be willing to stand and defend against a
lawsuit to prove the information is "open." But that is exactly what may
happen because the standards for determining what is infringement, a
"fair use," or an unprotected "idea" are notoriously fact specific.3"'
Contrast this now with the public domain: there are no restrictions
whatsoever. The public's enjoyment of things in the public domain does
not depend on (i) the IP rights holder's consent or distribution, (2) pay-
ment to the IP owner, or (3) potential exposure to an infringement suit.
Enjoyment of the public domain is unconditional and much more easily
identifiable, since the entire work itself is in the public domain. The only
contingency is the initial grant of IP rights for limited times. Once that
time expires, entry of the material into the public domain is guaranteed
and the public then has a right of free access to the material, end of story.
Even more fundamentally, "open" information fails to capture the
full level of public uses as a work in the public domain. Adding "open"
information to the public domain is an inadequate substitute for adding
entire works and inventions into the public domain after a limited term
of IP. It would make no difference to musicians that they can talk
"openly" about Shostakovich's works. Their learning is in playing the
music, and for that they need the sheet music. But because
Shostakovich's works were removed from the public domain and granted
"restored" copyrights, many orchestras have had to forgo learning or
playing these and other works altogether because the now copyrighted
sheet music is simply too expensive to rent.32 ' And even for things for
which "open" discussion serves a role, open discussion may not be an
adequate substitute for the underlying material itself because people of-
ten need to go straight to the source. For an informed discussion of
Eminem's music, it would be helpful to have copies of the song or the lyr-
ics to analyze; free copying of either, however, is not permitted by copy-
right. And just imagine if the Pentagon Papers, judicial opinions, and
other government works were copyrighted and not in the public do-
319. Id. nn.43-44 (citing Baker v. Selden, ioi U.S. 99 (1879) and SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mif-
flin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (sith Cir. 2001)).
320. See Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1325-26
nn.223-25 (2002).
321. Complaint at 71 54-55, Golan v. Ashcroft, No. oi-B-i854 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001).
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main.3" Any "discussion" of these government works would depend on
satisfaction of the conditions above. In the Pentagon Papers case, the
government could then have potentially obtained an injunction against
The New York Times because copyright law gives the copyright holder
that power to control the distribution of a copyrighted work.
While Wagner stresses the incomplete nature of IP control, there is
simply no getting around the basic fact that IP rights enable control.
Wagner's encapsulating maxim that information "wants to be free" ob-
scures the dynamics of information flow in a society.323 Information is
neutral and inanimate; it wants nothing. How free or open information is
in a particular society ultimately depends on how the government and
laws regulate or control its flow. Intellectual property laws enable the re-
striction of public's use and access to information and know-how by giv-
ing exclusive rights over the material. Even if this is not perfect control
over the material, it is control nonetheless. "Open" information does not
come close to capturing the full benefit of material in the public domain,
which is free of all government or private control.
b. Common Origin 2: Protecting the Free Flow of Information
and Sources of Learning
Thus far, I have described the common origin of only two sets of
cases: (I) copyright and patent cases interpreting the Copyright Clause,
and (2) the First Amendment cases dealing with government secrecy. I
limited my analysis to these cases because they most directly involve in-
terpretation of the Constitution. Yet it is not difficult to see how the
same constitutional value of protecting the flow of information, ideas,
and materials in our society may animate the other uses of the public
domain, even though they may more directly rest on statutory interpreta-
tion, common law doctrine, or regulations. For example, in interpreting
the espionage statute in United States v. Heine, Learned Hand recognized
a public domain limitation to espionage law in order to protect the
spread of information that was lawfully accessible to anyone.3"4 Hand
feared the government's attempt to convict people for simply disseminat-
ing information that was already available to the public, opining that
such a result would constitute "so drastic a repression of free exchange of
information."325
322. Cf Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding
that municipal codes are in the public domain and not copyrightable, even though based on uniform
code drafted by private entity).
323. Wagner, supra note 32, at 999 n.14, 1003.
324. 151 F.2d 813, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1945).
325. Id. at 81 5 .
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The public domain operates in the same way to limit trade secrets.
Perhaps nowhere is the connection between IP and government secrecy
more clear. Trade secret law is a form of espionage law for businesses, as
evidenced by the federal Economic Espionage Act.326 Like information
relating to the national defense, a trade secret must be secret;327 once the
secret becomes public through lawful means, it loses its protection .31 Just
as the public domain forbids the government from prohibiting the use of
public information under state secrets, so too the public domain prevents
private entities that attempt to do the same under trade secrets. In either
case, the public domain sets a clear line between what is proper subject
matter of exclusive rights and what is not.
Similar stories can be told for the remaining uses of the public do-
main. In trademark law, no one can remove a generic word from the pub-
lic domain by asserting a trademark to it.329 The public has rights to
continue to use the word freely in discourse as it has done in the past.
Nor can the government restrict the flow of information that is already
enjoyed by the public, through classification, defense regulations, or de-
nial of FOIA requests. A free and open society is premised on the flow
of information and materials that are in the public domain. All of the
uses of the public domain in IP and government secrecy cases originate
from this common value.
326. is U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
327. Kewanee Oil Corp. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,475 (i974).
328. Id. at 476.
329. See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 8o8 (2d Cit. 1999) (holding that Harley
Davidson could not trademark "hog" because the term had become generic, so Harley could not re-
move "this use of the word from the public domain"); First Bank v. First Bank Sys., Inc., 84 F.3d 1040,
1045 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Generic terms are not entitled to protection under trademark law because such
words are in the public domain and available for all to use.") (citation omitted); Loglan Institute, Inc.
v. Logical Language Group, Inc., 962 F.2d io38, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("[Tlhe term Loglan has never
been a trademark, but rather entered the public domain as a generic name from the time of its incep-
tion.").
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c. Common Adaptation to the Government's Power to
Control Public Access
An alternative way to explain the origin of the public domain is by
convergent evolution. This theory allows for the assumption that some or
all of the various uses of the public domain cannot be traced back to a
common norm or principle of law. Instead of common origin from the
same ancestor, convergent evolution involves common developments or
adaptations among different organisms in response to similar environ-
mental or selective pressures.
The selective pressure in IP and government secrecy cases is nearly
identical: government control (secrecy) or government-sponsored control
(IP) over the public's access to sources of learning.33 Both secrecy and IP
operate to restrict the free flow of information, ideas, and materials. To
effectuate either, an exclusive right over the underlying material must be
recognized. Although secrecy and IP are both considered essential, the
danger in both is that the government's ability to control the public's ac-
cess to materials may be abused. English history under the Crown re-
vealed to the Framers that a government that can exercise complete
control over the public's access to materials often does, whether to grant
exclusive rights to favorites of the Crown for things long enjoyed by the
public, to censor speech deemed offensive or heretical,33 ' or to carry out
judicial proceedings and mete out punishment in secret.332
A more modern example of abuse is provided by the former Soviet
Union. Since its inception in 1917, the Soviet government instituted an
elaborate regime of censorship and state control over the flow of, and ac-
cess to, information and government proceedings. Within days of assum-
ing power, Lenin issued a decree to suppress all non-Bolshevik
publications.333 A few years later, the Glavlit was established to oversee
the public censoring of works.334 During Stalin's reign, the censorship be-
came more severe and more secret. The Stalinist period marked the anti-
public domain at its greatest power. Under Stalin's regime, vast amounts
of information never saw the light of day. Stalin closed down many
learned journals, and forbade the publication of "most economic, social,
and demographic statistics." '335 Basic reports about the government itself,
330. Of course, IP involves government grants of property to private entities. Unlike the govern-
ment secrecy context, the government's restriction of the public's access to works protected by IP in-
volves a decision by a private actor to obtain and enforce exclusive rights.
331. See PATTERSON, supra note 116, at 20-40.
332. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (949) (discussing the Star Chamber).
333. PARTY, CITIZEN, AND STATE IN THE SOVIET UNION xviii (Mervyn Matthews ed., 1989).




such as activities of the ruling party and state bodies, were even greatly
restricted.336 Throughout its reign, the Soviet government proscribed the
dissemination of views that were considered to be counter to or critical of
the Soviet ideals or government.337
Neither i 7th century England nor the former Soviet Union recog-
nized a concept of the public domain. Their governments exercised an
unfettered power to control and deny the people's access to materials.
That power was so complete that the respective governments could even
forbid the dissemination of material that the public had long enjoyed.
Nothing was off-limits from government control.
The dangers of government control over the public's access to mate-
rial are not absent in a democracy. Because we recognize a legitimate use
for both government secrecy (national security) and exclusive rights un-
der the Copyright Clause (spurring creation), both are a necessary part
of our political and social ordering. And, for the most part, we entrust
the government with the power to decide what is the right level of se-
crecy or IP protection. But, as courts have recognized in both contexts,
there must be a limit to the government's power to control the public's
access to materials. Without a public domain to curtail IP, there is noth-
ing to distinguish our understanding of intellectual property from the
British Crown's unfettered understanding. Without a public domain to
curtail government secrecy, there is nothing to distinguish a putative
"open" society from a closed society such as under the Stalinist regime.
Without a public domain, the public's access to materials is always at the
discretion of the government and always susceptible to restriction.
Thus, the recognition of the public domain in IP and government se-
crecy cases can be explained as common responses to the same selective
pressure. Different courts operating within the same "environment" of
our democratic society responded similarly when confronting the same
selective pressure, i.e., the possibility that the government could restrict
or forbid the public's access to material without any limit. One response
to this selective pressure could have been simply to recognize no limit at
all. But that response did not "fit" with our constitutional form of gov-
ernment.
I have tried to depict a comparison between a society with a public
domain (Diagram C) and a society without (Diagram B). IP protection
and secrecy are both forms of government control over the public's ac-
cess to sources of learning. If nothing is beyond the government's con-
trol, then, as shown in Diagram B, there is no buffer between the
336. Id.
337. See id. at 89 (describing Article 70 which prohibits spreading ideas of an anti-Soviet nature).
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government and the public's access to materials. The government can
control (as depicted by the arrows) the public's access to culture, know-
how, and information, as well as the fruits of such access: creativity, self-
expression, criticism, and self-government. That was the unfortunate
situation in 17th century England and the former Soviet Union.
DIAGRAM B
SOCIETY WITH No PUBLIC DOMAIN
The Government
Intellectual Property Government Secrecy
-private, government- -government control
sponsored control over over access to materials
access to materials




0 The Public 4
By contrast, as shown in Diagram C, a society that recognizes a pub-
lic domain has a restraint against the government's power to control the
public's access to sources of learning. The public domain establishes a
buffer between (a) what the government may restrict in terms of public
access through IP or secrecy, and (b) what the government may not re-
strict at all. Whatever is in the public domain belongs to the public. The
government has no power here; it must accede its power to control access
once expiry of IP rights or secrecy occurs. With the public domain as a
buffer, the public's access to culture, know-how, and information is not



























The public domain protects the flow of information, ideas, and mate-
rials, in order to serve higher ends. Within the intellectual property
strand of cases, depicted on the left-hand side of the diagram, the public
domain has (I) the immediate goal of ensuring access to culture and
know-how, and (2) the ultimate goal of fostering self-expression and the
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further creation of works through the ability to build on what has come
before.
While much of the literature on the public domain focuses on its role
in spurring creativity or innovation,33 an even more elemental role of the
public domain is simply to ensure universal access to our common culture
and knowledge. Thus, while most people in our country are probably not
authors or inventors, everyone still enjoys this guaranteed right of access
to material in the public domain. If this access is properly utilized, the
most immediate benefit should be the promotion of learning in society.
The realization of this goal should be achievement enough to justify the
protection of the public domain.
But part of the beauty of the design of the public domain is that it
aims at self-generation. The public's right of access helps to ensure that
we all have a source of common knowledge and materials from which to
create, innovate, and build upon. Disney has made films of numerous
public domain stories. Shakespeare's works have inspired numerous pro-
ductions as well as new creations. On a more practical level, the expira-
tion of a patent for any drug, such as Prozac, allows other companies to
make generic versions and to develop new, improved drugs based on the
material now in the public domain.
An analogous story can be told for the government secrecy cases. As
the right-hand side of Diagram C shows, the public domain has (i) the
immediate goal of ensuring access to information, and (2) the ultimate
goal of fostering self-governance and informed critique of government.
Most people probably realize the immediate goal of accessing informa-
tion in the public domain, but not everyone uses that information to
achieve the ultimate goal of self-governance or critique of government.
Just as in the case of the IP strand, however, the public's utilization of ac-
cess to information should foster greater learning among society, an
achievement that would alone justify the protection of the public domain.
As in the case of the IP strand, the right to access information in the
government secrecy cases yields an additional benefit, that is, to foster
informed critique of government and the aspiration of self-governance.
As Neil Netanel has explained, democracy depends on the maintenance
of a civil society, a "sphere of voluntary, nongovernmental association in
which individuals determine their shared purposes and norms." '39 In this
civil society, "citizens develop the independent spirit, self-direction, so-
cial responsibility, discursive skill, political awareness, and mutual recog-
338. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 26, at io8.




nition."34 A civil society is not possible, however, without the education
of its citizens, who must be able to evaluate and participate in their gov-
ernment.34' Such participation requires "the widespread distribution of
knowledge.""34 "For citizens to articulate their interests, participate in
civic association, and engage in reasoned deliberation on public issues,
they must 'have access to the rich store of the accumulated wealth of
mankind in knowledge, ideas and purposes.'
343
The public domain thus operates in the IP strand of cases in a man-
ner that is parallel to its operation in the government secrecy strand of
cases. As depicted in Diagram C, on one strand, the public domain pro-
tects (i) access to culture and know-how, in part to promote (ii) creation
and self-expression. On the other strand, the public domain protects (i)
access to information, in part to promote (ii) criticism and self-
governance. At bottom, both strands respond to the selective pressures
of government control by establishing a restraint on the government's
power to deny the public's access to culture, know-how, and information.
2. Parallel Structures and Functions of the Public Domain
The various uses of the public domain in IP and the government se-
crecy cases also share a parallel structure and function. They accord
equal rights of access to members of the public to disperse the power to
control information and ideas equally among the people.
a. Parallel Structures: Rights of Access to Public Property
When the public domain is recognized in IP or government secrecy
cases, its basic structure is the accordance of rights of access and owner-
ship in the public to use and enjoy the underlying material. The basic
right of access to materials in the public domain is not predicated on any
condition; it is a right that asks for nothing in return. To my knowledge,
there is no other universal right to access and use tangible goods and ma-
terial (in some cases cost-free) made by others that is recognized in the
law. Unlike most things in our society, this is one domain in which we all
are treated equally and share equally in a common enterprise and cul-
ture. The public domain ensures that everyone, not just the privileged or
rich, can have access to our common culture and to information essential
340. Id. at 343.
341. Id. at 343-44.
342. Id. at 348.
343. Id. at 349. See also Benkler, Looking Glass, supra note 35, at 196 ("Article I and the First
Amendment claim that both democracy and autonomy are better served by an information production
and exchange system built around a robust public domain, rather than one built around extensive




for self-government. Few things in our society are as democratically dis-
persed.
b. Parallel Functions: Restraining Government Control over
the Public's Access to Information and Sources of Learning
The uses of the public domain in the IP and government secrecy
cases have a parallel function in serving as a structural restraint against
government control over the public's access to materials. By dispersing
property rights among all people, the public domain acts as a restraint
against the kind of governmental abuses of the British Crown in censor-
ship and concentrations of power in the production and dissemination of
information and technology.3"
The public domain also serves as a check on government abuse by
limiting the extent to which the government can conceal its own conduct
and insulate itself from criticism. Without a public domain, the govern-
ment could operate shielded from public scrutiny, as Stalin did in the
most repressive days of the Soviet Union. The public domain, however,
limits the ability of government to shield itself from public scrutiny by
guaranteeing the public access to "public things."
This important function of the public domain, as a structural re-
straint against government, is an example of the ingenious mechanism
that the Framers devised in the Constitution to check governmental
abuses that can occur with the concentration of power, such as with a
federal government dominating over the states, a national church joined
with the state, or one branch of the federal government dominating over
the others.345 In drafting the Constitution, the Framers sought "to divide
power, to demarcate its limits, and to establish mechanisms that would
guard against the aggrandizement of power."'36 The public domain does
so in both IP and government secrecy cases by dispersing power to con-
trol information ultimately and equally among the people.
D. THE DIFFERENCE OF THE PUBLIC's DOMAIN
A number of legal scholars have attempted to define more precisely
the concept of public domain.347 In my view, the proper understanding of
the public domain starts with the question of ownership-who has the
power over the contents in the public domain. The "domain of things
public" was originally recognized to indicate that the people owned cer-
tain "public things" that are essential for the knowledge of the citi-
344. Marci A. Hamilton, The Historical and Philosophical Underpinnings of the Copyright Clause,
5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS INTELL. PROP. FROM BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. L., YESHIVA U., at 9 (1999).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. See Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23, at 6o-64 (disclosing various definitions).
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zenry-the common culture, information, and know-how of society. Al-
though notions of public ownership are more pervasive in the context of
the public domain in IP law, they do appear in the First Amendment con-
text.3 8 The "public things" might relate to works that were once pro-
tected by intellectual property, or to information concerning the
administration of government. In either case, these "public things" are to
be shared and controlled by the people as a matter of right.
When we speak about public rights, public property, or a domain of
things belonging to the public, we prioritize the public's role in democ-
ratic governance. Although "public" has several meanings,349 a central
meaning is the "state of belonging to the community. '350 In the public
domain, it is the people, not the government or any single private entity,
who are the ultimate keepers of the common culture and knowledge in
our democracy. The public domain is, in other words, the public's do-
main, a zone that is off-limits to government interference.35 '
Although I do not attempt to provide a general test for determining
what constitutes a "public thing," a basic defining feature of a "public
thing" is its inherent value in providing some public benefit that is
deemed essential for society. The whole point of the public domain is to
benefit the public. In the IP context the public domain benefits the public
in a number of ways. People have greater access to information or mate-
rial when it enters the public domain, since the material can be copied
freely and disseminated at lower cost. People can also freely use and
build upon public domain material to create new works and innovations.
In the secrecy context, the public domain benefits the public by providing
information about the administration of government that is essential for
a democracy. The overriding goal of the public domain is the crafting of a
public space in our democratic society that guarantees the public full ac-
348. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469. 492 (975) (holding that a court pro-
ceeding is "public property"); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 68i, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) ("When
government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the peo-
ple.").
349. See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229 n.I (2003).
350. See THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (2d ed. 1789) (de-
fining "publickness" as the "[sitate of belonging to the community; openness, state of being generally
known or publick"); see also Mark H. Moore, Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization:
Introduction, I16 HARv. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (2O03) ("public" indicates some notion of a collective en-
terprise comprised from or for the people at large).
351. Recognizing zones that are free from government interference ("government-free zones") is
essential to democratic governance. The right to privacy creates another important zone of non-
interference, but discussion of its interplay with the public domain must await another day.
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cess to and use of different sources of learning, unencumbered by any
government control or restrictions. 52
Considering the doctrinal parallelism between the public domain in
IP and the public domain in government secrecy cases provides a much
deeper understanding of the concept. Although there may be differences
among the various uses, the similarities should not be overlooked. In
evolutionary terms, the public domain in IP occupies the same genus as
the public domain in government secrecy cases, but the two doctrines
may in fact be different species. Understanding the parallel origin, struc-
ture, and function of these species of the public domain gives us greater
insight for evaluating measures that affect the public domain more gen-
erally. Just as researchers study disease or changes to the environment by
studying how they affect closely related organisms, so too policy makers
should examine possible threats to the public domain by studying how
they affect the public domain in different areas of law.
IV. DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION: CATASTROPHES, DIFFERENT
RULES, AND THE EXTINCTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
For those who criticize legal scholarship for being too removed from
practice, or, in Judge Harry Edwards's far less charitable words, for being
just too "useless," '353 my previous discussion may seem like unwelcome
reading. But I can assure you that my discussion has a purpose beyond
academic exercise, and that the "theory" in the previous sections I will
relate here to practice. Indeed, much of my understanding of the public
domain has been greatly informed by my experience litigating cases in
which that very concept was at issue. In this last Part, I would like to
write about the growing number of ways in which the public domain lies
in jeopardy. The predicament we now face is something of a paradox:
just when technology has offered a revolutionary way to maximize the
public's enjoyment of the public domain, the concept of the public do-
main in U.S. law may be most vulnerable to extinction. What is at stake
today is whether the public domain truly belongs to the public, or, in-
stead, is something ultimately under the control of the government.
352. This is not to say that IP and government secrecy do not provide public benefits; obviously,
they do. But these benefits (in providing incentives for creation of works or protecting national secu-
rity) are worthwhile in our democracy only with the greater benefits provided by the public's free ac-
cess to the public domain.
353. Harry T. Edwards, Reflections (On Law Review, Legal Education, Law Practice, and My
Alma Mater), Ioo MicH. L. REV. 1999. 2001 (2002).
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A. THE INTERNET AND THE PROMISE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
First, let me begin with the positive side, and the ways in which the
promise of the public domain is becoming more realized. For most of its
history, the public domain has been underutilized and under-appreciated.
Although the public's right of free access to the public domain is one of
the most democratic-enhancing rights that we all share, it has been easily
taken for granted. When people talk about enjoying a right to public
school education354 or debate the value of universal access to health
care,355 it is easy to understand the value of those rights. People can visu-
alize the school or health care provider from which they or their children
may receive benefits: those benefits are concrete, immediate, and real.
But if you wanted to enjoy the public domain, where would you go? Be-
cause people cannot find the public domain like a school or hospital, the
benefits the public domain offered may have seemed slight, if not ethe-
real.
In the past few years, all of this has changed because of one single
force: the growth of the Internet . The Internet has revolutionized the
public domain by giving it, in essence, a home. Now if you want to enjoy
the public domain, you can go on the Internet. Therein can be found a
growing number of sites devoted to the sharing of thousands of works in
the public domain. For example, Eric Eldred runs his own Web site to
give the public free access to works that are in the public domain, such as
the works of Nathaniel Hawthorne and Henry James.3 7 His project
started out as a small way to enhance his children's education, but turned
into something great that can be enjoyed by all. Teaming up with his
counsel and Stanford Law School professor Lawrence Lessig and others,
Eldred has started an even more ambitious project, the Creative Com-
mons, which allows authors to grant permissible uses of their works
through licenses (effectuated by software) or to donate entirely their
works for free use in the public domain.5
The Internet has spawned numerous other sites devoted to the shar-
ing of public domain works. Project Gutenberg is a notable example.359
Started in 1971 by Michael Hart before the advent of the Internet, Pro-
ject Gutenberg is run by hundreds of volunteers who share the belief that
354- See Suzanne McAlpine, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools: Will Education Ever Be
Deemed a Fundamental Right?, 1o U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 629 (1990).
355. See Note, UniversalAccess to Health Care, lo8 HAR V. L. REV. 1323 (1995).
356. See generally LESSIo, supra note 26, at 19-25; Samuelson, supra note 250, at s66-69.
357. See Eldritch Press, http://eldritchpress.org ("Here are free, accessible books. Read them and
go in peace.") (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
358. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
359. See Project Guttenberg, http://promo.net/pg (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
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it would be a "really good idea if lots of famous and important texts were
freely available to everyone in the world."' ' As of 2002, Project Guten-
berg had available 6,267 e-books of public domain works for free
downloading, 36' including the works of Shakespeare, Dante, Edgar Allan
Poe, Arthur Conan Doyle, Lewis Carroll, and many, many others. 6z In-
credible as Project Gutenberg is, it is now only one of several Web sites
devoted to providing an online library for public domain books.,6' Brew-
ster Kahle and Rick Prelinger have undertaken a similar operation with
public domain films in their online project, the Internet Archive.364
Many other sites provide public information that bears directly on
the administration of government. The government itself has added con-
siderable material to the public domain, including judicial opinions and
court rules,36' different agency rulings and regulations, 66 and laws enacted
by Congress., 6' The Delaware Municipal Court in Ohio has even estab-
lished online public access to its courtroom proceedings through real-
time webcasts of the proceedings.6 s
Realizing the promise of the Internet appears just to be beginning.
In December 2002, Congress passed the E-Government Act, which cre-
ates a new Office of Electronic Government that will be charged with the
responsibility of coordinating and making more user-friendly the balkan-
ized ways in which different federal agencies post material online.'6 The
Act now requires each federal agency within two years of the Act's en-
actment to "establish a process for determining which Government in-
formation the agency intends to make available and accessible to the
public on the Internet and by other means.""37 The Act also requires the
creation of a federal Internet portal that will integrate agency Web




363. See The Internet Archive, http://www.archive.org (coordinating archiving of works by Project
Gutenberg, Million Book Project, Liber Liber, Arpanet, Open Source Books, Internet Bookmobile,
and Internet Children's Digital Library) (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
364. See id.
365. See The Federal Judiciary, http://www.uscourts.gov (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
366. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.gov (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
367. See, e.g., United States H.R., io8th Cong., 1st Sess., http://www.house.gov (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).
368. See Delaware Municipal Court, http://www.municipalcourt.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
369. See Rebecca Fairley Raney, In the Next Year, the Federal Government Will Move to Give the
Public Easier Online Access to Data and Services, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at C4.
370. E-Government Act, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 20 7 (f)(2)(A)(iii), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.)
2919.
371. Id. § 204.
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Federal Government Web sites." '372 Each federal court is required to pro-
vide online access to all opinions.373 The Act, which was sponsored by
Senators Lieberman and Burns,374 holds great promise for making gov-
ernment more accessible to the public.
These efforts to build an online space for the public domain offer
perhaps the greatest step forward for attaining the public domain's full
promise: the public's free access to vast amounts of sources of learning.
375
It is only fitting that the Internet would provide the home to the public
domain because the Internet itself was created by numerous program-
mers and engineers who developed and shared the protocols that govern
the packet-switching technology that underlies the Internet.376 In theory,
this technology could have been proprietary and subject to IP rights. But,
instead (and thankfully), the programmers who developed these proto-
cols allowed them to be freely used by all in common with an open archi-
tecture.377 This decentralized, nonproprietary form of creation led to
perhaps the greatest source of innovation in the past fifty years, if not
longer. With the Internet, the wealth of information available to the pub-
lic is, as the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU recognized, "diverse as
human thought. 3 78 The Internet creates a "new marketplace of ideas"
that greatly promotes "freedom of expression in a democratic society,
379
and it does so at every moment of every day.
At the same time, the Internet poses challenges to existing para-
digms of law. Because the Internet facilitates virtually perfect copying
and nearly instantaneous transmission of material around the world, in-
fringement of copyrighted works (most notably through file-sharing of
music) is extremely easy for anyone with broadband Internet access."
Similarly, the Internet poses a greater threat to government secrecy inso-
372. Id. § 20 7 (f)( 3 ).
373. Id. § 205(a)(5).
374. See Raney, supra note 369.
375. In a recent study, eighty-four percent of all Americans said that they expect to find on the
Internet information they seek about either government agencies, electronic commerce, news, or
health care. PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, COUNTING ON THE INTERNET: MOST EXPECT TO
FIND KEY INFORMATION ONLINE, MOST FIND THE INFORMATION THEY SEEK, MANY Now TURN TO THE
INTERNET FIRST 2 (Dec. 29, 2002), http://www.pewinternet.org.
376. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/
internet/historylbrief.shtml (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
377. Lessig has identified three types of commons created by the Internet: (i) the commons of
"code" that created the Internet, (2) the commons of knowledge that the Internet enables through
exchange of information, and (3) the commons of innovation that the Internet fosters through its open
architecture that allows people to develop programs that enhance the network. LESSIG, supra note 26,
at 49.
378. 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
379. Id. at 885.
380. See Samuelson, supra note 122, at 327.
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far as information that is posted online is at once publicly available to
millions of people on the Net. Thus, the same features of the Internet
that facilitate the growth of the public domain can also be used to
weaken attempts to maintain strong IP rights or government secrecy.
B. PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA, CATASTROPHES, AND
"DIFFERENT RULES" THEORY
For all of the promise the Internet holds in realizing the public do-
main's full potential, the public domain itself faces even greater chal-
lenges that threaten its very survival as a legal concept. Before evaluating
the current challenges and how they threaten the public domain, we first
must discuss how doctrines die.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred, which upheld
Congress's twenty-year extension of all copyright terms, The New York
Times wrote an editorial predicting "the beginning of the end of the pub-
lic domain and the birth of copyright perpetuity. ' 8' Quite a prediction,
but the end of the public domain? How can that be? When I first read
the Times editorial, I found its prediction off-base. Although I was one of
the counsel on the losing side in Eldred and welcomed the Times's sup-
port, I found the editorial to be eloquent, but in the end, overblown.
Notwithstanding the Times's hyperbole, Eldred itself did not involve any
works in the public domain. Although the effect of the law upheld in El-
dred is to prevent any copyrighted work in the United States from enter-
ing the public domain (due to the expiry of the term) until the year
2019,"' copyrighted works will presumably enter the public domain one
day. And in the meanwhile people still have free access to works that are
already in the public domain.3 3g As John Mark Ockerbloom put it, the
Times editorial incorrectly "makes it sound like enjoying the public do-
main is like a nice privilege the government decided to try granting us for
a while, rather than the general right of the public."384
Now, I must confess, I am much less certain about the future of the
public domain.8' The Eldred decision must be viewed against the back-
381. Editorial, The Coming of Copyright Perpetuity, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. I6, 2003, at A28.
382. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, Ioi MICH. L. REv. 409, 415 (2002).
383. If individuals purchase them, the public has partial access to the copyrighted works that
CTEA does affect.
384. John Mark Ockerbloom, Reply Post to Lawrence Lessig blog, at http://www.lessig.org/blog/
archives/ooo876.shtml (Jan. 17, 2003).
385. See generally Boyle, Enclosure, supra note 23, at 71 ("The fundamental tensions in the eco-
nomic analysis of information issues, the source-blindness of an original author-centered model of
property rights, and the political blindness to the importance of the public domain as a whole.., all




drop of the other laws that have negatively affected the public domain,
such as, in copyright law, Congress's removal of thousands of works from
the public domain by the grant of "restored" copyrights 36 and enactment
of strong protection for access-control measures placed on copyrighted
works under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.""v And, in the area of
secrecy, the government has not only pulled material from the public
domain, it has shifted more and more of its conduct from the purview of
the public domain.388 The government has effectively asserted plenary
power over the public domain-the power to decide not only what goes
in the public domain and when, but even the extraordinary power to de-
cide what goes out-the complete power to deny the public's free access
to things it had long enjoyed. If courts adopt the government's view,
whither the public domain?
This brings us to the question of how different laws or doctrines die.
Bruce Ackerman has offered what may be the most compelling contem-
porary theory of change in constitutional law.389 Under his theory,3" con-
stitutional law is characterized by periods of relative equilibrium and
continuity, which in rare "constitutional moments" are disrupted, result-
ing in upheaval and then a critical shift in our understanding of the Con-
stitution and a rejection of the previously prevailing view."' Ackerman
offers his theory to address the "countermajoritarian difficulty" '392 created
by the Supreme Court's ability to strike down laws created by Congress.
Although this difficulty suggests that what the Supreme Court does is
anti-democratic, Ackerman's solution lies in recognizing "We the Peo-
ple's" role in "higher" constitutional lawmaking. In Ackerman's view,
constitutional moments involve legitimate constitutional changes because
of the mobilization of "We the People" on behalf of the change.393
Through these constitutional moments, the People may effectively
amend the Constitution through democratic-enhancing means.3
Whether one agrees with Ackerman's theory of constitutional law or
not, his general approach for analyzing the development of law has a lot
386. See infra notes 417-29 and accompanying text.
387. See infra notes 430-43 and accompanying text.
388. See infra notes 444-580 and accompanying text.
389. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter TRANSFORMA-
TIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]; Bruce
Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1022 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Discovering].
39o. Ackerman's theory has sparked considerable discussion, which is too numerous to summarize.
A Westlaw search I performed reveals that some 972 articles have cited to We the People.
391. See Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 389, at 1022-23.
392. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 389, at 8.
393. Id. at 57
394- Id. at 43.
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to commend. Ackerman's approach is pattern recognition: "to think be-
yond the particular case at hand and consider the patterns of constitu-
tional law that emerge over decades and generations."'3 95 More
specifically, Ackerman's approach closely parallels a leading theory in
evolution. As Walter Dean Burnham has shown, Ackerman's theory is a
form of punctuated equilibrium theory for constitutional law.396 Punctu-
ated equilibrium theory was first developed by Niles Eldredge and
Stephen J. Gould, who posited that the evolution of organisms is carried
out through (i) long periods of relative equilibrium (2) that are "punctu-
ated" by catastrophic events that result in mass extinction of previously
"superior" organisms.397 Today, punctuated equilibrium has crossed over
into other sciences and disciplines, 3 s including political science and the
law.3" Ackerman's theory is one such crossover theory. Under his theory,
the development of constitutional law is carried out through (i) long pe-
riods of relative equilibrium (2) punctuated by "constitutional moments"
resulting in upheaval and overturning of the previous understanding of
some aspect of constitutional law."
I would like to build on and expand Ackerman's general approach.
For Ackerman's concerns, his theory is appropriately limited to a specific
phylum of law (constitutional) and two genuses (ordinary and higher
lawmaking). But evolution theory suggests that Ackerman's theory is in-
complete. Just as evolution theory examines all organisms for under-
standing development and interrelationships, I believe we should look
more broadly to examine moments of upheaval across all areas of law.
Instead of focusing solely on constitutional moments, we should look for
moments in any kind of law. We may have a "moment"-or "catastro-
phe" in the biologist's parlance4" -without a de facto amendment to the
Constitution in the Ackermanian sense. From a global perspective, it
395. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
396. See Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated Equilibria: A Political
Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman's We the People, io8 YALE L.J. 2237 (1999).
397. Niles Eldredge & Stephen J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradu-
alism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82- 15 (J.M. Schopf ed. 1972); see GOULD, supra note 278, at 1316.
398. See GOULD, supra note 278, at 922.
Many scholarly sources in the humanities and social sciences, with Thomas Kuhn's theory of
scientific revolutions as the most overt and influential, have combined with the many reali-
ties of late 2oth century life (from the juggernaut of the Internet's spread to the surprising,
almost sudden collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, largely from within) to raise the
general critique of gradualism, and the comprehensive acceptability of punctuational
change, to a high level of awareness, if not quite to orthodoxy.
Id.
399. See Burnham, supra note 396, at 2250.
400. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 389, at 19 ("American history has been punctuated
by successful exercise in revolutionary reform.").
401. See GOULD, supra note 278, at 484.
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matters not whether the extinction occurred in constitutional law or
elsewhere.4"' Under my theory of doctrinal parallelism, all law is relevant
for analyzing the development of doctrine.
Recognizing the susceptibility of any doctrine to extinction lays bare
the importance of asking not only whether a new law or doctrine is con-
stitutional, but also whether the new law or doctrine may cause the ex-
tinction of some prior law or doctrine. For before extinction does occur,
we would want to examine whether the doctrine under threat of extinc-
tion is not, in fact, the superior or best-fitted doctrine for our system of
governance. A "moment" need not necessarily rise to the level of a fun-
damental change in constitutional law to cause grave harm to either the
fabric of law or the values that animate the Constitution.
I would also like to expand the concept of "moments" by removing
the positive, progressive element that Ackerman imbues in "constitu-
tional moments," which he believes are accompanied by "a mobilized
mass of American citizens expressing their assent through extraordinary
institutional forms." 3 While the three "constitutional moments" Acker-
man identifies may well have been accompanied by such mobilization,4 4
a "moment" of legal upheaval may occur for any number of reasons,
good or bad. What evolution theory tells us is that the events that cause
the moments of upheaval are unpredictable.4 ' Organisms become extinct
during these moments not because they were inferior or weak, but be-
cause the catastrophes altered the environment enough to impose "dif-
ferent rules" on what is necessary for survival. 4°6 Under the "different
rules" theory of punctuated equilibrium, organisms may well have pos-
sessed the "best" or "superior" traits for the environment during a long
period of equilibrium, only to have those very same traits result in the
organisms' demise under the "different rules" precipitated by a catastro-
phic event.' °
Just as punctuated equilibrium in evolution may result from catas-
trophic events, the law, too, may face "catastrophes" that result in the ex-
402. The analogy to biology would be for researchers to focus only on the possible extinction of
homo sapiens, when many plants and animals may be facing extinction around us.
403. Ackerman, Discovering, supra note 389, at 1022.
404. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 389, at 19 ("[T]he original Constitution codified the
Revolutionary generation's defeat of monarchy on behalf of republican self-government; the Civil War
amendments codified the struggle of an entire generation to repudiate slavery on behalf of a new con-
stitutional ideal of equality; and so forth."); Burnham, supra note 396, at 2246.
405. See GOULD, supra note 278, at 1316.
406. Id.
407. Id. Gould contends that "different rules" theory "represents the most interesting and far-
reaching modification of Darwinian expectations unleashed by catastrophism's renewed respectabil-
ity." Id. at 1317.
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tinction of previously superior doctrines that had survived for long peri-
ods of equilibrium.4 ° If we expand Ackerman's theory of "moments," we
must take into account moments that prove to be non-salutary and lack-
ing in support of "We the People." These "catastrophes" are no less im-
portant than "moments" for understanding the development of law.
Ackerman's theory does provide, however, a very useful alteration
of punctuated equilibrium theory as applied to the law. While evolution-
ary biology makes no attempt to make any normative judgments about
catastrophes or the extinction of species,4" Ackerman's theory obviously
does make such judgments about the law. Ackerman's entire project is
based on the primacy of We the People to democratic governance and
our constitutional system." ' To the extent that the People do mobilize
and engage in higher lawmaking and to the extent that courts validate
and codify the People's lawmaking, democracy and our constitutional
system are served."' Our government institutions should be designed to
facilitate, not frustrate, higher lawmaking by the People.4 2
Although my theory of doctrinal evolution has a wider focus than
Ackerman's focus on constitutional law, I would like to adopt the norma-
tive line he draws in valorizing the involvement of We the People in the
entire system of governance and lawmaking established by the Constitu-
tion.4"3 To the extent we believe in democracy in which citizens may par-
ticipate in self-governance, our laws should be designed so as not to
substantially undermine the People's ability to engage in those democ-
ratic endeavors. The normative and constitutional judgments we make
about the extinction of a particular doctrine must always bear this impor-
tant principle in mind.
As a guide, I propose the following inquiry. When evaluating the de-
sirability of the extinction of a particular doctrine, we should ask the fol-
lowing questions:
408. I use the term "catastrophe" broadly to describe any major sudden change to the environ-
ment. The change could be to the general background environment-for example, the events related
to September It or the exponential growth of the Internet. It is possible, though, to have a dramatic
change in the law that could constitute a "catastrophe" in itself without necessarily an (identifiable)
accompanying major sudden change in the environment that precipitated the legal change.
409. Darwin did suggest that "progress" occurred over time as the naturally superior organisms
survived, but even that suggestion has been weakened by subsequent punctuated equilibrium theory,
which recognizes that random catastrophes may kill those superior organisms. See GOULD, supra note
278, at 476-77, 1316.
410. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 389, at 6-7.
411. See id. at 266-67.
412. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 389, at 409.
413. See id; see also Benkler, Looking Glass, supra note 35, at 188 ("[L]aw or policy that systemati-
cally and drastically reduces the information available to large numbers of, or defined classes of, indi-
viduals in a society undermines autonomy.").
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(i) Is the existing doctrine that is under threat of extinction a
special democratic-enhancing doctrine, meaning that it has
historically served an instrumental role in protecting the
People from abuses or overreaching by government and in
facilitating the People's ability to participate in democratic
endeavors?
(2) If not, the extinction would not be problematic under this
metric.
(3) But if the doctrine under extinction is democratic-
enhancing, we must then ask whether the "different rule"
that now threatens the extinction of the democratic-en-
hancing doctrine is itself somehow democratic-enhancing?
If the answer to question (3) is negative, and a special democratic-
enhancing doctrine has been terminated by a democratic-disabling
doctrine, then the adoption of the "different rule" is highly suspect.
The danger in allowing "different rules" to displace democratic-
enhancing rules should be obvious: democracy will die if no doctrines
exist any longer to protect it. 4
C. THE THREAT OF EXTINCTION TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Perhaps some will find my explanation for the extinction of doctrines
a lot of hullabaloo for something pretty basic. After all, a first-year law
student knows that courts and Congress can change existing laws (each in
their own way), and that the Supreme Court can always overrule a prior
interpretation of the Constitution, notwithstanding stare decisis. Con-
gress can abrogate common law or even override Supreme Court doc-
trines that are not constitutionally based."5 Any doctrine, constitutional
or non-constitutional, can become extinct in a moment.
True enough, but, just as in nature, we should not let extinction oc-
cur without (i) recognizing why it is occurring, and (2) asking whether
we want it to occur. We may decide it is necessary to intervene to stop
the extinction. The concept of the public domain may become extinct in
three different ways: (i) a "different rule" may terminate the public do-
main's structure by preventing the dispersion of power to the people
through common access and property rights; (2) a "different rule" may
414. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 389, at 291 ("[Tjhe American Republic is no more
eternal than the Roman-and it will come to an end when American citizens betray their Constitu-
tion's fundamental ideals and aspirations so thoroughly that existing institutions merely parody the
public meanings they formerly conveyed.").
415. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
Io YALE L.J. 331 (199).
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terminate the public domain's function by circumventing its ability to act
as a restraint on government abuses that may arise from the govern-
ment's power to restrict or deny public access; and (3) perhaps the most
catastrophic of all, the "different rule" may obliterate the public domain
at its very origin by renouncing its protection under the First Amend-
ment and Copyright Clause or spurning the democratic norm of ensuring
the free flow of information, ideas, and materials.
Viewed in this light, the Times's prediction of the "end of the public
domain" is not so fanciful after all. Today, "different rules" are affecting
the public domain at each of these levels. The danger is not recognizing
this before it is too late. Based on Ackerman's theory, a punctuated
"moment" can occur within an average of six to eight years, although
sometimes the period is longerf'6 By that indicator, what has been hap-
pening in the past few years is alarming.
i. Catastrophe and Different Rules in Copyright Law
a. The Removal of Thousands of Works from the Public
Domain by Copyright Restoration
Imagine that Congress tomorrow enacted a law that granted "re-
stored" copyrights to all of Shakespeare's works, and indeed to all for-
eign works ever created that never received a U.S. copyright (for much
of its history U.S. copyright law did not give copyrights to foreign works).
All of these thousands of works have been in the public domain under
well-established and settled U.S. law, meaning that everyone was free to
make copies of these works or to make new "derivative" works based on
them. Today, many of these works may in fact be freely available on the
Internet.
But just imagine in this new law Congress said: (i) all of Shake-
speare's works and all of these thousands of other foreign works are no
longer in the public domain, but now are subject to "restored" copyrights
owned by the estate of the dead authors; (2) no one but the "restored"
copyright holder has the right to publish, copy, or build on Shakespeare's
works or other works subject to this law; and (3) people who already
have copies of Shakespeare's works, or any of the other foreign works
subject to this law, may not sell their copies (as they normally would un-
der the first sale doctrine) to others after a one-year grace period. (4)
Any of the hundreds, if not thousands, of people who made derivative
works from Shakespeare's works or any of these other affected works
may no longer sell their works unless they pay royalties to the restored
copyright holder. Finally, (5) any online postings of Shakespeare's works
or any other of the thousands of foreign works subject to this law must be
416. See Burnham, supra note 396, at 2255-56.
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removed them from the Internet. Congress enacted this imagined law in
order to get a reciprocal deal abroad for the heirs or estates of dead U.S.
authors. The interests of these dead authors' estates in squeezing more
money out of the authors' works were deemed compelling enough to jus-
tify the removal of works from the public domain.
This imagined copyright provision may seem far-fetched, but in fact
Congress in 1994 enacted an amendment to the Copyright Act that pur-
ports to do something quite similar: to remove thousands of foreign
works from the public domain.4"7 The amendment followed the U.S.'s
signing of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPs) and was enacted putatively to further the U.S.'s posi-
tion within Berne Convention.JI Section I04A of the Copyright Act
grants a "restored" copyright to foreign works that were in the public
domain in the United States49 for one of three reasons: (I) the authors of
those works failed to comply with prior U.S. formalities (such as copy-
right notice); (2) the authors were nationals of countries that did not
have a copyright agreement with the United States when they first pub-
lished their works abroad; or (3) the works were sound recordings fixed
417. It is difficult to determine the exact number of works that have been removed from the public
domain, because "copyright restoration" occurs automatically under the statute. 17 U.S.C. § I04A
(20o0). Based on the number of putative restored copyright holders who filed optional Notices of In-
tent to Enforce restored copyrights for works in the public domain, the number is at least in the thou-
sands. See Copyright Restoration of Works in Accordance with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
61 Fed. Reg. 19,372-388 (May 1, 1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 46,134-159 (Aug. 30. 1996); 6I Fed. Reg. 68,454-
461 (Dec. 27, 1996); 62 Fed. Reg. 20,211-220 (Apr. 25, 1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 44,841-854 (Aug. 22, 1997);
62 Fed. Reg. 66,766-811 (Dec. 19, 1997); 63 Fed. Reg. 5,142-216 (Jan. 30, 1998): 63 Fed. Reg. 19,288-
366 (Apr. 17, 1998); 63 Fed. Reg. 43,830-832 (Aug. 14, 1998).
418. From the outset, the U.S. government has maintained that copyright restoration was not
mandated by any treaty or international agreement obligation of the United States under Berne or
TRIPs. Although Article i8 of Berne, which is known as the Rule of Retroactivity, states that copy-
right protection under the Convention "shall apply to all works which, at the moment of its coming
into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country of origin through expiration of the
term of protection." It also expressly leaves it to each country to decide "the conditions of application
of this principle." Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, r886,
art. 18 (Paris text). Significantly, after joining Berne and enacting the Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act to comply with its obligations under Berne, the United States did not adopt a copyright resto-
ration provision. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. IOO-568, § 7, 102 Stat.
2857-58. And even after joining TRIPs (which incorporates part of the Berne Convention) and enact-
ing copyright restoration, the United States took the position that copyright restoration was "not man-
datory but, in USTR's opinion desirable and compelling." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GA TT) Intellectual Property Provisions: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4894 and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm.
on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the House Comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trade-
marks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (I994) (statement of Rep. William
Hughes, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. and Judicial Admin.) (emphasis added).
419. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000).
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before the date (February I5, 1972) when U.S. law first recognized copy-
right protection for sound recordings.20
In order for § 104A to operate, "different rules" must be substituted
for well-established rules that have governed copyright. Section 104A
retroactively undoes the effect of the 19o9 Copyright Act, under which
no copyright could ever extend to a work in the public domain. Indeed,
the i909 Act expressly stated that "[n]o copyright shall subsist in the
original text of any work which is in the public domain. 422 If that provi-
sion were applied to all works affected by § 104A (because they were
published during the effective period of the 19o9 Act), § Io4A could not
operate. So to avoid this problem, § 104A simply establishes "different
rules" that attempt to erase a century's worth of settled law as if it never
existed.423
The key difference between § I04A and my imaginary restoration
law is that § Io4A applies only to foreign works still under copyright in
their source country.424 This difference, however, does not alter the fun-
damental issue raised by the whole notion of copyright "restoration": can
Congress remove thousands of works from the public domain, including
the great works of Stravinsky, Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Alfred Hitch-
cock, Fritz Lang, and many others under the guise of "restored" copy-
rights and restrict the public's free access to materials that had been
available in the public domain for many years?
Because I am involved in litigation to challenge the constitutionality
of this law, I do not feel this is the time or place for me to reargue the
merits of this issue here.425 I would like to focus instead on the worst-case
420. Id. § to4A(h)(6).
421. Id.
422. Copyright Act of I9O9, ch. 320, § 7,35 Stat. 1075, 1077.
423. Section io4A has even had the effect of retroactively reversing, over thirty years later, a fed-
eral court judgment that a particular work (i.e., the now well-known troll doll) was in the public do-
main and free for all to copy. See Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 29o F.3d 548, 553
(3d Cir. 2002). Another "different rule" imposed by copyright restoration is its abrogation of the first-
sale doctrine for works subject to copyright restoration. The Supreme Court recognized this doctrine
in 19o8 as a limitation to copyright. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (19O8). Under the
doctrine, once a copyright holder has sold a copy of his or her work to the public, the copyright holder
cannot claim any further distribution right over that lawfully purchased copy in the stream of com-
merce. After a "first sale" of the copy, the lawful purchaser of the copy can freely dispose of it at
will-for instance, by selling or renting it to others. Congress, however, abrogated the first-sale doc-
trine for all works subject to copyright restoration after a one-year grace period; owners who lawfully
purchased copies of affected works before 1994 cannot freely sell their copies of the works. See 17
U.S.C. § Io9(a).
424. Id. § 104A(h)(6).
425. I have participated as counsel in three cases challenging the copyright restoration provision.
See Golan v. Ashcroft, No. oi-B-I854 (D. Colo.); Luck's Music Library v. Ashcroft, No i:olCFo222o
(D.D.C.): Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie Co., No. o164oo8 (D.N.J.). The lawyers challeng-
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scenario for the public domain: § 104A is upheld, and courts adopt the
government's view that it has the power to remove thousands of works
from the public domain.
Under an evolutionary approach to the law, this result would be
catastrophic for the concept of the public domain. To uphold the consti-
tutionality of Congress's removal of thousands of works from the public
domain would create a "different rule" that would obliterate the public
domain's very structure, function, and origin. Under the original under-
standing of the public domain, as articulated by the Singer Court and
other early courts, the public domain is off-limits to government con-
trol." 6
But, if upheld, the "different rule" that § 104A imposes would de-
stroy both the structure of the public domain in dispersing indefeasible
property rights among the people to access whatever lies therein and the
overall function of the public domain in serving as an ultimate restraint
on the government's power to control public access through the grant of
intellectual property. One of the whole purposes of the doctrine is to put
an end to the kind of abuses the British Crown inflicted on the public by
granting exclusive rights over things that people had long enjoyed. Sec-
tion 104A is, however, no different.
Finally, and most worrisome of all, a decision to uphold the constitu-
tionality of § I04A would strike at the very origin of the public domain. It
would be a renunciation of the original understanding courts had that
material in the public domain could not be taken away from the public
because it was already public property, publici juris, and in the public
427domain. It would be a rejection of the Supreme Court's prior teaching
in Graham that the "constitutional command" in the Copyright Clause-
"to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"-forbids Congress
from "restrict[ing] free access to materials already available" in the pub-
lic domain.4"' Although the Supreme Court in Graham admonished that
ing this law have posted most of the briefs filed in Golan v. Ashcroft, No. oi-B-I854 (D. Colo. 2002), at
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/golanvashcroft.
426. See supra notes 45-133 and accompanying text.
427. See id.
428. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1. 6 (1966). See also supra notes 8o-124 and accompany-
ing text; Benkler, Looking Glass, supra note 35, at 177 ("This reading of the Clause-that it requires
an exclusive right to encourage at least some information production and that it restrains such rights
from removing or burdening free access to materials already in the public domain-is one that the
Court has unanimously reaffirmed."); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legisla-
tive Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L.




this constitutional command "may not be ignored,""4 9 § I04A does just
that by creating a "different rule" that restricts the public's free access to
materials already in the public domain.
Scrutinized under the test for doctrinal extinction outlined above,
this "different rule" is highly suspect. First, the public domain is a de-
mocratic-enhancing doctrine that has historically served an instrumental
role in facilitating the People's ability to engage in self-expression and to
enjoy free access to culture and know-how. Second, the "different rule"
created by § 104A is democratic-disabling: it purports to take away the
rights of the People to works in the public domain, but without the sub-
stitution of any democratic-enhancing rights. The law appears to reflect
naked rent-seeking by copyright holders, both here and abroad, attempt-
ing to secure more income for themselves at the People's expense.
b. DMCA 's Anti-Circumvention Provisions
"Different rules" for copyright are also established by the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"). In 1998, amidst concern
that copyright holders might not sell their works on the Internet if their
legal rights to prevent digital copying were not strengthened, Congress
enacted the DMCA, which gives copyright holders strong statutory pro-
tection for the technological protections (such as encryption) they place
on their copyrighted works.43 Under the DMCA, people are not allowed
to "circumvent" these access-control technologies,43" ' or develop tech-
nologies that are designed to circumvent them432 even if only to make a
fair (meaning completely legal) use of a copyrighted work, at least under
the Second Circuit's interpretation of the Act.433 The Second Circuit in
Universal City Studios v. Corley upheld the movie industry's DMCA
claim against a person who posted software that could be used to decrypt
the encryption on DVDs that helps to prevent the unlawful copying of
movies.434
The Second Circuit's interpretation of the DMCA threatens to un-
dermine the fair use doctrine. Under the court's ruling, the DMCA pro-
hibits conduct that copyright law would expressly authorize as fair use, a
result that is perplexing in that the DMCA was intended to serve the
goals of copyright and expressly states that it does not affect fair use
rights.433 Because copyright expressly permits all fair uses of copyrighted
429. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
430. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
431. Id. § 120(a)(I).
432. Id. § 120I(a)(2), (b).
433. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,459 (2d Cir. 2001).
434. Id. at 6o.
435. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(C).
[Vol. 55:91
THE PUBLIC'S DOMAIN
works, the DMCA should too if it is to effectuate the goals of copyright
and if, as the DMCA expressly states, it does not affect fair use.
But, under the Second Circuit's interpretation, the DMCA need not




The court supported its conclusion with the almost laughable suggestion
that a person who wanted to copy a clip of a DVD for a perfectly legiti-
mate fair use should be required instead to "record[] portions of the
video images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a camera, a camcor-
der, or a microphone at a monitor as it displays the DVD movie." '437 In
the more than 200 years of our copyright law's existence, no court has
ever restricted the formats of a permissible fair use. Fair use has always
operated as an equitable doctrine to allow a flexible "safety valve" in
copyright law providing great freedom to users to make "fair" uses de-
pending on the particular facts and circumstances. 43 But, in a moment,
the Second Circuit appears to have ruled that some fair uses are no
longer permissible.
The DMCA also threatens the public domain. Because the DMCA
does not contain an express durational limit on the term of its protection,
it is unclear whether the anti-circumvention provision would apply to en-
cryption on works whose copyrights have expired.439 While the anti-
circumvention provision of the DMCA appears to prohibit a person only
from circumventing encryption on copyrighted works ("work[s] protected
under this title"),'0 a person who wished to copy a public domain movie
on DVD still needs to obtain a decrypting device to disable the encryp-
tion on the DVD. But the DMCA would still appear to prohibit the
manufacture and dissemination of any such circumventing software that
decrypts the encryption on DVDs.41 Thus, a person who wanted to make
a legitimate copy of a public domain movie on DVD would not be able
to find someone who could legally sell decrypting software that is needed
to make the copy." As the district court held, the DMCA prohibits the
decrypting software, even if it has a "substantial, noninfringing use" that
would allow its dissemination under the doctrine established by the Su-
436. Corley, 273 F.3 d at 459; see Benkler, Looking Glass, supra note 35, at 210.
437. Corley, 273 F.3 d at 459.
438. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (994) (stating that fair use "is not
to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the [Copyright] statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls
for case-by-case analysis"); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair Use, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1291 (1999).
439. See Samuelson, supra note 250, at 16o-6i.
440. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I) (2000).
441. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
442. See Samuelson, supra note 250, at 161.
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preme Court in Sony."3 Put simply, DMCA abrogates the rule in Sony
that allows for the sale of technologies that are capable of substantial,
noninfringing uses.
The "different rules" established by the DMCA are democracy-
disabling. First, fair use has historically served an important role in pre-
venting the government from unduly restricting speech through copy-
right, and it has also facilitated the People's ability to comment, criticize,
teach, and learn-all critical endeavors for a democracy. Likewise, as dis-
cussed already, the public domain is instrumental in ensuring the peo-
ple's access to culture and know-how that ultimately enables them to
engage in the creative and expressive pursuits. The DMCA, however, has
great potential to undermine both fair use and the public domain by not
allowing the public to engage in the expressive endeavors those doctrines
authorize. Instead of supplementing copyright law, the DMCA threatens
to supplant it with "different rules."
2. Catastrophe and Different Rules in Government Secrecy
Following the terrorist attacks on September I I, the government has
attempted to become more vigilant in protecting our domestic security.
The government has adopted many new measures that utilize secrecy as
an essential component of their strategy.' To be sure, after 9/I1, no one
in this country should doubt either our dependence on our government
to protect us from terrorist acts or the courage of so many who carry out
that protection each day. Because we live in a democracy, however, the
tragedies of 9/I do not obviate the basic need of U.S. citizens to be able
to evaluate the conduct of their government.
The challenge post 9/I i is balancing this basic need with the gov-
ernment's need to more effectively guard our country against terrorism.
While no one can deny that the government has a legitimate need to use
secrecy in urgent situations involving national security, there is a danger
in making secret more and more things that previously had been open to
the public. What if the government makes a mistake in concealing infor-
mation that should be available to the public, or, even worse, in arresting,
surveilling, deporting, or trying someone in secret? How would, or could,
the public even know it?
a. The Removal of Information from Web Sites and New
FOIA Policy
The Bush Administration has adopted two policy changes that nega-
tively affect the amount of information in the public domain. First, fol-
443. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, i ti F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 47 (1984).
444- See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
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lowing 9/11, federal agencies removed many materials that had been pub-
licly available on agency Web sites in an apparent effort to implement
the Administration's instruction "to safeguard sensitive but unclassified
information related to America's homeland security," a newly created
but undefined category of information."5 From the standpoint of the
public domain, there is nothing inherently wrong with the mere act of
removing material from government Web sites. One might expect that
over the course of time government Web sites will remove old informa-
tion and post new information to stay current. But that is not what hap-
pened here. The government has removed material precisely to make
them unavailable to the public because the material purportedly falls
within the vague class of "sensitive but unclassified" information. Each
agency can exercise considerable discretion in removing public material
from its Web site, and there is no public record maintained on what in-
formation has been removed. O0MB Watch has estimated the amount
of documents removed to be in the thousands."7
In addition to the removal of public information from Web sites, the
government has also adopted a more restrictive FOIA policy under
which Attorney General Ashcroft will defend the discretionary decisions
of agencies to withhold information requested by the public "unless [the
decisions] lack a sound legal basis."" 8 This marks a dramatic change from
the prior policy of Attorney General Reno, which established a "pre-
sumption of disclosure" and policy to "defend agencies that are sued for
non-disclosure only when it was 'reasonably foreseeable that disclosure
would be harmful' to an interest protected by the law."" 9
b. Secret Arrests, Secret Detention, and Secret Tribunals
As a part of its law enforcement response to 9/II, the government
has asserted greater authority to use secrecy in arresting, detaining, try-
ing, and deporting individuals. These cases present a more complicated
analysis than Congress's direct removal of works from the public domain
in the copyright context. There, it was clear that the government action
took away something (indeed, many things) from the public domain.
Here, however, the government has invoked secrecy before the matter
has entered the public domain. While these cases most directly implicate
445. See Memorandum for Departments and Agencies from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Director
Information Security Oversight Office, at http:/Iwww.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapostl2oo2foiapostbo.htm (Mar.
19, 2002).
446. See The Bush Administration's Secrecy Policy: A Call to Action to Protect Democratic Val-
ues, at http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/i I45/i/8 (Oct. 25, 2002).
447. Id.
448. See supra note 445.
449. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Government Adopts New Standard for Openness
(Oct. 4, 1993), at http://www.fas.org/sgp/clinton/reno.html.
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the constitutional rights of the individuals whom the government has de-
tained, the cases also implicate the First Amendment rights of the public
and press to have access to such proceedings. For the latter, the question
is whether the government is seeking to remove a type of proceeding or
subject matter that should properly reside in the public domain because
it involves information or proceedings that belong to the public.
(i) Secret Proceedings for Aliens
Since 9/II, the U.S. government has detained at least 762 aliens in
secret, at times without publicly revealing their names or the location of
their detentions and while subjecting a number of the aliens to secret de-
portation hearings.4"' These September I I detainees were all apparently
held on valid immigration charges,45' but they were held or deported by
more restrictive and secretive procedures. Under the so-called "hold un-
til cleared" policy, the government detained aliens, at times without
charge and in secret, until the FBI cleared them of any connection to ter-
rorism.4"2
After this policy was instituted the media reported allegations that
the government was mistreating the detainees.453 The allegations included
claims that the government (i) had detained the detainees without in-
forming them of the charges on which they were being held for lengthy
periods of time, (2) had denied the detainees access to their attorneys,
families, and embassy officials, (3) had detained people who were not in-
volved in terrorism, and (4) had physically and verbally abused the de-
tainees.454 Amnesty International and the Lawyers Committee for
450. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE SEPTEMBER II DETAINEES: A
REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVES-
TIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER II ATTACKS 2 (Apr. 2003) [hereinafter IG REPORT]. At first, the govern-
ment did not require detainees or their lawyers to keep information secret outside of the hearing.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 707 (6th Cir. 2002). Subsequently, DOJ instituted an in-
terim rule that authorized immigration judges to issue protective orders requiring detainees and their
attorneys to keep certain information secret indefinitely. See Protective Orders in Immigration Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799 (May 21, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. Pt. 3).
451. IG REPORT, supra note 450, at 15.
452. Id. at 37. The government has also detained an undisclosed number of individuals as material
witnesses. See Center for National Security Studies v. United States Dept. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 921
(D.C. Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2003) (No. 03-472); t8 U.S.C.
§ 3144 (2003). Unfortunately, the IG REPORT did not analyze the government's use of material witness
status to detain individuals, so the available public information is even more scant. See IG REPORT,
supra note 450, at 4; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-
SEPTEMBER I I DETAINEES 6o (August 2002) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES] (discussing the deten-
tion of thirty-five individuals as material witnesses).




Human Rights issued reports detailing alleged human rights abuses
committed by the government. 55
Following these reports, the Department of Justice's Office of In-
spector General (IG) began an investigation of the government's treat-
ment of the September I i detainees."56 The IG eventually issued a report
of its findings that was made public in June 2003.4"7 The IG Report was
highly critical of the government's treatment of the September I I detain-
ees and largely confirmed the detainees' allegations of abuse and mis-
treatment.
Among the key findings, the IG Report concluded that:
(I) the government failed to serve many detainees with the
charges underlying their detention, in some cases for
weeks or months, notwithstanding the INS's stated goal of
72 hours; 5
(2) shortly after the investigation of detainees began, the gov-
ernment realized that many of the detainees had no con-
nection to the attacks or terrorism;459
(3) despite the government's belief that detainees who were
found to be of "no interest" could be cleared "within a few
days," the clearance process was "slow and not given suffi-
cient priority," with the average length of detention lasting
8o days from arrest and more than one quarter of the de-
tentions lasting over three months;
46
o
(4) the government detained aliens for more than the 90 days
allotted following a final order of removal, even though
the aliens wanted to leave the country (and even though
455. HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, supra note 452; LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF
Loss: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER I I (Sept. 5, 2002).
456. The IG did so pursuant to its authority under the Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-12
(2000), and the Patriot Act, the latter of which directs the Office of the IG to review claims of civil
rights violations by DOJ employees. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1001 (2001).
457. IG REPORT, supra note 450.
458. Id. at 35. Before September i, INS regulations required the INS to charge a noncitizen
within 24 hours of detention or release the individual. 8 C.F.R. 287.3(d) (2001). After September II,
the INS issued a new regulation -without a period for public comment-that increased the time to
forty-eight hours and created an exception that allows the INS to hold noncitizens without charge for
"an additional reasonable period" in an emergency. 8 C.F.R. 287, INS No. 2171-01 (2003). The excep-
tion for immigration detention appears to allow the government the discretion to detain an individual
even beyond the 7-day period that the PATRIOT Act allows the government to detain aliens sus-
pected of terrorism without charge. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. bO7-56, § 412(5).
459. IG REPORT, supra note 45o, at 47.
46o. Id. at 46, 5 1.
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some in the government doubted the legality of such de-
tention);46' and
(5) the government adopted a policy to request that all Sep-
tember i I detainees be held without bond, even in cases
for which the INS "had no information from the FBI to
support that argument."462
Perhaps the most disturbing of the IG Report's findings was the ar-
bitrary way in which the government classified detainees into one of
three groups: (I) "high interest" detainees who were considered to have
the greatest potential to have a link to the September I I investigation or
terrorism; (2) "of interest" detainees "who might have some terrorist
connections"; and (3) "interest undetermined" detainees for whom the
FBI could not rule out that they did not have a connection to the Sep-
tember ii attacks.46' If an alien fell within any of these categories, the
government would hold the alien in detention until cleared by the FBI of
any connection to terrorism. Remarkably, this new system "was not me-
morialized in writing," 464 and apparently was instituted by word of mouth.
Even worse, the government failed to "develop clear criteria for deter-
mining who was, in fact, 'of interest' to the FBI's terrorism investiga-
tion.',465 The lack of such criteria often led to the detention of aliens
based on arbitrary factors46 "rather than any evidence that they were ter-
rorists. '6' The IG Report was highly critical of "the indiscriminate and
haphazard manner" in which the government categorized and detained
"many aliens who had no connection to terrorism., ' 41 Significantly, when
461. Id. at 70.
462. Id. at 89.
463. Id. at 18.
464. Id. at 37.
465. Id. at 40.
466. ld. at 70. In its report, Human Rights Watch suggests that the detention of September i i de-
tainees may have been based not on arbitrary factors, but instead on "little more than a form of profil-
ing on the basis of nationality, religion, and gender. Being a male Muslim non-citizen from certain
countries became a proxy for suspicious behavior." HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, supra note 452, at 12.
467. IG REPORT, supra note 45 o , at 41.
468. Id. at 70. The IG REPORT concluded:
[W]e question the criteria (or lack thereof) the FBI used to makes its initial designation of
the potential danger posed by September ii detainees. The arresting FBI agent usually
made this assessment without any guidance and based on the initial detainee information
available at the time of arrest. In addition, there was little consistency or precision to the
process that resulted in the detainees being labeled 'high interest,' 'of interest,' or 'of unde-
termined interest.'
Id. at 158; see also id. at t86 (noting that government agents "did little to distinguish" aliens with "evi-
dence of ties to terrorism from those encountered coincidentally ... with no indication of any ties to
terrorism"); id. at 18 ("initial assessment was often based on little or no concrete information tying the
detainee to the September ii attacks or terrorism"); id. at 41-42 (some detainees "appear to have
been arrested more by virtue of chance encounters or tenuous connections to a... lead rather than by
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the FBI could not determine at the outset that the individual was "of in-
terest," the INS treated the individual "of interest" until cleared by the
FBI.469 However, to date, no September ii detainee has been charged
with a terror-related crime.47°
The arbitrary way in which the government categorized Septem-
ber i i detainees was further compounded by the disparate treatment the
detainees received based on their categorization.47' The "high interest"
detainees were put in high-security federal prisons, where their treatment
was much worse than that faced by "of interest" detainees, who typically
were held in lower security facilities.72
In its investigation of the federal prison in Brooklyn, the IG Report
found that the "high interest" detainees were subjected to severe condi-
tions, including physical abuse. The detainees "were subjected to the
most restrictive conditions of confinement authorized by [Bureau of
Prison] policy" '473 and were confined to their cells under "'lockdown' for
23 hours a day,"474 with continual video camera surveillance in their cells
and their cell lights illuminated for 24 hours a day for a period of several
months. 475 Nearly all of the detainees interviewed by the IG's Office
noted experiencing "exhaustion, depression, stress, and sleep depriva-
tion '4, 6 due to the round-the-clock illumination of lights in their cells.
The IG Report concluded that "substantial evidence" indicated that
some correctional officers physically abused the detainees, especially
during the first few months following 9/II. 477 For example, the detainees
claimed that when they arrived at the prison, the correction officers
"forcefully pulled them from the car, slammed them into walls, dragged
them by their arms, stepped on the chain between their ankle cuffs, ver-
bally abused them, and twisted their arms, hands, wrists, and fingers."
478
One officer corroborated the detainees' claim in a sworn affidavit to the
IG, but the officer later attempted to recharacterize his statement.479 Sev-
any genuine indications of a possible connection with or possession of information about terrorist ac-
tivity").
469. IG REPORT, supra note 450, at 40.
470. Edward Alden, Rethink on Round-Up of Terror Suspects, FIN. TIMES, June 14,2003, at so.
471. IG REPORT, supra note 45o, at 158.
472. Id. at III.
473. Id. at t12.
474- Id.
475. Id. at 155, 162.
476. Id. at 163.
477. Id. at 162.
478. Id. at 144.
479. Id. at 145.
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eral of the detainees have brought a civil rights lawsuit against the gov-
ernment based on its alleged mistreatment of them.""
The IG Report also found that the government's treatment of the
detainees frustrated their ability to communicate with counsel or family.
Initially, the detainees were subjected for several weeks to a total "com-
munications blackout," during which time they were not permitted to
communicate with anyone by phone or mail. 4"' Even after the blackout
was lifted, the prison officials imposed a make-shift policy of one legal
telephone call per week, which "severely limited the detainees' ability to
obtain, and communicate with, legal counsel." '' Because most of the de-
tainees did not have legal counsel before entering the federal prison, they
had to locate a lawyer from prison.48' However, detainees were not al-
ways made aware of their opportunity to make a weekly legal call,' 4 and
the list of pro bono attorneys the officials provided the detainees was in-
accurate and outdated.48" "As a result, detainees often used their sole le-
gal call during a week to try to contact one of the legal representatives on
the pro bono list, only to find that the attorneys either had changed their
telephone number or did not handle the particular type of immigration
situation faced by the detainees. ' '4s6 Because the detention of the Sep-
tember i i detainees was kept secret from normal prison logs, prison offi-
cials mistakenly told the detainees' legal counsel and family that the
detainees were not at the prison, when in fact they were.""
Although the IG Report did not evaluate the government's use of
secrecy in detaining or deporting the September ii detainees, 48" the find-
ings of the Report certainly provide reason for pause. Had the IG Report
not made public the severe flaws in the government's "hold until clear"
policy for the September i i detainees, it seems doubtful that the gov-
ernment would have changed its policy. The use of secrecy in the gov-
ernment's treatment of the detainees created a situation in which few
officials might dare to question the policy, which itself was created by
verbal instructions handed down through the chain of command, entirely
outside of public scrutiny. Indeed, even immediately following the publi-
480. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-Civ-2307 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 17, 2002); Tom Hays, Report
Backs Muslims' Complaints, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 23, 2003, at 4.
481. IG REPORT, supra note 450, at I58.
482. Id. at 130, 159.
483. Id. at 131.
484. Id. at 132 (noting that official asked "are you okay?" to inquire whether detainee wanted to
make legal call).
485. Id. at 161.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 115.
488. Id. at 4.
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cation of the IG Report, the Justice Department initially attempted to
cast the report in a positive light, asserting that it supported the view that
the government's "actions are fully within the law.""" DOJ claimed to
"make no apologies for finding every legal way possible to protect the
American public from further terrorist attacks."4' The press release was
followed by Attorney General Ashcroft's testimony before Congress, in
which he vigorously defended the government's "hold until clear" policy
against the criticisms in the IG Report as well as those from members of
Congress.49' However, afterwards, FBI Director Mueller publicly recog-
nized the need for changes in its detention policy following the IG Re-
port, including the development of better criteria for categorizing
detainees and more efficient disposition of their cases.492
The IG Report casts into a new light the government's use of secret
deportation hearings for September ii detainees. The government has
deported an undisclosed number of aliens through secret hearings in
"special interest" cases,493 which includes any detainee whom the FBI has
designated as "high interest," "of interest," or "interest undeter-
mined."494According to the Justice Department, this new category of
"special interest" cases involves an alien who "might have connections
with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activities in the
United States." '495 Following the September ii attacks, Chief U.S. Immi-
gration Judge Michael Creppy issued a directive requiring that all pro-
ceedings in any case designated by the Executive to be a "special
interest" case to be closed to the public, press, and family members of the
alien.4 6 No entry for the case is even to be placed on the docket.4" "In
short, the Directive contemplates a complete information blackout along
both substantive and procedural dimensions."
498
A circuit split has developed as to the constitutionality of the Creppy
Directive and the government's use of secret deportation hearings. The
489. Dep't of Justice, Statement of Barbara Comstock, Dir. of Public Affairs, Regarding the IG's
Report on 9/1I Detainees, June 2, 2003, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2oo3/June/o3_opa-324.htm.
490. Id.
491. Stephen Dinan, Ashcroft Wants Powers Expanded to Fight Terror; House Panel Scolds Jus-
tice's "Dubious Actions," WASH. TIMES, June 6, 2003, at As.
492. Alden, supra note 470, at so.
493. North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002). At least one
commentator has suggested that secret hearings were used for all of the September iI detainees that
were deported. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 962 (2002).
494. IG REPORT, supra note 450, at 5.
495. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3 d at 202.
496. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3 d 681, 683-84 (6th Cir. 2002).
497. Id. at 684.
498. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3 d at 203.
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Sixth Circuit, in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,499 held that the First
Amendment guarantees the public and the press a qualified right of ac-
cess to deportation hearings-a right that can be overcome only if the
government's invocation of secrecy can withstand strict scrutiny." Ap-
plying the two-part "experience and logic" test for determining First
Amendment rights of access elaborated in Richmond Newspapers,"°' the
Sixth Circuit found that: (I) "deportations proceedings historically have
been open"; °2 and (2) that public access serves a vital role in acting "as
perhaps the only check on abusive government practices" "[i]n an area
such as immigration, where the government has nearly unlimited author-
ity."5" Because the Creppy Directive imposed a blanket rule of secrecy
without individualized showings of need or any standards, the Directive
was not narrowly tailored."4
The Third Circuit reached, in a 2-1 decision, the opposite conclusion
in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft.5"5 Also applying the Rich-
mond Newspapers test, the court held that: (i) open deportation hearings
have not reached the level of an "unbroken, uncontradicted history"'"6;
and (2) the positive role that public access may play is countervailed by
the negative effect on national security it may have through the possible
disclosure of sensitive information.
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in these cases, it is not
clear if or when the circuit split will be resolved. The number of "inter-
est" aliens has dwindled after most have been deported,50 8 so it is not ap-
parent if future cases challenging the Directive will arise.
From the standpoint of the public domain, the Creppy Directive is
suspect in two respects. First is the way in which it was adopted in secret
and outside the public domain. The Directive was not a public order or
499. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
500. Id. at 705.
5oi. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (198o) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The Court later described the experience and logic test as follows:
First, because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience, we
have considered whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and
general public.... Second.... the Court has traditionally considered whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.
Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. s, 8 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (internal quotation and cita-
tion omitted).
502. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701.
503. Id. at 704.
504. Id. at 710.
505. North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2002).
506. Id. at 201.
507. Id. at 202.
508. "As of June 13, 2002, only seventy-four remained in custody." Center for National Security
Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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regulation, but rather a secret directive that instructed immigration
judges not to disclose its content.5" The Executive thus authorized secret
proceedings by a directive that itself was initially secret, even further re-
ducing the possibility of public scrutiny of its content or the practice it
authorized.
Second, the Creppy Directive allows deportation proceedings to be
removed from the public domain based on an ad hoc, unwritten system
of classifying aliens that the IG later determined was arbitrary in classify-
ing "many aliens who had no connection to terrorism..5.. In seeking se-
cret deportation hearings, the INS simply relied on law enforcement's
initial determination of "special interest" status which, in the end, was an
arbitrary procedure with few standards or safeguards. "-
Although neither the Sixth nor the Third Circuit had the benefit of
the IG Report when deciding the constitutionality of the secret deporta-
tion hearings, I believe the Report provides considerable support for the
Sixth Circuit's analysis. As the court noted, deportation hearings have
been presumptively open from their creation in the first immigration act
in 1882, which only required closure of exclusion hearings."' Since 1965,
INS regulations have contained an express provision providing that de-
portation hearings are to be presumptively open."3 Although exceptions
have been allowed to close deportation hearings, the majority of "experi-
ence" in our immigration laws has allowed open hearings."4
509. The directive is now in the public domain through its revelation in litigation. See Memoran-
dum from Michael Creppy to All Immigration Judges and Court Administrators, Sept. 21, 2001 (on
file with author).
510. IG REPORT, supra note 450, at 70, 158.
511. Id. at 5.
512. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 3o3 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002). The distinction between ex-
clusion (before entry into theUnited States) and deportation (after entry) is supported by the Supreme
Court's case law. Aliens seeking entry into the United States with no ties to the United States are not
"persons" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and therefore have no claim to due process.
See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598-99 (1953). Aliens who have gained entry into the
United States do, however, have a right of due process. See Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454,
464-65 (192o). Even the Third Circuit acknowledged that "[t]he Supreme Court has consistently held
that persons facing deportation possess far greater legal rights than those contesting exclusion." North
Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 211 n.8.
513. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2003). Under the regulation, hearings for abused alien children are re-
quired to be closed, and in other cases the immigration judge has discretion to close the hearing to pro-
tect "witnesses, parties, or the public interest." Id.
514. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701-03. The Third Circuit found that "the tradition of open
deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access,"
apparently elevating the standard to proof for "experience" to an "unbroken, uncontradicted history"
of open access. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 211 12. But this standard of an "unbroken, un-
contradicted history" appears to limit dramatically the Supreme Court's formulation of the "experi-
ence" prong. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. I, io (1986) (Press-Enterprise 11) (finding the
experience of open preliminary hearings, notwithstanding fact that several states allowed closed hear-
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The IG's Report substantiates the compelling "logic" of openness in
deportation hearings to ensure that the proceedings are conducted fairly
and properly, and to inform the public of the administration of govern-
ment.5 Even without the benefit of the IG Report, the Sixth Circuit rec-
ognized the inherent flaws in the Creppy Directive: "By the simple
assertion of 'national security,' the Government seeks a process where it
may, without review, designate certain classes of cases as 'special interest
cases' and, behind closed doors, adjudicate the merits of these cases to
deprive non-citizens of their fundamental liberty interests."'' This make-
shift, standardless use of secrecy has essentially no checking mechanism
to prevent unwarranted attempts to keep hearings secret. The IG Report
confirms the worst of the Sixth Circuit's fears-that, without any estab-
lished standards or procedures, the government's categorization of "in-
terest" aliens was essentially arbitrary or based on mere speculation."7
While some extreme situations may perhaps necessitate some level
of secrecy in deportation hearings, strict scrutiny should be required on a
case-by-case basis before departing from the presumptively open depor-
tation procedures.' The problem with the Creppy Directive is that it
seeks a mandatory rule of secrecy based on the government's mere invo-
cation of a "special interest," all of which occurs behind closed doors.519
The public cannot know how the vague standard is being applied, and
whether properly, much less the propriety of the government's conduct
in deporting the individual. The Creppy Directive allows the government
to "selectively control[] information rightfully belonging to the people"
based on the government's mere invocation of a "special interest."'52 Un-
der this regime, "no real safeguard on [the government's] exercise of au-
thority exists. '
ings upon proper showing); In re The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1332
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J.) ("A historical tradition of at least some duration is obviously necessary.").
515. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 703-04.
516. Id. at 71o.
517. Id. at 692 ("[N]o definable standards used to determine whether a case is of 'special interest'
have been articulated.")
518. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692-93; North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308
F.3d 198, 228 (3d Cir. 2002) (Scirica, J., dissenting); see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. i,
13-14 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II).
519. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710 ("The directive is over-inclusive by categorically and com-
pletely closing all special interest hearings without demonstrating, beyond speculation, that such a clo-
sure is absolutely necessary.").
520. Id. at 683. For example, the government conceded that three secret hearings challenged in
Detroit Free Press did not involve any information that threatened national security. Id. at 709.
521. Id. at 71o.
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(ii) Secret Proceedings for Enemy Combatants
When the government seeks to take away people's liberty during
criminal investigation, the normal criminal procedures would require
formal charges to be made against the individuals in a public proceed-
ing, 22 the allowance of the individuals to exercise their Sixth Amendment
right to counsel (and the provision of such counsel if necessary), 23 and
the eventual opportunity for the individuals to face the charges of the
government and offer a defense at a public trial with a jury of their
peers." 4
These public criminal procedures help to ensure that the govern-
ment's prosecution of individuals is subject to the crucible of public scru-
tiny. An open court proceeding supplies critical information that enables
people to scrutinize and evaluate the administration of justice.5 Without
such information, people would have no way to evaluate the govern-
ment's conduct in arresting, detaining, putting on trial, and punishing in-
dividuals. But to further the goals of democratic governance, the
Constitution requires that criminal trials be open to the public. A
criminal trial is a "public thing" to which the public must be guaranteed a
right of access. 27
Within two months of the attacks of 9/11, the President instituted
different rules to allow for the expanded use of the concept of "enemy
combatant" to hold individuals in secret detention without allowing for
access to legal counsel or the courts."' The government continues to hold
522. See Mallory v. United States. 354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 344-47 (I943).
523. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963).
524. U.S. CONST. amend. vi.
525. See supra note I68 and accompanying text.
526. Id.
527. These public proceedings contrast with the secretive processes of the Star Chamber in Eng-
land. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (discussing Star Chamber).
528. On November 13, 2001, the President issued an order allowing for the detention of non-
citizens as enemy combatants and trial by military tribunal. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2oo). Because the order does not apply to U.S. citizens, the President's designa-
tion of Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, two U.S. citizens, as enemy combatants may not fall within the
Nov. 13, 2001 military order, but some other unspecified assertion of executive power. See Amanda
Schaffer, Comment, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-Depth Analysis of the Govern-
ment's Right to Classify United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try
Those Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1465, 1479-81 (2003).
Courts have held that the President's use of enemy combatant status against U.S. citizens was author-
ized by Congress's general enactment following September i i that authorized the President to "use all
necessary and appropriate force" against persons involved in the terrorists attacks. Hamdi v. Rums-
feld, 316 F.3d 450, 467 (4 th Cir. 2003). petition for cert. filed, No. 03-6696 (U.S. Oct. I, 2003); see Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. I8, 2001).
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two U.S. citizens, Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla,529 and many other non-
citizens53 in secret detention as enemy combatants. In so doing, the gov-
ernment seeks to keep the detention of the individuals outside the
normal, and predominantly public, criminal process. Although the gov-
ernment has the putative power to prosecute enemy combatants in a
military tribunal, up to this time the Administration has used its enemy
combatant designations of U.S. citizens not to prosecute, but to hold
them indefinitely.
531
Hamdi was captured during the fighting in Afghanistan and has been
detained at the Naval Station Brig in Norfolk, Virginia since April
2002.532 The Fourth Circuit ruled that the President as Commander in
Chief has the constitutional power to hold Hamdi in secret detention
without formal charges and without access to counsel, because Hamdi
had been "captured in a zone of active combat in a foreign theater of
529. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460; Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
530. On June 23, 2003, the Administration announced that President Bush had designated a third
enemy combatant, Ali Saleh Kahlah AI-Marri, who allegedly was an Al Qaeda operative and part of a
plan to wage a second round of attacks against the U.S. A1-Marri has been held since December 2001,
at first as a material witness and then on charges of credit card fraud and lying to the FBI. A1-Marri, is
a Qatari citizen and Saudi native, who was living in Peoria, Illinois with his wife and five children. The
government has claimed that an Al Qaeda detainee revealed that AI-Marri is "an Al Qaeda sleeper
operative who was tasked to help new Al Qaeda operatives get settled in the United States for follow-
on attacks after 9/i1." When Al-Marri was first arrested, the government allegedly had evidence that
AI-Marri had made calls to an associate of a top Al Qaeda financier linked to the September I I at-
tacks, that Al-Marri possessed stolen credit card numbers to fund terrorist activities, and that Al-Marri
had audio lectures from Bin Laden, prayers in Arabic to protect Bin Laden, and photos of the Sep-
tember iI attacks. See Josh Meyer, Suspect Is Declared an Enemy Combatant, L.A. TIMES, June 24,
2003, at At. The government is also holding an untold number of people captured in Afghanistan as
enemy combatants at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id.
531. As of July 2003, the government has used the criminal process, and not military tribunals, to
prosecute individuals for terror related offenses. John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen and the so-called
"American Taliban" who was caught in the fighting in Afghanistan, pleaded guilty to two federal of-
fenses for aiding the Taliban and carrying explosives. See "I Made a Mistake in Joining the Taliban";
Apologetic Lindh Gets 20 Years, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2002, at As. The attempted "shoe bomber" Rich-
ard Reid also pleaded guilty to federal charges for attempting to blow up a plane on Dec. 22, 2001. See
"I Am an Enemy of Your Country"; 'Shoe Bomber' Pleads Guilty, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2oo2, at At. In
the first post 9/15 terror case to be decided by trial, a jury convicted two men of being part of a "com-
bat operational sleeper cell" for Islamic terrorists, but acquitted a third defendant of being a part of
the terrorist cell. See Robert E. Pierre & R. Jeffrey Smith, Jury Splits Verdict in Terror Trial: Two Men
Convicted in Alleged 'Sleeper Cell' Plot; One Is Acquitted, WASH. POST, June 4, 2003, at Alo. On July 3,
2003, the U.S. government announced that it may try six suspected Al Qaeda terrorists by military tri-
bunal at Guantanamo Bay. See John Mintz, Six Likely to Face Military Tribunals; Captives Tied to Al
Qaeda, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, July 4, 2003, at Ai. Two of the suspects are British citizens, while one is
Australian. See Glenn Frankel & John Mintz, Two Britons, Australian Among Six Facing Trial; U.S.
Tribunal Process Questioned, WASH. POST, July 5, 2003, at As3.
532. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 460; A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, supra
note 143, at 3 n.i.
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conflict. 5 33 In such case, the court must "avoid encroachment into the
military affairs entrusted to the executive branch."5" Although upholding
Hamdi's detention, the Fourth Circuit expressly declined to issue any
judgment about the government's detention of a U.S. citizen who was not
in a zone of combat at all, but was apprehended on American soil.535
That issue is raised by the Padilla case.536 Padilla was arrested in Chi-
cago on a material witness warrant that was carried out by federal agents
on May 8, 2002.537 Subsequently, the President designated Padilla as an
enemy combatant and the Department of Defense took custody of him,
detaining him at the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston, South Caro-
lina. 5 On June 10, 2002, in a hastily called news conference from Mos-
cow, Attorney General Ashcroft announced the arrest of Padilla, whom
the government alleged was attempting to make a "dirty bomb" in the
U.S with some connection to Al Qaeda.539 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld
explained Padilla's detention outside of the "normal [criminal] proce-
dure" as necessary to gather intelligence from Padilla.54° In denying a ha-
beas petition filed on Padilla's behalf, Judge Mukasey held that the
President has the constitutional authority to designate Padilla as an en-
emy combatant, although the court reserved judgment on whether
Padilla was properly classified as an enemy combatant.
A number of scholars have called into question various aspects of
the Executive's attempt to use enemy combatant status and military tri-
bunals in its war on terrorism.5 42 The main constitutional issue concerns
whether the defendant's constitutional rights are being violated by
treatment as an enemy combatant outside the criminal process with its
traditional safeguards. Another issue, and the one I will focus on here,
concerns the denial of the public's rights of access to what may be subject
matter that, by its nature, should be within the public domain or open to
the public through the criminal process. In criminal prosecutions, the ac-
533. Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 459.
534- Id. at 473
535. Id. at 465.
536. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
537. Id. at 568-69.
538. Id. at 571; A.B.A TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS, supra note 143, at 3 n.2.
539. James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Ai; Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 573.
540. Padilla. 233 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
54 . Id. at 596.
542. See, e.g.. Katyal & Tribe, supra note 144, at 1268 (arguing that the President's use of enemy
combatant status and military tribunals is unconstitutional because it violates a structural constitu-
tional restraint that requires "the concurrence of all three branches ... [to] decisively alter anyone's
legal rights"); Koh, supra note 144, at 339 (noting that president's military order undermines the con-
stitutional principle of separation of powers).
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cused has a Sixth Amendment right to a public trial,43 while the public
enjoys a First Amendment right of access to such proceedings. 44
A court must therefore determine whether the person being de-
tained by the government should be properly treated as (i) a criminal de-
fendant within the public safeguards of the criminal process, or (2) an
enemy combatant within the secret military process. The government's
use of secret military procedures would be unconstitutional if a court
found that the Executive wrongly categorized someone as an enemy
combatant or improperly used secret military procedures against the in-
dividual. Such government action would be unconstitutional for a num-
ber of reasons, including the denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial or other criminal proceeding, and the denial of the
public's First Amendment right of access to what should be a proceeding
open to the public.
In reviewing the government's designation of an enemy combat-
ant,545 the court must test the legal sufficiency of the government's desig-
nation to see if "there is some evidence to support [the] conclusion that
[the individual] was, like the German saboteurs in Quirin, engaged in a
mission against the United States on behalf of an enemy with whom the
United States is at war. ' ' ,, 6 Even if the government's factual allegations
are supported by some evidence, a court could find that the allegations
are legally insufficient to support the conclusion that the individual is an
enemy combatant . 47
Without attempting to decide these issues firmly or finally, I think
the strongest case for the government's recent designations of enemy
combatant status was made against Hamdi. Hamdi's capture in the field
of battle during a war makes the government's claim to application of the
543. U.S. CONST. amend. vi.
544- See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,492 (975).
545. The government has conceded that the President's discretion to designate a person as an en-
emy combatant is not unfettered or unreviewable. The government's proposed standard of review is
that the President's designation should be upheld as long as the government provides "some evidence"
to support the designation. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 451, 474 (4th Cir. 2003); Padilla, 233 F.
Supp. 2d at 6o8. I will not attempt to evaluate whether this is the proper standard. Assuming it is the
proper standard, the key is defining what constitutes an enemy combatant or the indicia of being an
enemy combatant.
546. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 6o8. The Supreme Court in Quirin provided the following exam-
ples of enemy combatants: "The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging
war by destruction of life or property[.]" Ex parte Quirin, 3 17 U.S. , 31 (1942).
547. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 472 (Deference to the Executive's designation "does not preclude us
from determining in the first instance whether the factual assertions set forth by the government
would, if accurate, provide a legally valid basis for Hamdi's detention under that power[.]").
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laws of war and status of enemy combatant quite powerful. According to
the government affidavit, Hamdi received weapons training from the
Taliban and was captured in Afghanistan with the Taliban while carrying
an AK-47 rifle.154 These circumstances strongly support the conclusion
that Hamdi was an enemy combatant: someone who was engaged in a
mission against the United States on behalf of an enemy with whom the
United States is at war. Like the German saboteurs in Quirin, Hamdi was
captured during circumstances that provide substantial indicia of in-
volvement with an enemy of the United States.549 Where, as in Hamdi,
the putative combatant is caught on enemy soil during war while armed
with foreign weapons and serving with an enemy force, the designation
of enemy combatant deserves considerable deference (as the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded).5
Padilla's designation, however, presents a closer question, at least
under the unsealed version of facts presented in the opinion. Unlike
Hamdi, Padilla was apprehended on United States soil, in Chicago, with
much less indicia that Padilla was engaged as an enemy combatant in a
war against the United States. The government apparently did not be-
lieve that Padilla was a member of Al Qaeda, only that he was "closely
associated" with the group, having received some training from Al
Qaeda and having discussed with one senior Bin Laden lieutenant in Af-
ghanistan the possibility of detonating a "dirty bomb" within the United
States.5 ' Apparently, the government did not allege that Padilla had ac-
tual possession of any explosives or Al Qaeda material at the time of his
arrest. Unlike the individuals in Quirin or Hamdi, Padilla was not cap-
tured during circumstances or with physical evidence (such as a gun,
ammunition, explosives, or enemy material) that would readily indicate
that Padilla was fighting in a war against the United States.5 '
Courts reviewing the Padilla case553 should attempt to define more
concretely the indicia that support (or not) the government's designation
of enemy combatant. In Quirin, the indicia of enemy combatant were
readily apparent: (i) German citizens during World War 11 (2) entered
548. Hamdi, 316 F.3 d at 46i.
549. Cf Quirin,317 U.S. at 2I.
55
o
. Hamdi, 316 F.3 d at 460-62.
551. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
552. Cf Qurin, 317 U.S. at 36-37 (noting that individuals were enemy combatants when "acting
under the direction of the armed forces of the enemy"); id. at 37-38 ("Citizens who associate them-
selves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter
this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Conven-
tion.").
553. The district court reserved judgment on Padilla's case pending his submission to contest the
government's showing. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 61o.
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the United States with German military uniforms that were later dis-
posed and (3) with explosives and (4) large sums of money from the
Germans (5) allegedly to blow up installations in the United States.54
However, in Milligan, the indicia were lacking: a U.S. citizen-whom the
military alleged was part of a secret society that conspired to steal weap-
ons and overthrow the government during the Civil War-was captured
in Indiana, not in one of the Confederate states. 555 As the Supreme Court
concluded, even if Milligan "had conspired.., to assist the enemy" while
in Indiana, the facts did not support the conclusion that he was an enemy
combatant," or "a part of or associated with the armed forces of the en-
emy. '57 At least on the information that has been revealed, Padilla's case
seems closer to Milligan than Quirin. Padilla apparently was not captured
with physical evidence tying him to Al Qaeda forces, whether it be
money, Al Qaeda material, or explosives. Greater scrutiny should be ap-
plied to determine what was the precise nature of Padilla's alleged in-
volvement with Al Qaeda. The absence of an alleged agency relationship
would militate strongly against an assertion of enemy combatant status.
From the perspective of the public domain, the government's desig-
nation of enemy combatants is suspect to the extent that any individuals
are improperly classified as enemy combatants when they should be
treated as criminal defendants and subject to public criminal proceed-
ings."" The government's use of enemy combatant status in the cases
made known to the public is less suspect, however, than the govern-
554. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 7-8, 21.
555. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,6-7 (4 Wall) (1866).
556. Id. at 131; see Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44.
557. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
558. A related issue arises when the government uses criminal procedures against a terror suspect,
but then attempts to keep parts of the proceedings or evidence secret. The government's case against
Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen and the alleged "twentieth hijacker" who was supposed to be a
part of the September I I attacks, has spawned considerable controversy with the government's at-
tempt to keep parts of his case secret and to prevent Moussaoui from interviewing a witness Ramzi
Binalshibh, who was captured in Pakistan and who allegedly told the U.S. government that Moussaoui
was not a part of the September i i plot. See Jerry Markon, Court Seeks Deal on Terror Witness Access,
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2003, at A12. Judge Brinkema ordered that the government allow Moussaoui to
depose the witness. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 512 (4 th Cir. 2003) (dismissing gov-
ernment's appeal for lack of jurisdiction). Judge Brinkema also expressed great concern about the
government's attempt to use a "shroud of secrecy" in prosecuting the defendant. See United States v.
Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21266379 (E.D. Va. Apr. 4, 2003) ("The Court... is dis-
turbed by the extent to which the United States' intelligence officials have classified the pleadings,
orders and memorandum opinions in this case; and further agrees with the defendant's skepticism of
the Government's ability to prosecute this case in open court in light of the shroud of secrecy under
which it seeks to proceed."). The government refused to comply with Judge Brinkema's order, setting
up the possibility of a dismissal of the case but appeal by the government or perhaps attempted trans-
fer of the case to a military tribunal. See Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Prosecutors Defy Judge, WASH.
POST, July 15, 2003, at Ai.
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ment's designation of 750 or more "special interest" alien cases. Unlike
the alien cases, the government has publicly revealed the identities of the
putative enemy combatants shortly after the President designated them
as enemy combatants (although not the identities of those combatants
captured in Afghanistan and detained in Guantanamo Bay). Moreover,
courts have scrutinized the Executive's designation of two U.S. citizens
as enemy combatants with individualized review of each case. The same
cannot be said for "special interest" deportations, which involved secret
deportation hearings of individuals whose identities have not been dis-
closed and whose designations were not subject to any individualized re-
view under the Third Circuit's decision.
c. Expansion of Secret FISA Surveillance
I will end this Article as I began, with the secret world of FISA, a
statute that establishes an exceptional apparatus for the government to
conduct secret electronic surveillance of individuals in this country. FISA
carves out a rare space in our democracy in which the public domain
simply does not exist. Absent a right of access to any FISA related in-
formation, people must ultimately place blind trust in the government
that it is not misusing its FISA powers, whether by conducting FISA sur-
veillance for illegitimate purposes or by making misrepresentations in its
submissions to the FISA Court. Blind trust is normally not the quality we
expect of an informed citizenry in a democracy, but perhaps in this rare
case we can tolerate it. The government may have a compelling need to
use extreme, secretive measures when attempting to surveil agents of a
foreign power who may be engaging in espionage. But, as the FISA
Court's first published opinion revealed, there are dangers to depending
on blind trust. Lost amid the Administration's public hailing59 of the
FISA Court of Review's decision to absolve the government from using a
"wall" in FISA minimization procedures was the stark fact that the FISA
Court had found that government agents had submitted numerous false
affidavits in the past to obtain FISA searches of individuals in the United
States. Because FISA operates outside of the public domain, we may
never know the full details about these falsehoods or the government's
explanation for making them. But the incident should shake at least
some of our confidence in blind trust.
In this light, the government's expansion of its FISA powers under
the USA PATRIOT Act s6° ("PATRIOT Act") and the Administration's
559. See David G. Savage & Henry Weinstein, Court Widens Wiretapping in Terror Cases, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2002, at As.
56o. Under the PATRIOT Act, some of the changes to FISA are slated to sunset on Dec. 31, 2005.
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 15 Stat. 272, 295 (2001). One can expect a major battle in Congress over
whether the changes to FISA should be made permanent.
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contemplation of even greater expansion in a follow-up act being drafted
by the Justice Department should provide reason for pause. The
PATRIOT Act amended FISA to allow electronic surveillance as long as
a "significant purpose" of the surveillance is to gather foreign intelli-
gence from a person suspected of being an agent of a foreign power."'
This marks a change from previous case law that recognized that it was
impermissible for the government to use a FISA search if its primary
purpose was to conduct a criminal investigation of the suspect.6 In such
case, the government was required to satisfy the more stringent require-
ments of Title III (the Federal Wiretap Act).
The PATRIOT Act also amended FISA to allow greater types of se-
cret searches against U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. FISA
now allows the government to obtain the secret use of pen registers and
trap and track devices (that can monitor the numbers dialed by a phone
and the numbers of incoming calls) against individuals, based on a certi-
fication by the government that the information sought is "relevant to an
ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clan-
destine intelligence activities." ''6 FISA also authorizes the government to
conduct "roving surveillance" of a suspect's communications regardless
of location, phone, or email.' 64
In perhaps the most controversial provision of all, FISA now author-
izes the government to require any entity or person to produce "any tan-
gible thing" -apparently, including someone's library and computer
records-as part of an investigation "to protect against international ter-
rorism or clandestine intelligence activities., 5 There is growing public
concern that the government could use this authority to search the li-
brary and computer records of U.S. citizens without their knowledge and
with few, if any, safeguards built into the system.56 Under the prior pro-
vision, FISA only authorized limited production requests upon a showing
of "specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person
to whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
561. See 50 U.S.C. § 18o4(a)(7)(B) (2ooo), amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 1o7-56, §
218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
562. See supra notes 1-12.
563. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(i), amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 214, 115 Stat.
272, 286 (2001). Prior to this change, FISA did not allow such secret searches; instead, the government
had to use the standard criminal procedures for obtaining a pen register. See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2);
American Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22-23 (D.D.C. 2003).
564. 50 U.S.C. § 18o5(c)(2)(B), amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 206, 1I5
Stat. 272, 282 (2001).
565. Id. § t86i(a), amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287
(2001).
566. See Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA PA TRIO T Act's Application to Library Patron Records,
29 J. LEolS. 283, 288 (2003).
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power. ',, 6, Under the new provision, the government need not allege any
such facts or connection to a foreign power by the target of the surveil-
lance. FISA imposes a gag order on any libra y or person served with
such a production request by the government FISA would thus allow
for the government to keep its searches of a person's library or other re-
cords entirely secret, without any notice to the individual or opportunity
for public scrutiny. Although the provision forbids the government's use
of surveillance against a person "solely upon the basis of activities pro-
tected by the first amendment of the Constitution, '56 it is difficult to see
how an affected party could challenge an illegal search if the search is
kept entirely secret. Attorney General Ashcroft has indicated, however,
that as of September 2003, the government had not undertaken any such
FISA search of a person's library records. 7°
The Justice Department is now contemplating even further expan-
sions of FISA, a fact that was only revealed through the efforts of the
nonprofit watchdog the Center for Public Integrity. 7' FISA has defined
"agent of foreign power" for U.S. citizens to require that the person be
suspected of engaging in clandestine intelligence gathering for a foreign
power, "which activities involve or may involve a violation of the crimi-
nal statutes." 7 The Justice Department has proposed removing any limi-
tation to criminal activities: what the U.S. citizen is doing could be
perfectly legal, and the proposed amendment to FISA would still allow
secret electronic surveillance of that person.5 73 The Justice Department
has also proposed expanding the definition of "foreign power" to include
a single person suspected of being engaged in such activities. 74 While the
government has proposed this provision out of a concern for a "lone
wolf" terrorist, this contemplated provision may allow for indiscriminate
surveillance of U.S. citizens who have no real connection to a foreign
country, government, or entity-which was the essential animating force
of FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as originally en-
acted.575
567. American Civil Liberties Union, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
568. 50 U.S.C. § 186i(d), amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat.
272, 287 (20O0).
569. Id. § i86i(a)(i), amended by USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272 ,
(2001).
570. See Dan Eggen, Patriot Monitoring Claims Dismissed, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at A2.
571. See The Center for Public Integrity, http://www.publicintegrity.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2003).
572. 50 U.S.C. § I8oi(b)(2)(A).
573. Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 § 102, at http:/lwww.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/
downloads/StoryoI.o20703_Doc.i.pdf (proposed USA PATRIOT Act II) (draft Jan. 9, 2003).
574 Id. § ioi.
575. See Alison A. Bradley, Comment, Extremism in the Defense of Liberty?: The Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the USA PATRIOT Act, 77 TUL. L. REV. 465, 489 (2002).
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While the government may have legitimate reasons to seek to ex-
pand its secret FISA powers, any such expansion comes with inherent
dangers. Expanding the scope of the government's powers to engage in
secret surveillance and searches through secret, ex parte procedures nec-
essarily reduces the scope of information in the public domain related to
the government's conduct. People have no rights to access anything
deemed by the government to be related to FISA surveillance. In fact, in
FISA's entire twenty-five-year history, none of the thousands of people
who have been subjected to covert FISA surveillance has ever been
granted the opportunity to review the affidavits the government used to
obtain the search through the ex parte procedures of FISA. We have
countenanced FISA's secret procedures and searches in our democracy
only as an exceptional procedure, separate from the criminal process,
that was necessary to serve national security interests. These exceptional
procedures were thought an improvement on the abuses of the past in
which the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover conducted completely unregulated
"black bag" operations on people whom the government viewed as sus-
picious based on "national security grounds," such as the civil rights
leader Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr."76
The danger in expanding FISA's secrecy measures is transforming
the exceptional procedure into the standard, prevailing practice, thereby
displacing the traditional safeguards of the criminal process. Even before
the Patriot Act amendments, FISA appeared to be the government's
procedure of choice over Title III for obtaining electronic surveillance. In
1994, the government sought over 6oo FISA applications, 200 more than
it sought under Title III 7 During the period from 1978 through 1999,
the FISA Court approved 11,883 FISA searches sought by the govern-
ment, while not denying any. After the Patriot Act, it is more than
likely that the government will attempt to utilize FISA (over Title III)
even more.
I do not mean to suggest in any way that whenever the government
uses secrecy, there is reason to suspect that government agents are at-
tempting to skirt the law. It is my belief that probably in the good major-
ity of instances involving government secrecy we can expect that
government agents are faithfully carrying out the duties entrusted to
them within the letter of the law. The question is not, however, what my
576. See S. REP. No. 95-604(1), at 28 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3970, 3997. President
Nixon authorized extensive use of secret, unregulated electronic surveillance of suspected "subversive
groups," as well as his political adversaries in the Democratic Party. See Bradley, supra note 575, at
469.
577. See McGEE & DUFFY, supra note 3, at 329.
578. See Bradley, supra note 575, at 479.
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belief is, or even whether government agents are, on the whole, acting
properly. Rather, the question is whether a system of democracy can tol-
erate more and more things related to the administration of government
that do not ever fall into the public domain-whether because of the se-
cret procedures for FISA searches, enemy combatants, or "special inter-
est" deportation hearings, or because of a vague policy denying public
access to information deemed sensitive by the government. As the Court
has noted, "[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from
their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are pro-
hibited from observing.,
579
What is worrisome for our democracy is that the expansion of the
government's secrecy domain results in a corresponding shrinkage of the
public domain. Where the public domain does not operate, the govern-
ment controls the public's ability to access information that is necessary
to critique the administration of government. Under FISA, there is little,
if any, way for people to know if the government is carrying out unlawful
or unconstitutional searches against them, since the searches are con-
ducted in secret.58' Secrecy vitiates scrutiny and therein lies the danger
for democracy.
3. The Extinction of the Public's Domain?
Although we have not yet reached the stage of the public domain's
extinction, the current situation is precarious. The government has as-
serted the extraordinary power to remove things from the public domain
through intellectual property and government secrecy. If courts uphold
the government's assertion of power over the public domain, then, as de-
picted below in Diagram D, the government can pierce through the
buffer of the public domain (as depicted by the arrow in the center of the
diagram) and effectively deny the public's full access to culture, know-
how, and information-things that all once belonged to the people.
This piercing of the public domain upsets the careful checks and bal-
ances effectuated by the public domain. As depicted in Diagram C,"5I the
public domain is meant to serve as a restraint against government over-
reaching by creating a buffer zone in which the public is guaranteed not
only rights of full access, but also the ultimate control over the material.
The government's removal of materials from the public domain, how-
ever, enables it to invade the public domain, cutting off the public's right
of full access and usurping the power of the people. In such case, and in
579. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (i98o).
580. See Amy Goldstein. Fierce Fight Over Secrecy, Scope of Law, WASH. POST., Sept. 8, 2003, at
AI.
58I. See supra Diagram C.
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short order, the public domain will be lost. For if the public domain pro-
vides no restraint on government power, then the public domain does not
act as a buffer and simply drops out of the picture. And, then, we find
ourselves left with the exact same predicament as depicted earlier in
Diagram B, a society in which everything is potentially subject to gov-
ernment control.52
DIAGRAM D























582. See supra Diagram B.
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D. CAVEATS AND CONCERNS
i. Competing Views of the Public Domain
I have elaborated a conception of the public domain based on the
first principles on which the doctrine was established. I have traced the
development of the concept in the case law and its derivation from no-
tions of public rights and public property, focusing on those cases that
were pivotal in recognizing the concept. The public domain, as it was
originally understood, served as an important restraint on the govern-
ment's power to control public access to materials.
This is not to say that there is no competing view of the public do-
main. As evolution theory suggests, we may find competing doctrines
that vie to fill the same niche. There is a competing view that the public
domain imposes no substantive limit on government power and the gov-
ernment may therefore alter it at will183 The question, then, is which view
of the public domain is right. I believe the view that the public domain is
a substantive restraint is more faithful to Supreme Court precedent and
the first principles on which the public domain was established. I have
also attempted to show how and why this conception of the public do-
main is essential to democratic governance. But, as evolution theory
teaches, the soundness of this doctrine does not necessarily insure its sur-
vival. Ultimately, the survival of the concept of the public domain will
depend largely on the decisions courts make in cases involving the public
domain in the not too distant future. "Different rules" are threatening to
displace the principles on which the public domain is based.
2. Exceptions to the Rules Governing the Public Domain
One might also object to my use of categorical rules to describe the
public domain, for example, in my contention that Congress has no
power to remove material from the public domain through the grant of
intellectual property rights. It could be argued, however, that every rule
has exceptions, as suggested by my analysis of secret deportation hear-
ings that are permissible if justified by strict scrutiny. It could also be ar-
gued that catastrophes or emergencies, such as war, may necessitate
583. The government has asserted this competing view in defense of copyright restoration's re-
moval of thousands of works from the public domain. For support, the government offers sporadic
examples in which Congress purportedly removed material from the public domain by the grant of
intellectual property rights in the past. See Mem. in Supp. of Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Golan v. Ashcroft,
No. oI-B-I85 4 , at 3-4 (D. Colo. filed Apr. 29, 2003). For argument's sake, I'll assume that some of
these past examples are instances in which Congress removed material from the public domain. This,
however, says nothing about the constitutionality of the enactments. Nor does it vitiate the existence




departures or exceptions to the normal rules' 84 And the use of such ex-
ceptional procedures or measures may coexist with, instead of vitiating,
the ordinary rules. 
58
While it is true that legal rules sometimes have exceptions, and
emergencies may sometimes require them, exceptions are just that-
exceptions, and not the rule. Today's debate over the concept of the pub-
lic domain in copyright law is, however, not about recognizing an excep-
tion; it is about the very rule. The government has asked courts to
recognize the rule that it has a general power to remove works from the
public domain by the grant of copyrights, not in an exceptional circum-
stance, but in any circumstance. Likewise, in the context of government
secrecy, the government has asked courts to recognize that it has a gen-
eral power to hold secret deportation hearings not in an exceptional cir-
cumstance, but in any circumstance, since First Amendment scrutiny
does not apply at all, according to the government 86 Thus, whether or
not exceptions exist to the presumptive rule, what is at stake in these
cases is the very notion that the public domain acts as a restraint on gov-
ernment power under the Copyright Clause or First Amendment. To
embrace the government's view would mean that the public domain has
no significance as a legal doctrine and that the government can restrict
people's access to things in the public domain at will.
3. More Than Just Conclusions?
Like the categories of "public forum" in First Amendment law, 87 the
term public domain is open to the criticism that it is a conclusory or for-
malistic label that obscures the real issues in a case. This objection ap-
plies not just to my theory of the public domain, but to any theory that
supports the use of the term.
While I concede that labeling something "in the public domain" is a
conclusion, I do not believe this simple fact vitiates the importance of the
term. Legal conclusions often have important consequences for future
conduct. When the Court says facts, ideas, and other material or pro-
ceedings are all in the public domain, this conclusion carries important
ramifications beyond a single case. People know that for their future
conduct such subject matter is free for their unrestricted use. These cate-
gories of material are-as the traditional public fora of public streets and
parks are in the First Amendment context -indicators of areas in which
the public has important rights of access.
584. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Consti-
tutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1o1, 1058-69 (2003).
585. Id. at 1097.
586. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2002).
587. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 740-42 & n.i (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, the term "public domain" is not just a conclusion or an
empty label as may sometimes be the case with the more open-ended
term the "public interest." The public domain is a doctrine that has an
underlying theory or logic that helps to frame the analysis of different is-
sues involving intellectual property and government secrecy. When we
speak of the public domain, we are talking about a sphere in our democ-
ratic society that is ultimately meant to be beyond the government's con-
trol or interference. The doctrine gives us more than just the conclusion
that material is beyond government control; it tells us the reason why it is
beyond government control as well as the particular mechanism that
makes it beyond government control. When we deem something to be a
"public thing" or in the "domain of things public," we are affirming its
importance in our democratic form of government. When the public
owns it, no one has authority to take it away from the public because it is
so essential to democratic governance that all citizens must have access
to it.,
4. Oscillation Versus Punctuated Equilibrium
My use of punctuated equilibrium theory ignores other kinds of de-
velopment in the law. It is quite possible that the law develops in some
areas by oscillating between two different poles, such as increased gov-
ernment openness and increased government secrecy, or strong IP pro-
tection and a more balanced approach. I do not rule out the possibility
that such oscillation occurs. But this does not preclude the possibility that
the law faces punctuated equilibria as well. Ackerman's theory shows
quite convincingly, I believe, that major shifts in the law do occur in cer-
tain, punctuated moments. I have tried to sketch out above the reasons
why the concept of the public domain may now be facing such a moment.
The controversies in which the public domain is at issue challenge the
very notion that the concept has any legal significance at all. The choice
is not one of oscillation between different poles, but of the very existence
of the pole itself.
588. Perhaps to some the notion of public ownership may seem like an archaic notion. I believe,
however, it still has tremendous purchase today, particularly in cases that go to the heart of democratic
governance. It is evident in the Sixth Circuit's holding that the Creppy Directive was unconstitutional,
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3 d at 683 ("When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls
information rightfully belonging to the people."), as well as in Fifth Circuit's recent decision holding
that municipal codes are in the public domain and owned by the people, Veeck v. Southern Bldg.
Code Congress Int'l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ("[Plublic ownership of the law
means precisely that 'the law' is in the 'public domain' for whatever use the citizens choose to make of
it.").
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5. No Natural Legal Selection
Finally, the analogy I have drawn to evolution is not perfect. For if it
were, we would be helpless to stop the "different rules" imposed by ca-
tastrophes or the extinction of doctrines they caused. Extinction of doc-
trines would occur as a natural process.
Unlike in evolution, however, the "different rules" in the law are
created by intentional acts of human beings-Congress passes a law, the
Executive issues an order, and courts render a decision. At each level,
the decision to adopt a "different rule" is always one that involves the
possibility of rejecting the rule. Congress could have decided against re-
moving works from the public domain by the grant of retroactive copy-
rights. The Executive could have decided against the use of secrecy in
detaining U.S. citizens outside the criminal process or in deportation
proceedings against aliens. And courts have the power to reject a "differ-
ent rule" that is unconstitutional or, where ambiguity in the rule exists, to
interpret it in a way so as to avoid constitutional difficulties. "Different
rules" need not-indeed, should not-be allowed to displace the consti-
tutional principles of the public domain under the Copyright Clause and
First Amendment.
It is not inevitable, I hope, to cede the public domain to the pres-
sures caused by the government's attempt to expand its zone of secrecy,
remove works from the public domain, or deprive the public access to
things once considered public. In the law, at least, a catastrophe can be
avoided. The question then is whether we have the will to avoid it.
CONCLUSION
The concept of the public domain has never been more the subject
of debate. Today's debate is seriously flawed, however. First, it has ig-
nored the origin of the concept and the historical development of the
term from the twin concepts of publici juris and public property. Un-
moored from its origin, the public domain becomes in today's debate an
empty shell, a figment that people see and grasp only on the surface.
Second, the debate focuses primarily on copyright law and almost exclu-
sively on intellectual property law to understand the concept of the pub-
lic domain. This copyright-centric view of the public domain ignores the
many uses of the public domain in other areas of law involving govern-
ment secrecy.
This Article attempts to correct these two major flaws, first, by trac-
ing the historical development of the concept of the public domain and,
second, by examining the interrelationships among the various uses of
the public domain in IP and government secrecy cases. Drawing upon
evolution theory as a framework, I have proposed a unified theory of the
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public domain that shows the parallel origin, structure, and function of
the various uses of the public domain in IP and government secrecy
cases. By dispersing power among the people and according everyone a
right of free access, the public domain serves as a constitutional restraint
on the government's power to control the public's access to culture,
know-how, and information. Whatever lies in the public's domain be-
longs, by definition, to the people and is, therefore, off-limits to govern-
ment control.
Under this understanding of the public domain, there are reasons for
concern about recent measures adopted by the government that ad-
versely affect the public domain. These have occurred in both the context
of IP, where the government has asserted the power to remove thou-
sands of works from the public domain, and in the area of government
secrecy, where the government has withdrawn increasingly more infor-
mation and its own conduct from the purview of the public domain, post-
9/rI.
What we are now witnessing may very well be the extinction of the
public domain as we know it. Just as in nature where superior organisms,
best-fitted to the environment, may become extinct in a sudden, "catas-
trophic" moment, so too a superior doctrine that is best-fitted to democ-
ratic governance may become extinct in a catastrophic moment that
imposes "different rules" on what is necessary for survival. For the public
domain, these "different rules" are not of the positive kind as they are in
Bruce Ackerman's concept of a "constitutional moment," which is de-
mocratic-enhancing because effectuated by "We the People." The mo-
ment we now face is, by all measures, democratic-disabling: The
government asserts the power to shrink the public domain (by removing
thousands of works from the public domain) and the power to skirt it (by
shifting its conduct from the purview of the public domain to the domain
of secrecy). If the government's view prevails, and courts recognize a
general power in the government to remove material from the public
domain, the government can control the public's access to culture and
know-how, just as it can control the public's access to information related
to the administration of government. The public's domain would then
become the government's domain, where everything is ultimately subject
to government control.
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